
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
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
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


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
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
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THE INSTITUTION

The Institution is situated opposite the Horse Guards in Whitehall. It provides Members with a comfortable reading room containing the leading papers, periodicals and principal Service (including foreign) Journals.

There is a Lecture theatre where lectures are given followed by discussions in which officers of every rank are encouraged to take part.

Members can obtain on loan four volumes at a time from the best professional library in the Country. They are provided with a free copy of the JOURNAL.

There is a private entrance to the celebrated R.U.S. Museum in the former Banqueting Hall of old Whitehall Palace.

MEMBERSHIP

Commissioned officers of all H.M. Services, including those of the Dominions and Colonies, also Midshipmen of the Royal and Dominion Navies, the R.N.R., R.N.V.R. and R.N.V.S.R. are eligible for membership without formality.

Naval, Military and Air Force Cadets are eligible on the recommendation of their Commanding Officers.

Ladies whose names appear or have appeared in the official lists as serving or having served as officers in any of the three Services are eligible.

Officers' messes are not eligible for membership, but may subscribe to the JOURNAL.

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The rates of subscription are :—

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Annual Subscription	1	10	0
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or four yearly instalments of	6	6	0 each.
Covenanted Life Subscription—seven yearly instalments of	3	12	0 „

Full particulars of membership with alternative forms for bankers' orders, and for deeds of covenant enabling the Institution to recover income tax, can be obtained on application to the Secretary, R.U.S.I., Whitehall, S.W.1.

The JOURNAL is published in February, May, August and November. Copies may be purchased by non-Members, price 7s. 6d. Annual subscription, £1 10s. post free. Orders should be sent to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.1.

MUSEUM

The R.U.S. Museum is open daily from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., except on Sundays, Christmas Day and Good Friday. Members may obtain free passes for their friends on application to the Secretary.

Members of the Services in uniform are admitted free.

SECRETARY'S NOTES

May, 1951

ROYAL VISIT

Her Majesty Queen Mary visited the Royal United Service Institution on the afternoon of 28th April. Her Majesty was received by Admiral Sir Henry Moore, the Chairman of the Council, and was conducted to the Banqueting Hall.

After admiring the restored panels of the Rubens Ceiling and showing great interest in the Museum exhibits, Her Majesty expressed her gracious appreciation and signed the visitors' book.

COUNCIL

Chairman of the Council

Admiral Sir Henry Moore, G.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., has been re-elected Chairman of the Council for 1951.

Vice-Chairman of the Council

General the Lord Ismay, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O., M.C., has been re-elected Vice-Chairman of the Council for 1951.

Elected Members

The names of Members elected to the Council at the Anniversary Meeting will be found in the Report of the Proceedings at the end of this JOURNAL.

Representative Members

Captain W. K. Edden, O.B.E., R.N., has succeeded Captain R. G. Onslow, D.S.O., R.N., as Admiralty Representative on the Council.

Ex-Officio Members

Captain R. A. Currie, D.S.O., R.N., has accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex-officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Director of the Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich.

Honorary Members

General M. Ayub Khan has accepted the invitation of the Council to become an Honorary Member (Pakistan).

STAFF

The following appointments have been made by the Council :—

Captain (S) E. Haslehurst, C.B.E., R.N., as Librarian with effect from 2nd April, 1951.

Lieutenant-Commander P. K. Kemp, R.N., as Assistant Editor of the JOURNAL with effect from 12th March, 1951.

NEW MEMBERS

The following officers joined the Institution between 1st February and 30th April, 1951 :—

NAVY

Midshipman C. P. O. Burne, R.N.
Lieutenant The Hon. T. L. E. Lowther, R.N.
Lieutenant-Commander W. D. S. White, R.N.
Lieutenant-Commander W. J. P. Roberts, R.D., R.N.R.
Commander D. G. King, R.C.N.

ARMY

Major H. F. W. Fox, M.B.E., Royal Artillery.
Major J. H. Trigg, Royal Engineers.
Lieutenant William Holmes, F.R.G.S., late 1st Bn. The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment and R. of O. (South Africa).
Lieutenant G. H. F. Reynolds, R.A.S.C.

Lieut.-Colonel G. J. Hamilton, D.S.O., The Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Captain A. J. Jackson, Royal Signals.
Captain D. L. Ormerod, M.B.E., The Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Major A. A. Locke, W.R.A.C.
Major Harbans Lal, Army Ordnance Corps, I.A.
Major W. A. S. Rough, late The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment, and R.A.F.
Captain R. Wheen, Royal Artillery.
Captain R. A. L'Estrange, Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant I. G. B. Goad, The South Wales Borderers.
Captain E. G. M. Pearce, 135 Survey Engineer Regiment (T.A.).
Major E. L. Butler, M.C., The South Staffordshire Regiment.
Lieutenant M. M. Makgill-Crichton-Maitland, The Gordon Highlanders.
Lieut.-Colonel S. E. Thomas, late R.F.A. (T.A.).
Captain D. R. Freeman, Royal Engineers.
Lieut.-Colonel J. H. M. Hackett, D.S.O., O.B.E., The Sherwood Foresters.
Captain B. H. J. A. O'Reilly, R.A.S.C.
Captain M. P. Sandbach, W.R.A.C.
Lieut.-Colonel E. P. Townsend, D.S.O., 6th Gurkha Rifles.
Lieut.-Colonel E. N. Oldrey, O.B.E., Royal Artillery.
Captain R. H. Hollies-Smith, late 1st King's Dragoon Guards.
Captain C. E. Eberhardie, The Royal Norfolk Regiment.
Lieutenant D. R. C. Carter, The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment.
Major J. A. T. Fisher, Royal Engineers.
Captain A. G. Evans, The York & Lancaster Regiment.
Captain E. I. Windsor Clive, Coldstream Guards.
Captain Fazl-I-Raziq, Royal Pakistan Engineers.
Captain M. P. Carr, The King's Shropshire Light Infantry.
Lieutenant B. J. H. Chapman, Royal Artillery.
Captain C. N. Clayden, The Middlesex Regiment.
Major P. Forsyth-Forrest, XII Royal Lancers.
Major C. Robinson, Royal Signals.
Colonel A. De. G. Best, O.B.E., late Royal Engineers.
Captain A. P. Bird, R.A.S.C.
Major D. J. S. Duthoit, The Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire Regiment.
Captain K. W. Hocking, R.A.S.C.
Major M. D. W. Elphinstone, T.A.R.O. (The London Scottish).
Captain J. W. Hilder, R.A.S.C.
Brigadier H. M. Curteis, M.C., Highland Light Infantry.
Captain W. A. MacIntosh, Royal Canadian Artillery.
Major M. A. G. Osmany, Pakistan Army.
Captain P. I. Laughton, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders.
Captain G. M. Birse, Royal Engineers.
Major T. W. Daniel, M.B.E., Royal Artillery.
Major B. A. Fargus, The Royal Scots.
Captain A. M. L. Hogge, 3rd The King's Own Hussars.
Lieut.-Colonel M. Aslam Khan, M.C., F.F. Regiment, Pakistan Army.
Captain C. F. J. G. Flint, The South Staffordshire Regiment.
Major K. S. Garewal, Corps of Signals, Indian Army.
Captain I. R. Mackrill, 3/4 County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters) (T.A.).

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Flight Lieutenant D. J. Nicholson, R.A.F.
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Flight Lieutenant D. H. Tew, R.A.F.
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Squadron Leader A. C. Langdon, R.A.F.
Flying Officer B. Brownlow, R.A.F.
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Flight Lieutenant P. J. Evans, R.A.F.
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Squadron Leader A. Hindley, A.F.C., R.A.F.
Flying Officer J. E. D. Roberts, R.A.F. Regiment
Wing Commander W. E. Wolsey, R.A.F.

PRIZE MEMBERSHIP

On the recommendation of the President, Royal Naval College, Greenwich, the following officers have been awarded five years free membership of the Institution :—

Second Lieutenant (Acting Lieutenant) G. G. W. Brace, Royal Marines.
Second Lieutenant (Acting Lieutenant) J. F. Mottram, Royal Marines.

On the recommendation of the Commandant of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the following officer has been awarded five years free membership of the Institution :

Second Lieutenant N. J. M. Phillips, R.A.S.C.

COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Council hope that many more Members will support the Scheme for Covenanted Subscriptions, details of which have been circulated to all Members.

This materially assists the Institution because it enables Income Tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription.

To date, there are 1,532 Annual and 778 Life Covenanted Members.

Any Member who has not received his copy of the Scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

MUSEUM

His Majesty The King has graciously lent the following pictures from the Royal Collection for hanging on the main staircase to the Banqueting Hall :—

Charles I at his devotions.
Return of the Fleet from Spain with Prince Charles on board, 1623—by Vroom.
Inigo Jones—by Nogari after Van Dyck.

The Rubens Ceiling is back in its original setting, and the Banqueting Hall, which has been entirely redecorated and relighted, was reopened on 1st May.

A temporary Exhibition has been staged in the Lecture Theatre, and among exhibits not hitherto seen are new ship models, including the " Victory " and the " Illustrious " ; scale silhouette photographs in perspective showing events in the history of the Royal Air Force ; tableaux of lesser-known military scenes ; and a world map showing the Service Stations in 1851. An item of particular interest is a display of specially selected model soldiers provided by the British Model Soldiers Society.

The temporary Exhibition will remain open until September this year; there is no additional entrance charge to the public.

Additions

A Cromwellian spur (9506). Given by the R.A.S.C.

A model of H.M.S. "Renown," built by Captain R. F. Elkins, O.B.E., R.N., who was her Commander, 1940–42 (9507). Given by Captain R. F. Elkins, O.B.E., R.N.

A cutlass as issued to the Royal Navy in 1800 (9508). Given by The Royal Norfolk Regimental Association.

An engraving by L. Sullivan from a painting by W. Hogarth entitled "A Representation of the March of the Guards towards Scotland in the year 1745" (9509). Given by Lieut.-Colonel P. S. M. Wilkinson.

A pair of silver spurs, reputed to have been worn during the period of King Charles II, 1660 (9510). Given by the Imperial War Museum.

Full dress coat, dress trousers, cocked hat, epaulettes and belt of a Commander, R.N., of the period when this Order of Dress was last worn. It was abolished in 1950 (9511). Given by Commander J. H. C. Minter, R.N.

JOURNAL

Members are invited to offer suitable contributions for the JOURNAL. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of the War; also contributions of a general Service character, such as Strategic Principles, Command and Leadership, Morale, Staff Work, Naval, Military and Air Force History, Customs and Traditions.

The Editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers and, if found suitable, to obtain permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army Officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's Commanding Officer.

CHANGES OF ADDRESS

Members are particularly requested to notify any change of address which will affect the dispatch of the JOURNAL.

Naval Officers are strongly advised to keep the Institution informed of their address, as JOURNALS sent to them via C.W. Branch of the Admiralty are invariably greatly delayed.

CHRISTMAS CARDS

Owing to the big demand on Type B cards last year it was not possible to satisfy the later orders. Type B cards are available every year and Members may place a standing order if they so desire.

FOR SALE

The Strategy of the South-East Asia Campaign

Owing to the demand for copies of the above-named lecture by Admiral the Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, arrangements have been made for a reprint, with the appropriate pull-out map; price 2s. 6d., post free.



THE RUBENS CEILING

The centre panel of nine, painted by Rubens for the Ceiling of the Banqueting Hall, which houses part of the Royal United Service Museum

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THE COMMONWEALTH OF TO-DAY

By THE RT. HON. L. S. AMERY, C.H.

On Wednesday, 24th January, 1951, at 3 p.m.

VISCOUNT BRUCE OF MELBOURNE, P.C., C.H., M.C., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: It is my privilege to-day to preside at this Lecture to be given by Mr. Amery. He is going to give us his views with regard to the present position of what is now called the British Commonwealth of Nations. I know of no man who possesses the background which would enable him to judge of what point we have reached and where we are likely to go that is equal to that possessed by Mr. Amery.

In the old days when we were so proud of the British Empire no man played a greater part than Mr. Amery, and I do not know what your feelings are, but mine are of the most intensive interest to see how he will develop this quite absorbing subject.

LECTURE

A SHRINKING WORLD

THE subject on which I have been asked to speak is that of "The Commonwealth of To-day." I hardly suppose that you want me to give a geographical catalogue of its different elements or a statistical compendium of its resources, or even a detailed analysis of its constitutional structure. The most I can attempt to do is to give you some idea of those essential features of its character and outlook which have made it what it is, and in particular of those constitutional methods by which it has been built up, by which it is maintained to-day, and by which I believe its future permanence and strength will be assured.

In any case, it would be of little value if I spoke of the Commonwealth in isolation from the World in which it moves, lives, and has its being. It is a world which is not only a background and a framework to the Commonwealth, but a pressure chamber which is all the time conditioning the Commonwealth's own development. What is more, it is a playground of passionate emotions and violent forces which are all the time exercising their impact upon it. Therefore, I think that it may not be amiss if I begin by saying something to you about that outside world, and about the changes which it has been undergoing and is still undergoing at this moment.

The most significant aspect of that change is the tremendous shrinkage of the World as the result of the technical advances of the last century. It is a world which, for nations even more than for individuals, necessitates a complete revision of our ideas of distance, of magnitude and of importance. When I was at school I was thrilled by the adventurous exploits of Mr. Phineas Fogg who betted that he could

go round the World within eighty days. It would be a very leisurely person who required a week to go round the World to-day; a world in which the remotest ends can be visited in something like forty-eight hours; a world in which we can all talk to and at each other at the same moment; a world in which very soon, with the spread of television network, we shall be able to see whatever goes on anywhere at the time it is happening.

All that, of course, makes for closer intercourse and understanding. It also, unfortunately, increases the powers of marshalling and intensifying collective misunderstanding and collective hatred. It is a world which has enormously enhanced both the effect and the range of its weapons of destruction, not only of the atomic bomb but of many other kinds. One result of this is that to-day no nation is secure unless its vital centres of production and of government have elbow room to the extent of something like 1,000 miles from the nearest frontier with a potential enemy. Again, these same modern conditions mean an enormous increase not only in the monetary cost of defence, but in the standard of industrial strength and of resources in raw materials. In their turn those industrial resources and organized skill depend on mass production, and mass production means a large secure market and the control of raw materials.

All these various factors come to a common result, namely, that what were great nations until a little while ago are much too small to-day to be able to afford the luxury of an independent existence, The only nations which are in the true sense fully independent are nations like the United States of America or, of a very different type, the Soviet Republic. All this leads to instability and insecurity, and aggravates the dangers of war; and the question is what solution can we find to that problem of insecurity and instability?

A WORLD SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

There is one solution to which statesmen and writers have turned with enthusiasm and with hope ever since the 1914–18 War. I refer to the solution of some one world system, if not for all purposes of government, at any rate for the purpose of maintaining and enforcing peace. From the purely technical point of view there would be no difficulty to-day in complete world government. It is far easier to come here from New Zealand to-day than it was to come to Westminster from Scotland at the time of the Union. Aristotle once defined the maximum size of a democracy as one in which all the citizens could be addressed simultaneously by a single speaker. Well, the whole World can listen-in without difficulty to a Christmas Address from our own King or to a speech by Mr. Churchill. There are no technical difficulties in a one world system. All the same, the best may well be the enemy of the good. I am convinced, myself, that the attempt to by-pass evolution by jumping to a single world authority is a dangerous illusion and a blind alley more likely to prove mischievous than helpful to the cause of World peace. The reason for that lies in the very fact that men differ so profoundly on all those issues which underlie the question of peace and war.

Some form of ultimate world government is an ideal which we should keep before us. Even at the present moment there are many subjects of universal interest, not touching intimately the sovereignty of nations, which can only be satisfactorily regulated by international agreement. They are matters like postal arrangements, mercantile shipping conditions, and such questions as arrangements to deal with those world food problems to which you, my Lord Chairman, have devoted so much

attention. But when it comes to the question of machinery which will not only take decisions, but enforce those decisions, on the questions of peace and war, I do not believe that any such machinery on a world wide basis can be made to work, for the simple reason that it demands at any rate some basis of ultimate agreement as to what is right and what is wrong; what constitutes aggression and what constitutes being the victim of aggression.

In the World as it is to-day, in the eyes of a Communist all action by a non-Communist power for its own defence is aggression, all action for the extension of Communism is not aggression. There is a further ideological issue dividing the World. It is the long resentment of Asia against foreign domination. It is very difficult for the peoples of Asia to look upon any Western interference in the East, however justified on United Nations principles, as being without the taint of aggression on the part of the West. Further, the more you spread responsibility the less responsibility there is, and that is one of the weaknesses of a world-wide organization in which everyone is inclined to leave ultimate responsibility to someone else.

We have seen that in the case of the League of Nations. The members of the League cheerfully voted for sanctions against Italy over Abyssinia, first, because Mussolini was not very popular and, secondly, because Italy was believed to be peculiarly vulnerable to economic pressure. When she proved less vulnerable than was thought and when Mussolini showed his teeth, the League collapsed. From that moment it was dead, and the only result of it all was to drive Mussolini into Hitler's camp and bring war nearer.

I am not sure that over the Korean problem the United Nations are not following precisely the same path. They cheerfully voted for military sanctions against North Korea because on the whole its members disliked Communism, because most of them wished to be in the good graces of the United States and, above all, because it was assumed that North Korea was not a formidable military power and could easily be dealt with by the United Nations Forces. The moment there emerged behind the North Koreans the actuality of Chinese aggression and the shadow of war behind that, the whole outlook of the United Nations began to change. Incidentally it is interesting to notice that the elements which were most vociferous in demanding the execution of the principles of the League of Nations over Abyssinia are the very elements that now call for prudence and caution in applying those principles against China, and even try to find justification for Chinese action. In any case it is worth while remembering that it was only due to the accidental absence of Russia that the Security Council were able to act. That accident will not be repeated.

The Security Council of the United Nations is dead and defunct. Attempts to use the Assembly are already beginning to come up against the difficulties of post-ponement and evasion. It looks very much as if over this Korean business we are beginning to see the end of the United Nations as a body of any real effective power in influencing the issues of peace and war. All I would say is that I earnestly hope that the continued co-operation between the British Commonwealth and the United States in dealing with the realities of a difficult and dangerous situation may not be impaired by divergence of outlook over the procedure of what, in my opinion at any rate, is a moribund institution.

A NEW BALANCE OF POWER

Is there then no constructive alternative? Is there no way out except armed preparation between two irreconcilable camps? I think that there is. I believe it

consists in following the natural course of evolution from smaller to larger units, and in the development of a new system of balance of power between nation groups. Such a system would consist of nations whose identity of outlook and whose community of interests, geographical, economic or historic, do make them really unities; and, at the same time, unities large enough to be able effectively to develop their resources and, if need be, to defend themselves, either singly or in combination, against any threat from some particular overgrown, over-ambitious power. Such a solution does not give an absolute guarantee of world peace, but it does take us a long way. Unities large enough to be self-sufficient have little inducement to attack their neighbours. They can live reasonably securely by virtue of their very size and their resources. Security, moreover, as our island example has shown, is an important element in the development of political freedom. By the very complexity of their structure they tend to be more self-regarding than anxious to strike out upon the world outside. Above all, a combination of such units against a potential aggressor can constitute that natural balance of power upon which the peace of the World has habitually rested in the past.

Such unities already exist or are beginning to emerge. The United States can be classed, in spite of its rigid federal structure, as such a unit. Whatever we may think of the internal or external politics of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, they constitute another such unit. Potentially China and the Far Eastern Countries constitute another, as do the Latin Countries of South and Central America. But there are two units of more immediate importance to the peace of the World as a whole. The first of them is Europe—and by Europe I mean all those countries which were once part of Western Christendom, which have embodied in their life and culture the Greek love of political and intellectual freedom, the Roman devotion to law and order, and the Christian sense of the equal value of each human soul. All those factors have contributed to the life of what has hitherto been the leading group of nations in the World. I think that it was true statesmanship which led both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Marshall in their different ways to treat the re-emergence of Europe as a unit, as an essential need of the British Commonwealth, of the United States and of the World.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Influence in World Affairs

Necessary as Europe is to the peace of the World, I believe myself that our British Commonwealth is even more necessary. It is, for one thing, owing to its geographical distribution, interested in the peace of every region of the World. It is the one nation group which bridges all those differences of race and religion, which may be as much the main source of conflict in the World in the next generation as are Communism and non-Communism to-day. It can also mean much to the World as an example of how a group of nations too divided for actual rigid federation can still work effectively together.

I know quite well that there are many critics who will say "This is all very well as a picture of what might be, but in fact the British Commonwealth is far too scattered geographically, far too unorganized politically, and far too weak defensively to constitute a nation group which can really carry weight in World affairs." The critics will argue that the British Commonwealth came into existence, and has existed so far, by virtue of our undisputed command of the sea, and because Britain in her day was the richest and greatest industrial country in the World. Britain is that no longer. They might well add that this impoverished, overcrowded little Island is more

likely to be a liability than an asset to the other members of the Commonwealth when we regard its proximity to the greatest source of danger in Europe. It no longer enjoys undisputed command of the sea, still less of the air, which has, in some measure at any rate, superseded the command of the sea. Even if it maintains some sort of nominal existence it will be like that of the Holy Roman Empire which lingered on as a fiction for many centuries after it had ceased to be a reality in world affairs.

I believe the critics are wrong. Although there is much force in their criticism I think that they overlook the underlying spirit, the factors of tradition and sentiment, of outlook and of ideology which have kept the Commonwealth together so far, and which have seen it successfully through two World Wars. Unlike the so-called United Nations the British Commonwealth does not shrink back in the face of danger. However seemingly disorganized in quiet times, it instinctively draws together and becomes one when all it stands for is threatened.

Even so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, I believe that the critics underestimate the resiliency of this ancient nation of ours. We have often been down before. We have never been down and out. I doubt whether we have ever seemed so down as we were in 1783, when we lost our colonial Empire, when Ireland was, to all intents and purposes, an independent country, and when we were supposed to be overwhelmed by the burden of our debts. Yet within a few years we emerged triumphant from the long conflict with Napoleon, the arbiters of Europe and the undisputed masters of all the seas of the World. We seemed to be very down and out in the " Hungry Forties " when Chartist rebellion threatened and when it looked as if our industrial prosperity was over. Yet as a result of the great Californian and Australian gold discoveries, we found ourselves within a few years on the very crest of the economic wave. So I am not prepared to believe that this little Island, although down at the moment, is down and out yet.

Unity of Purpose and Mutual Understanding

So far as the Commonwealth is concerned, I think that we are inclined to forget that in spite of the complexity and looseness of its structure, it still has a certain underlying unity which runs through its history, and still has a deep instinctive appeal to its members when that unity is threatened. The Commonwealth, after all, is in one respect nothing more than the outward manifestation, under infinitely varied local conditions, of the British character and of certain social and political institutions which have developed in this Island. One element of the British character which has done much to create and maintain the Empire has been a certain natural adaptability and an instinctive preference for building on to that which already exists and dovetailing into local foundations, rather than imposing some new preconceived structure of our own. It is the spirit of compromise, and compromise means the toleration of others. It is a policy of live and let live and of seeing the other man's point of view which is the foundation of true justice. Above all, we have taken with us everywhere a certain political and social outlook which I might perhaps sum up in the two words " ordered freedom," We have always, since that great man William the Conqueror gave us a strongly governed country, believed in strong government ; a government which could enforce the law, but also a government which lived within the law. The reign of law has been the most characteristic feature of British civilization and that feature we have instinctively applied everywhere. Our government in India may have been bureaucratic, but it was always a government within the law, government under which every subject ultimately had the right of appeal to the courts of law against his governors.

With us at home, the principle that the law is above the government of the day and its Ministers, and can only be changed by consent of the community as a whole, has been the starting point of our whole system of Parliamentary government. That system was not without its difficulties. It led to frequent trials of strength between the executive government and the representatives of the communities in Parliament. It led in the XVIIth Century to civil war. In the end we found a way of harmonizing these difficulties in what we now know as responsible parliamentary government, the system under which the Crown selects as the rulers of the Country, men who will undertake to provide a majority in Parliament. It is essential to remember that our system in not one under which the people select a Parliament which then selects the government. Our elections turn not so much on electing particular parties as on electing the government already in office or the alternative team, and the majority in Parliament is elected with the primary duty of supporting the government which it then returns. I mention this because it has a very important bearing on the whole problem of the development of the Commonwealth.

That system was unfortunately not fully understood when the American Colonies revolted, or it might have avoided the great secession. The Americans themselves, when they set up on their own, framed their constitution on earlier British lines. When, however, the same kind of trouble occurred in Canada later it was an obvious solution to adopt the system of reponsible government there and in other colonies. In the first instance this was purely for matters which immediately interested the Colonies. But gradually—and this is the important point—there was not an element of national sovereignty which the young nations overseas wished to control themselves that was not freely and readily granted. In this way a centrally controlled British Empire was, in the course of the last century, transformed into an informal partnership of equals, which, so far as the older Dominions are concerned, was finally ratified by the 1926 Imperial Conference whose conclusions were subsequently put into legal shape in 1931 by the Statute of Westminster.

It was inherent in the nature of the Commonwealth and in the tradition which it had built up, that after this last war, India and her neighbours in Burma and Ceylon should have been admitted to share in the full and equal independence of the older Dominions. In doing that the other nations of the Commonwealth were prepared to concede that India's desire to retain Commonwealth partnership should be compatible with her desire also to regard herself as a Republic. For the rest of us the Crown has always been the legal and constitutional pivot around which our whole system has developed, as well as the symbol of all our loyalties and common ideals. But it was, I believe, wise to recognize that India, while accepting the King as the symbol of our free association, found it hard to endorse the legal and constitutional conceptions which spring from a history which she feels she had no part in shaping. More significant for the purposes of practical co-operation than the fact that India is a Republic or that Pakistan might become one, is that their type of government is still the British type of responsible Parliamentary government, and not a government of the type, say, of that of the United States.

That transformation of a centralized Empire into a free and equal partnership is perhaps the most remarkable thing which has happened in the last century of violence in international affairs. It will have been remarkable even if that partnership should now gradually dissolve. It will be far more remarkable and far more pregnant with good for its members and for the whole World if, as I believe, that partnership grows and prospers in strength and unity in the years ahead of us.

One of the factors which the critics of the Commonwealth overlook is that the centrifugal tendencies of the past have all naturally exercised their influence in a world which seemed to offer almost unlimited room for expansion—a world where, under the wing of the British Navy, each part of the Commonwealth could develop its independence in complete security and without regard for the possibility of danger from outside. To-day we live in a contracting and highly dangerous world, a world in which there is no prospect for any but the strongest nations or groups of nations of being able to stand alone. There are few nations to-day which can really be in any sense independent, unless they belong to some interdependent group.

When it comes to that there is no group in the World which offers more and asks for less than the British Commonwealth. It asks for no surrender of sovereignty, no restrictions upon the complete control by each nation of its national social, domestic and political life; but only for such measure of co-operation as the needs of the time ask from it. I remember in the 1914–18 War a very well-known cartoon by Bairnsfather. It showed a couple of "old sweats" crouching in a large shell hole, and one was saying to the other who seemed discontented "Well, if you know of a better 'ole you had better go to it"! There are few better holes than the British Commonwealth to go to to-day.

Co-operation and Flexibility

All the same, it is essential that a group like ours should be able to act effectively, not only when war has actually broken out, but in order to prevent wars coming about. For that co-operation, at any rate among nations which wish to preserve their independence, our type of government offers great advantages. We all attach importance to our own system of free and ordered government, but for the very reasons I mentioned earlier, this type of government makes possible effective co-operation between governments without asking for the sacrifice of any element of sovereignty. When the British Commonwealth governments come to an agreement, or some, if not all, of its members come to an agreement, they are in a position to implement that agreement; to "deliver the goods," in fact. Their position is very different from that of nations with a constitution like that of the United States where President Wilson, after having urged the Allied nations to create the League of Nations found himself repudiated by his own Country.

How effective this method of co-operation can be was shown in the 1914–18 War in the Imperial War Cabinets, as they were called, which met under the leadership of Lloyd George in 1917 to 1918. I had the privilege of acting as Secretary to those Cabinets, and I can say that they found no difficulty in working with all the decisive efficiency of a single national cabinet, yet retaining the full sovereign independence of each nation and the separate constitutional responsibility of its members to their Parliaments. So successful in fact were those meetings that it was decided at the time that the Imperial War Cabinet should be a permanent institution meeting at least once a year, and more often if required. That was the high watermark, in our day, of effective Commonwealth co-operation. There is no inherent difficulty in repeating that efficiency of co-operation whenever the nations concerned, some or all of them, feel that effective unity is essential in the interests of our common existence.

It is just that flexibility of our arrangements that keeps us together and will enable us to meet the needs of the situation when that situation demands more effective unity. This flexibility, incidentally, also makes it possible to co-operate more effectively and easily with other nation groups. It is easy for the British Common-

wealth to co-operate closely with the United States. It is easy for it to co-operate with Europe, not only for the purpose of defence, but also from the point of view of mutual trade. It is easy for us eventually to co-operate through Pakistan with the Middle East or through India with the nations of Eastern Asia. There is something in that flexible world-wide system of ours which may make it, if we survive, the nucleus of an ultimate world union coming about by a natural evolution and not by the hatching out of some mechanical paper constitution.

All that, however, is just a day-dream, as the critics might say, unless behind the structural unity and spiritual unity there are the material resources adequate for defence and for welfare. Well, the resources are there, but they have never yet been properly developed. The wealth and power are there if only we would make full use of our resources as the United States have made use of their resources in the last sixty or seventy years. I am old enough to remember when the United States were regarded as a secondary power, not only internationally but economically. The pundits thought it absurd that the United States should attempt to vie with British industry by protecting her own industry. The Americans disregarded the pundits. They concentrated their purpose upon the fullest development of the vast natural resources of the United States, and in the process built up the World's dominating economic power. There is no reason why within the next half century the nations of the British Commonwealth, working together—not like the United States under a single rigid economic system, but by mutual give and take, mutual priority and preference in every field of economic life—should not once again draw level with or even outstrip the United States. If that happened, then this British Commonwealth of ours, which to-day is a loose string of weak nations, none of them really strong enough to defend itself or lend much assistance to the rest, could become a world girdle of unbreakable strength to preserve its own peace and the peace of the World.

All this requires a strength of purpose which we have still to show—a strength of purpose in our own interests and also a conciousness of our mission in the World. It needs a more serious and a more strenuous outlook than in the past. The prosperity and security of the last century may well have engendered too complacent an outlook in our people here and overseas. We must somehow or other get rid of the easy assumptions engendered by that age. We must shake off " the obese, unchallenged old things that stifle and overlie us." The Victorian age has gone beyond recall. We are in many respects back where we were when young Queen Elizabeth ascended the throne, weak in many respects but with infinite possibilities before us. We need the sense of adventure of Drake and Raleigh and Hawkins, the sense of spiritual adventure which created Shakespeare and Spenser, the statecraft of Burleigh and of Elizabeth herself. Our appeal must be, again to quote Kipling :

> " Down from your heaven or up from your mould,
> Give us the hearts of our fathers of old."

DISCUSSION

LIEUT.-COLONEL C. GARSIA : So far as the British Commonwealth of Nations is concerned, it has now become an association of democratic nations which are not all British, and the word " Commonwealth " implies a constitutional entity which does not exist. It is an association of independent states, and I submit that the very words " British Commonwealth " do not accurately describe its function. If the words " Oceanic League " could be substituted, we should then have an accurate description, that is, of a number of nations all over the World—India, Pakistan, and so on—all recognizing the King as a symbol of free association for purposes of mutual benefit.

It could then be extended to include such countries as Holland, Belgium and France, and would leave the real British Commonwealth free to be what it always has been, an association of countries owing allegiance to the British Crown, and enable it to speak with one voice on vital international issues which it fails to do at present.

I should like to know whether the Lecturer does not think that this would be an improvement on the present arrangement.

THE LECTURER: I was speaking in favour of groups of nations which are united by something which keeps them together and maintains a common sense of responsibility; and one of those is that which is called the Commonwealth. I quite agree that no designation is perfect, but "Commonwealth" is a fine old word which goes back into the Middle Ages. It does not necessarily preclude the independence of its components. It indicates a common interest of all its members in the welfare of the whole. It is a difficult word and one which lacks an adjective. I have always called myself an Imperialist; I do not think that I have ever called myself a "Commonwealthist" or a "Commonwealther"! It is a word which is untranslatable into any foreign language, and one which very few foreigners, owing to the "w" and the "th," can pronounce. However, it is serving our purpose.

I think that the word "Oceanic" was suggested. Three hundred years ago Sir John Harrington suggested that our Commonwealth should be called Oceana, and that is an alternative. In any case we have to see whether we can make the Commonwealth a complete reality or not.

COMMANDER A. FEARN, R.N.: I should like the Lecturer's views as to whether those centrifugal forces, to which he referred and which I gather he thinks are not wholly desirable, at any rate when complicated by our troubles to-day, could not be overcome by a greater devolution of authority within the Commonwealth itself. What I am thinking of concerns the administration of our Colonial Empire. With all the many social and economic problems facing us in the Colonial Empire to-day I do feel that the Colonial Office—and I am not saying this to its discredit—has more on its plate than it can really cope with. Cannot we bring in various Commonwealth Countries and give them greater responsibility in those matters on a regional basis?

For example, could not the West Indies or the Western part of them, with the consent of the natives, which I think would be readily forthcoming, be administered by Canada? Canada has always taken an immense interest in that part of the world and has done much more there than we ever have. I think that the Canadians, and the Colonial Office too, would probably welcome the idea, and I feel sure that the natives would consent.

Similarly as regards the Middle East and the Suez Canal. On the Council of the Canal itself there are 32 directors, 10 of whom are British. Why could not one of the three representatives of the British Government come from a Dominion Government? Although this is not the place to argue it, I can see considerable advantages in a New Zealander, an Australian or a Pakistani being a member of that Council.

Is it not possible now to control these "centrifugal" forces and make them more "integrated"? It is rather like the management of a large estate or firm. A man builds up a family business, his sons grow up and gradually take over certain departments and you have a board of directors and so on. As the concern progresses it is necessary to decentralize the authority and management.

THE LECTURER: I think that there is much in your suggestion which has appealed to me. It is thirty years since I negotiated a Commercial and Shipping Treaty between Canada and various West Indian colonies, and I have often discussed this question of closer union of the West Indies with Canada. But hitherto the difficulty has been that the West Indians were not prepared to come under Canada merely on the colonial footing. If they were to come under Canada at all it would be with complete equality with the Canadian provinces. That involves from Canada's point of view a change in the racial composition of that country, which Canadians themselves are somewhat cautious about. So there are certain difficulties in the way of a complete integration of Canada with the West Indies, however much we might desire to bring about closer co-operation.

Many years ago I suggested to our chairman that the Pacific colonies might be merged into a single joint administration, under Australia, New Zealand and ourselves. But somehow or other, faced with the detailed practical difficulties, that project never quite came to anything. Undoubtedly the conception of closer regional interest of different parts of the Commonwealth with each other is very important. I was reading the other day a speech I delivered in Melbourne in 1913, on the duty of Australians to take a more lively interest in the Colonial Empire and more particularly in India. To-day we find Mr. Menzies taking infinite pains on his way to the Prime Ministers' Conference to stay in Delhi and in Karachi in order to keep in closer touch with Indian opinion. So your idea is moving in the direction in which you wish it to move.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN WINTERTON: The Lecturer referred to his conception of groups of nations. I should like to ask the Lecturer whether, in his conception, he sees one country belonging to more than one group, because Great Britain, for example, seems to belong strategically to the West European Group, as well as to the Commonwealth Group.

THE LECTURER: I do believe that the flexibility of our system makes it possible to work with more than one group. A federation is by its nature exclusive. If Europe is to be rigidly federated on the American plan we could not be part of that federation. At most we could be a good neighbour as Canada is to the United States. Under our flexible system it is easy to co-operate. There is no difficulty on such questions, for instance, as economic preferences. It may not be possible for us to go inside a European tariff, but it is quite feasible to have the Commonwealth giving some second preferences to Europe, and Europe similar preferences to the Commonwealth, without impairing the preferences which we give to each other. In the same way we are vitally concerned in the defence of Europe and play our part in that without subtracting from the demands of the Commonwealth. If Europe fell into enemy hands nothing could be more dangerous to the whole Commonwealth, because Europe lies right across the communications of the Commonwealth.

There is no difficulty in our working with other groups and working more particularly with the group of the region in which one or other of our members belongs.

VICE-ADMIRAL T. BAILLIE-GROHMAN: I understood the Lecturer to describe the British Commonwealth, very aptly it seemed to me, as an expression of the British character. Out of his great experience, would he tell us whether and to what extent he considers the British character is likely to be undermined by the coming of the Welfare State and, if so, how does he think we can best counteract this state of affairs.

THE LECTURER: I think that the British character can suffer a good deal of temporary undermining without being permanently impaired. When you think of what the ordinary poor people of London faced up to under bombing during the War, I do not think you can say that the essential fibre of these people has been in any way weakened. A bit of temporary easy-going does not sink very deeply into the character.

THE CHAIRMAN

If there are no more questions I should now like, on your behalf, to express our deep gratitude to Mr. Amery for the extremely interesting and stimulating address which he has given us this afternoon.

I think that one of the things which appealed to me the most was when, after describing how the World has contracted, he said we have all to be linked up with something. Believe me, that is becoming more and more evident even to the different Dominions of this ancient Empire and in the Commonwealth of ours. I have seen it time and again. I see the representatives of these countries in their international capacity as independent nations, and they are all grasping more and more that they have to be linked with somebody.

Looking back over the years one cannot help thinking of the position of the old Empire. Of course, as Mr. Amery pointed out, we had the Navy to protect us. We have lived in complete comfort and security, and in the process we developed and some of us became arrogant, while others suffered through an inferiority complex. I may say that Australia

belongs to the arrogant class! Perhaps the United Kingdom suffered from the fault that they always said "Yes" to all the Dominions however unreasonable they were being, and we might have got on better if there had been a United Kingdom government which stuck its jaw out a bit more and told the Dominions precisely where they got off! Nowadays the Dominions cannot shelter behind the British Navy. They have to play their own part and take steps to ensure their security, which will be found within this great group of nations.

I am sure I am expressing the wishes of every member of this audience in conveying to Mr. Amery our very sincere thanks for his address to us this afternoon. (*Prolonged applause.*)

MAJOR-GENERAL WALSHE: May I, on your behalf, express to Lord Bruce our great appreciation that he should have come here to-day. He is an exceedingly busy person and the fact that he should have found time to come has been both a great pleasure and a great honour to us. (*Applause.*)

GOLD MEDAL AND TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY, 1950

By Major W. G. F. Jackson, M.C., R.E.

SUBJECT

" The smaller our forces become the more difficult it is to maintain their proper balance. Would it therefore be better to aim at balance within the total forces maintained by ourselves and our Allies, accepting, if necessary, a lack of balance within our own forces ?"

IN the past, the United Kingdom has been chary of entrusting her vital interests to the chances of international politics. History and our natural instinct for independence have taught us to beware of relying too steadfastly on allies, however faithful they may appear at the moment. Our position as a World Power has been maintained in the last resort by the strength and quality of our own balanced forces. The changes now facing the Free World are such that no Western Power can follow this policy any longer. Our limited resources, the possibility of losing the Cold War through overburdening our ecomony with heavy defence expenditure, and the certainty of losing a shooting war if we do not combine effectively with our Allies, have already compelled us to go a long way towards surrendering the traditional balance of our forces.

Since the terms of reference of this paper were published, we and the other Atlantic Treaty Powers have announced our acceptance of the principle of collective balance. The aim of this paper is to review the reasons for this drift from our traditional policy; to consider the factors that limit the extent to which collective balance is either desirable or possible; and, finally, to apply the general principles thus evolved to the forces of the United Kingdom to show what they may mean in practice.

THE NEED FOR COLLECTIVE BALANCE

If we look back over the last one hundred and fifty years, it may seem strange that we should consider abandoning a policy which has served us so well. During that time, three serious attempts have been made by a single Power to achieve World domination. Napoleon, Imperial Germany and then Nazi Germany were all defeated by Grand Alliances. In those wars each ally provided a balanced contingent. Though Supreme Commands were established in the two World Wars, it was not found necessary to attempt collective balance. Why, then, has collective balance now become desirable ?

There are three reasons for this change. The first is economy. The expense of modern equipment has become so great that very few nations, if any, can afford balanced forces. The Cold War tactics of World Communism led by Soviet Russia aim to profit from poverty and low standards of living. One of the best ways of discrediting such methods is to raise the standard of life in all non-Communist countries. This can only be done if the weight of defence expenditure is kept as low as possible. A policy of collective balance helps to achieve this economy. Secondly, unless the load of defending the Free World is evenly distributed between all the Allies, the countries nearest the Iron Curtain may decide that the odds against them are too great, and that Communism is better than destruction. Thirdly, accepting collective balance appears to be the only way in which the Western World can match the integrated forces of Soviet Russia and her satellites.

Economy

By accepting collective balance the Free Nations are enabled to pool their resources, reduce their overheads and adopt the principle of "The best man for the job." This may not always accord with the history or traditions of individual nations. For instance, the Dutch by tradition are a sea-faring nation and have always spent far more on their Navy than on their Army. But, if Western Europe is to be defended, nations bordering the Iron Curtain should put the largest possible ground forces into the field as soon as a war starts. Dutch sea communications with her overseas possessions can be left safely to the protection of the American and British fleets. Every man that Holland does not need for internal security in her overseas territories should face East on land. Similarly, we, in the United Kingdom, are proud of the efforts of Bomber Command and are firm believers in strategic bombing. The defence of Western Europe, however, demands that fighter defences and tactical air forces must be in a high state of readiness to meet the initial air and land assault. We might well leave strategic bombing to the United States, who are not immediately threatened by land or short-range air attack.

Sharing the Load.

The problem of equalizing the load between the Free Nations is best illustrated by a short analogy. A blast furnace consists of a steel outer casing with a heat resisting inner lining of fire brick. The fire brick alone has no strength, and the steel casing by itself would melt. Yet together they can contain the great heat and pressure within the furnace. The World can be divided into similar casings or rings surrounding the Soviet Union and her satellites. The Inner Ring contains the countries bordering the Iron Curtain—Western Europe including Great Britain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Persia, South-East Asia and Japan. The Outer Ring contains the Americas, Africa, Pakistan, India, Australia and New Zealand, and possesses comparative security from attack. Pakistan and India have been included in the Outer Ring because they possess the security afforded by the Himalayas. In the early stages of a war, the Outer Ring countries are unlikely to be attacked on land and they possess ample depth for early warning of air attack. The Inner Ring will provide the battlefields of a shooting war. If the Inner Ring is to bear the brunt of destruction and devastation, its people must be certain that the Outer Ring will play its part at once and not several years later. The Outer Ring must be firmly committed from the start, and must make great efforts to provide men and equipment to balance the losses which the Inner Ring must suffer. The acceptance of collective balance is a major step towards giving the Inner Ring the confidence it needs, not only in an ultimate Allied victory, but also in immediate support if war breaks out.

Military Strength

Though the forces of Russia and her satellites appear overwhelming, the total resources of the West compared with those of the East show a very favourable balance.

	Atlantic Powers only	*U.S.S.R. and Satellites (excluding China)*
Population	340	270 million
Steel production	110	30 million tons
Coal production	790	400 million tons
Electric power	470	100 billion kilowatt hours

The resources of the East, however, are welded into one homogeneous machine, whereas those of the West are still scattered and devoted to narrow national interests. If the great resources of the West are to be effective, they must be properly organized. We must make the best use of our potential and, in particular, of the secure centres of production of the Outer Ring. Collective balance offers one of the best ways of achieving the cohesion needed.

Summary

To sum up, then, a degree of collective balance is essential in order that :—

(*a*) The Free World can avoid defeat in the Cold War by keeping its standard of living high, without prejudicing its chances of survival in a shooting war.

(*b*) The Inner Ring countries, particularly in Western Europe, can be given confidence not only in ultimate Allied victory, but also in immediate help from the Outer Ring.

(*c*) The scattered resources of the West can be effectively combined to match the integrated forces of the East.

THE LIMITS OF COLLECTIVE BALANCE

There are four major disadvantages to collective balance. History casts doubt upon the reliability of alliances in long term planning. The sovereignty of individual states must be infringed. Secure sea communications and sufficient merchant shipping are essential for any workable scheme of collective balance, but our sea lanes have been in jeopardy in both World Wars. Finally, there is the difficulty of making the large organization required work efficiently. We must study these disadvantages in turn to determine the reservations needed to make the policy of collective balance both workable and acceptable to individual governments.

History

From the historical point of view there are a number of reasons for distrusting alliances in long term planning. Probably the most important are the effects of the policy of balance of power and the natural rise and decline of great nations. Both have been responsible for the continual regrouping in international politics and the instability of alliances. We need not go back far in history to find examples. During the Napoleonic wars, few people would have believed that one day we would be the ally of France and the enemy of Germany. More recently, few people in the 1930's could have guessed that, by 1939, Nazi Germany was to become the Ally of Communist Russia, though there was less surprise when the position was reversed in 1941.

The misfortunes of war have had an equally disastrous effect on long term Allied plans. In 1939, we depended on the French forces in many parts of the World, but by 1941 we had lost their assistance. There is a risk of similar reverses in the future, because any aggressor, faced by a Grand Alliance, will attempt to defeat the Allies in detail.

Alliances always possess the seeds of their own disruption. In free countries ruled by parliamentary governments, war is rarely declared unless the country's vital interests are at stake. If an aggressor chooses the issues skilfully, it is often possible to prevent some members of an alliance from entering the conflict. In 1914, Germany just failed to prevent Great Britain from entering the European struggle but, in 1938, Hitler succeeded at Munich. To-day there are the seeds of disagreement amongst the Western Powers. Divergent policies in the Far East and differences over Germany may still be skilfully used by the Soviet Union.

Have there been any changes in international relations which might upset the lessons of recent history? The natural rise and decline of great Powers is bound to continue; misfortunes of war will still deprive us of Allies upon whom we have depended; clashes of vital interests will still occur; but are power politics, based on balance of power, still the main spring of international relations? In the present East-West conflict, religion, not balance of power, is the driving force. The religion of Communism is attempting to convert the World by force. The World has drifted back through the centuries, in which the balance of power held sway, to the days of the Wars of Religion of the XVth and XVIth Centuries. The position to-day shows many striking similarities to the wars waged by the Catholic Church against the rising power of the Protestants, and the wars waged to stop the Moslem advance over Europe. Religion rather than the balance of power was the driving force in those wars. To-day, the Free World faces the aggressive religion of Communism. All the bitterness, cruelty and uncompromising faith in a creed, which were characteristic of the Wars of Religion, are present again to-day.

During the Wars of Religion very few states changed sides voluntarily. There were many forcible conversions, but, as nations were welded together by religious ties, alliances were more stable. To-day we should be able to place greater faith in countries who possess the same beliefs as ourselves. It is, however, difficult to tell which countries are firmly anti-Communist. In deciding this, we should bear two factors in mind. First, if a country is close to the Iron Curtain, it may be converted forcibly before help can reach it. Secondly, a country may fall to internal attack if it contains well-developed Communist cells and is fertile ground for Communist expansion due to low standards of living. We should avoid accepting collective balance with any country which falls within these categories.

If these conditions were accepted rigidly, most of the Inner Ring would be debarred from any system of collective balance because most of its countries are vulnerable to forcible conversion. Since one of the reasons for collective balance is the physical and moral strengthening of the Inner Ring, we cannot accept such a restriction in toto. The vulnerability of these countries must, however, be borne in mind so that the loss of any one of them does not throw the forces of the Free World out of balance. It should be possible for the Inner Ring to rely firmly on the Outer Ring, but the Outer Ring should not depend on the Inner Ring to the same degree. For instance, the Inner Ring might concentrate on preparation for the initial defensive phase of a war foregoing units and equipment required for the offensive phase, whilst the Outer Ring might retain complete balance and develop the resources required for the build up and offensive phases.

Thus the first reservation, which we must make to the acceptance of collective balance, is that the degree of vulnerability of each country either to forcible conversion to Communism or internal Communist disruption must be taken into account, so that its loss will not upset the balance of the rest of our forces.

Sovereignty

Infringement of sovereignty is probably the greatest stumbling block to be overcome in making collective balance acceptable to individual governments. Some countries will have to accept the presence of foreign soldiers in their territory in peace. All governments will lose some degree of control of their own armed forces. In addition, each nation has defence commitments of its own which are not connected with the general East-West conflict.

The presence of foreign troops in a country need not present any unsurmountable difficulty, and has already been accepted in the case of the United States Air Force in the United Kingdom. But the problems of control of a nation's armed forces and its outside commitments are not so easy to solve. If a country's vital interests are endangered, its government will be forced to use all its resources to protect these interests even though it may not be in the common good to do so. A threat to a country's vital interests may well influence its decisions more than any agreement on collective balance. In 1940, we could not strip the fighter defences of Great Britain below a certain level to provide fighters for France. In 1942, we could not provide adequate forces in time to defend Malaya, because the security of Great Britain and the Middle East was threatened. In America there was the strong school of thought that Japan was America's first enemy, though the interests of her principal Ally, Great Britain, demanded the defeat of Germany first. To-day the United Kingdom and the United States consider the rearmament of Western Germany essential, but France considers the rebirth of the German Army a threat to her security. Apart from the idealists' dream of an effective political union of the Free World, there appears to be no way of avoiding such clashes of interest. Any scheme of collective balance must respect the vital interests of individual governments. If it does not, very few governments could accept the principle. Even if they were persuaded to do so, they would be unable to carry out their commitments once their security was threatened.

Besides their vital interests, most of the Western Powers possess other defence commitments which are important though not vital to them. They must consider their moral obligations to the peoples of their colonies and protectorates, and also the protection of their commercial interests all over the World. Though Great Britain may wish to concentrate her forces for the defence of Western Europe, she cannot abandon her commitments, say, in Malaya. Much as she might like to take the attractive course of handing over her responsibilities in South-East Asia to Australia, she must consider the wishes of the people of Malaya. Even if Australia were willing and able to undertake this task, it is very doubtful whether the Malayans would accept the transfer of power. Until Malaya achieves Dominion status, the United Kingdom must continue to maintain the security of Malaya. Should Malaya once more become a theatre of war, its protection may require forces from elsewhere in the Free World, but the command of these forces and the internal security of the Country must remain in the hands of the United Kingdom. The War in Korea affords a similiar example. The prestige of the United States would have been fatally weakened in the Far East if she had allowed the South to be absorbed by the North unopposed. Korea as a piece of territory was not vital to the defence of the United States, but it was the symbol of her determination to meet her moral obligations.

Thus to ensure that collective balance is acceptable to individual governments, each country's vital interests and moral obligations must be respected. The second reservation which we must make is that individual countries must be allowed to retain national balance in forces needed to *defend* their vital interests and to meet their moral obligations. The word defend has been underlined because unless applied strictly, this reservation would kill collective balance and bring us back very quickly to national balance.

Sea Communications

Any scheme of collective balance must depend for its success on our ability to ship units, equipment and stores from the Outer to the Inner Ring. Unfortunately,

our shipping is menaced by new types of submarine and our ports are within range of Soviet air attack. Past experience also shows that shortage of merchant shipping in war-time is likely to be a major factor in the strategic plans of the West.

During the build up and offensive phases of a war, we must assume that we can establish a degree of security at sea which will enable us to ship the vast tonnages required for modern offensive operations. If we do not succeed in establishing this security, the ultimate offensive may never take place. During the initial defensive phase, however, we must assume an adverse shipping situation. We must do everything possible to reduce our bids on merchant tonnage. The Inner Ring would be unwise to rely on obtaining from the outer Ring the equipment and stores needed in large quantities during the early defensive battles. Stock piling equipment, stationing Outer Ring forces in Europe before war starts, and the use of air transport will help, but none of these expedients can do more than make a useful contribution to the problem. The Inner Ring must be made as near self-sufficient as possible for the defensive phase. This might be assisted by grouping together the Inner Ring countries not separated by long sea communications. The forces within each group should be balanced for the defensive phase and, at first, would rely only on help which could be provided from the Outer Ring before war starts.

The vulnerability of our sea communications is only one factor in the larger problem of organization, grouping and command which will be considered next. At this stage the third reservation need only state that account must be taken of the vulnerability of our sea communications and shortage of merchant shipping during the defensive phase.

Organization and Command

The final and probably most difficult problem of all is to produce an organization which can control such an array of powers, and yet not become so cumbersome that it is incapable of quick and effective decision. During the 1939-1945 War great strides were made in the technique of co-ordinating Allied forces, but this was done under the stress of actual war. It was possible to set up Supreme Commands in each theatre, and the number of nations involved was small because only the Commonwealth and the United States had any large forces operating together. We have now to create an organization under almost peace conditions to control a minimum of nineteen different governments, the Atlantic Powers and British Commonwealth.

If collective balance between so many sovereign states is to succeed, there must be some decentralization to produce a workable chain of command. Responsibilities must be as simple and clear cut as possible. It would be no use attempting collective balance between countries so far apart and possessing such different interests as, say, Iceland and Australia. It would be equally futile to expect one or two countries to produce and man, say, all the tanks. Command of land formations would be impossible if all divisions contained several nationalities. On the other hand, there are certain types of specialized warfare such as strategic bombing or arctic warfare which could be assigned to one or two countries only. What, then, should be the basis for decentralization?

The first clear cut division which might be used is the difference between those countries bordering the Iron Curtain who should concentrate on stemming the initial onslaught, and those of the Outer Ring who can carry out their preparations in comparative security. Inner Ring countries might be responsible only for preparation for the defensive phase. All their energies should be bent towards the problem of

absorbing the first shock of the Soviet attack. All preparation and research for the build up and offensive phases might be the responsibility of the Outer Ring. This does not, however, mean that the forces of the Outer Ring would not take part in the initial battles. Their help would be essential, but limited to what they could provide before war starts and to what they could move to the battle area in the face of enemy submarine and air attacks.

Leading from this, the various countries of the Outer Ring form natural Main Support Areas for sectors of the Inner Ring. The Free World might be divided into Collective Security Zones, each containing Inner Ring countries responsible for absorbing the initial attacks, and Outer Ring countries constituting the Main Support Area for the Zone. These Zones might be :—

(*a*) *A North Atlantic Zone* covering the present North Atlantic Treaty Countries.

(*b*) *A Middle East Zone* comprising the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf areas as the Inner Ring with Africa, Pakistan and India as its Main Support Areas.

(*c*) *A Far Eastern Zone* covering South-East Asia and the Pacific with the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India as its Main Support Areas.

This grouping brings together countries with similar interests and problems, and should make control more practical than world-wide collective balance.

The next problem is to decide the lowest level at which a force can be international. Can individual ships of a fleet contain different nationalities? Can we accept different nationalities within the corps, divisions or brigades of an army, or within the groups, wings or squadrons of an air force? The limiting factor seems to be control. At whatever level international command occurs, decisions will be slower and more difficult to take. In tactical formations decisions must be quick and effective. We should, therefore, try to avoid collective balance within tactical formations; that is to say Divisions in the Navy and Army, and Groups in the Air Force should consist of one nationality only. In the case of the small nations and "Free" contingents from satellite countries we must naturally make exceptions to this rule. As far as equipment is concerned, there need be no such restriction though equipment should be standardized as far as possible within each collective security zone.

As far as specialist operations are concerned, there is no reason why these should not be concentrated in the hands of those countries best suited to them. Strategic bombing is not closely linked with the tactical land or sea battle. Only those countries which have the industrial potential to sustain a strategic bomber force should attempt to do so. Arctic warfare might be left in the hands of Canada and the Scandinavian countries. Jungle warfare might best be left to India, Australia and New Zealand, and so on.

Summary

To summarize, then, the policy of collective balance, however desirable in theory, must always be limited in scope by the following factors :—

(*a*) Each country must be allowed to retain the forces it needs to defend its vital interests and to meet its moral obligations.

(*b*) The vulnerability of countries to internal disruption or forcible conversion to Communism must be taken into account.

(*c*) The command organization evolved must be capable of quick and effective decision.

(*d*) Dependence on long sea communications during the defensive phase must be kept to a munimum.

APPLICATION

Let us now apply these principles to the Defence Forces of the United Kingdom to see whether they would be practical and how they would affect the shape of our forces.

First, we must be clear about our vital interests. These can best be summed up in our three traditional pillars of strategy :—

> " The defence of the United Kingdom,
> the defence of the Middle East,
> and the defence of our sea communications."

The defence of the United Kingdom can no longer be entrusted only to sea and air power. The advent of the long-range rocket and high speed aircraft makes the land defence of Western Europe vital to the defence of the United Kingdom. We must, therefore, recast the first pillar of our strategy to read " the defence of Western Europe."

The defence of our sea communications is still our vital concern, but, in the face of the tremendous odds against us, should we continue to place the defence of the Middle East on a par with that of Western Europe ? If Western Europe were overrun, we would be faced with the possibility of immediate defeat ; but if we were to lose the Middle East we would be faced only with defeat in the long run unless we could regain our position there. The defence of Western Europe should, therefore, come before the defence of the Middle East, though the Middle East remains vital to us in the long run. If we can find someone else to help us in the Middle East, we should do so in order to concentrate more of our strength in defence of Western Europe and our sea lanes.

The second thing to decide is with whom we should accept collective balance. There is no problem in the Outer Ring, but the Inner Ring presents some difficulty. As we have territories in the three suggested Collective Security Zones we must consider them all. In the North Atlantic Area we should, in theory, be prepared to assist the countries bordering the Iron Curtain, but we should not depend upon them for collective balance because they are in danger of forcible conversion. But Western Europe is vital to us, and since we cannot defend it without the assistance of the Western European Powers, we cannot accept this theoretical reservation. We must take the risk of accepting collective balance with Western Europe. At present the risk involved in doing this is great, but we can reduce the risk by wholehearted economic and military support of Western Union. As the Western European Countries become stronger the chances of forcible conversion and internal disruption will lessen. But Western Europe will never gain strength if we consider ourselves in a special " Intermediate Ring " or part of the Outer Ring.

In the Middle East Zone, the problem is to find someone else to shoulder some of the load. South Africa, Pakistan and India would be the Main Support Areas, but can they supply the necessary strength ? At present the answer is ' No,' but we should do all that we can to build up their strength. Much as we would like to hand over the responsibility for desert warfare to these countries, we cannot do so at the present.

In the Far East a similar position exists. Australia, New Zealand, India and the United States are main Support Areas. The United States may be heavily committed in the Pacific. Can Australia, New Zealand and India look after South-East Asia? The answer is again "no—not at present." Our aim must be to strengthen them to undertake some of these responsibilities eventually. In the meantime, we cannot give up forces trained and equipped for jungle warfare.

With these factors in mind, let us now consider each armed service in turn to see what outside assistance we can expect and what assistance we must give to others.

Navy

The Navy is best considered in five components :—

(*a*) The Strength Element consisting of the heavy ships, battleships, carriers and crusiers.

(*b*) The Numbers Element containing destroyers, escort vessels and small craft of all types.

(*c*) The Merchant Navy.

(*d*) Base installations.

(*e*) Landing craft.

The Strength Element takes many years to build up and cannot be dispensed with lightly. On the other hand, the Soviet Navy possesses very few heavy ships. Most of our naval strength will be required for the battle against the submarine. Though we will still need our heavy ships in case of the forcible conversion of some Western European fleets and for defence of our convoys against surface raiders, the Outer Ring is better placed to provide the bulk of the Strength Element. We might, therefore, give the construction and manning of heavy ships a low priority and depend on the Outer Ring to neutralize the Soviet heavy ships.

As far as the Numbers Element and the Merchant Navy are concerned, every Western Power must build as many anti-submarine craft and fast cargo ships as they can man. There will be no question of collective balance; collective effort using every craft available will be needed.

Bases present a different problem. We already rely on our Allies and the Commonwealth to provide bases. Can we close any down? Is Malta necessary if collective balance gives us the use of Italian ports? In this case, the rule of not accepting balance with countries too near the Iron Curtain holds good because the defence of Italy is not vital to us to the same degree as Western Europe. We would be unwise to close Malta and depend on Italian ports in the Central Mediterranean. West Indies bases, on the other hand, might well be closed as we can rely firmly on the United States.

Finally, landing craft, though useful in most operations, are essentially offensive phase craft. We cannot consider large scale assault landings early in a war. The bulk of these craft might be better provided by the Outer Ring when the time comes.

Army

If we accept that we are an Inner Ring country and, therefore, responsible with the rest of the Inner Ring for stemming the initial land and air assault, then there are three ways in which we can concentrate the strength of our land forces on this task.

(*a*) By giving up all units and equipment needed for major offensive operations.

(*b*) By relying on the Outer Ring to provide troops for certain specialized operations.

(*c*) By stock piling before war starts equipment produced in the Outer Ring which is needed in comparatively small quantities or has a small wastage rate.

The difference between offensive and defensive operations of land forces is one of quantity. The same units and equipment take part in both, but on a reduced scale in defensive operations. There are very few major items belonging to the Infantry, Artillery or Armour which are not needed in the initial defensive battle. On the Engineer and Administrative sides, however, there is a great difference between defensive and offensive requirements. The resources needed for an offensive over devastated country involving the construction of airfields, roads, railways, harbours and so forth are not required during the defensive phase. The large repair organizations, equipment depots and transport echelons needed to sustain such an offensive are only required on a very reduced scale. We might, therefore, depend on the Outer Ring for a large proportion of our engineer construction resources and for the build up of the administrative tail. Provided there has been a reasonable degree of standardization of equipment, this should be possible.

The specialized operations which we might forego are :—

(*a*) Major seaborne operations.
(*b*) Major airborne operations.
(*c*) Arctic operations.
(*d*) Mountain operations.

The first two will be needed only in the offensive phase and could be the responsibility of the Outer Ring. Arctic operations could be entrusted to Canada and Scandinavia. Mountain operations could be handed safely to the French, Scandinavians and Italians. Desert and jungle training, research and development, however, must be retained until we can hand over this commitment to whoever covers the Middle East and South-East Asia.

Stock piling of equipment from the Outer Ring might cover such slow moving items as heavy artillery, heavy engineer equipment, electrical machinery, and some types of radar. They should be items used in small numbers which could be replaced even if shipping is tight.

Air Forces

Air forces probably provide the greatest scope for collective balance. The aircraft themselves are not hampered by sea communications, though the movement of their supplies and maintenance organization still depends largely on shipping. Aircraft can be manufactured safely in the Outer Ring and flown anywhere they are required. As we will be faced with an enemy air force of very great size, we must use all the aircraft production potential which the Free World possesses. Collective balance will allow us to use these resources to their best advantage.

Experience has taught us that the first task of an air force is to establish air superiority. We have also learnt that a balanced air force is needed to achieve this aim. To-day we are faced with the possibility of Europe being over-run before strategic bombing of Soviet industry and communications can take effect. The recent events in Korea have underlined this danger. In Korea there was no enemy air opposition after the first few weeks, but, if the Soviet Army attacks in the West, it will be supported by large tactical air forces. If the Inner Ring countries are to carry out their task of stemming the initial Soviet assault, they must place first

things first and concentrate on destroying these tactical air forces. As they will be working against time, they must use the most direct means. However desirable balanced air forces may be, the Inner Ring must concentrate on fighters and light bombers, leaving the indirect attack with strategic bombers to the Outer Ring.

In our own air force, the fighter defences of the United Kingdom must be given first priority. They form part of the forces which we must be allowed to retain in our own hands to defend our vital interests. As an Inner Ring country, we should concentrate the rest of our air resources on the tactical land/air battle, but this would mean sacrificing our great experience in strategic bombing and our ability to produce long-range bombers. Like the Strength Element of the Navy, our bomber forces have taken a long time to create and should not be dispensed with lightly. Though we may have to place strategic bombing on a low priority, we should not dispense with it altogether, as it will play a vital part in the build up and offensive phases.

Concentration by the United Kingdom on fighters and medium-range bombers would fit in well with the principle of the best man for the job. Our lead in jet design and the American lead in the production of long-range aircraft, provides a good example of the advantages of collective balance. Since a major Allied land offensive is unlikely for some time, we should also leave the production of transport aircraft to the Outer Ring.

Summary

As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, accepting the degree of collective balance envisaged would mean that we could concentrate on :—

(*a*) Winning the early land and tactical air battles with our Allies in Western Europe.

(*b*) Keeping the sea lanes open for the build up and offensive phases of a war.

To do this, the Royal Navy together with Coastal Command would concentrate on anti-submarine warfare, and our shipbuilding yards would concentrate on anti-submarine craft and fast merchant ship construction. The Army would be organized primarily for continental warfare in Western Europe. The Royal Air Force would look to the fighter defences of the United Kingdom and the tactical land/air battle in Western Europe.

We might relegate the construction and manning of heavy ships, strategic bombing, arctic and mountain warfare, and eventually jungle and desert warfare, to a low priority. We would depend on the Outer Ring for :—

(*a*) The neutralizing of enemy heavy ships.

(*b*) Strategic bombing in the defensive phase of a war.

(*c*) Quantity production of latest types of equipment for the offensive phase of a war.

(*d*) Transport aircraft for major airborne operations.

(*e*) Landing craft for major seaborne assaults.

(*f*) The build up of engineer and administrative resources for the offensive phase.

In all probability most of these economies would have been necessary whether we accepted collective balance or not. But in accepting this policy, we ensure that the Outer Ring prepares to cover our deficiencies. In return for this assistance we will have to abandon once and for all any idea of not taking part in the first land and air battles in Western Europe. We must also provide a base for the forces of the Outer Ring operating in the European theatre.

CONCLUSION

The case for collective balance turns on three factors. If we in the Free World are to win the Cold War, we must discredit Communism by raising the standard of living of our people. We can only do this if defence expenditure is kept to a minimum. Collective balance will help us to achieve this economy. If we are to win a shooting war, we must ensure that we are materially and morally superior to the Soviet Union and her satellites. We have far greater material resources than the Soviet Union but they are not effectively organized. Collective balance will help to integrate these resources. But material strength alone will be useless unless the Inner Ring has the will to win. Collective balance will help to give the Inner Ring the confidence it needs, and will help to ensure that the countries bordering the Iron Curtain do not decide that Communism is better than destruction.

The degree to which we can accept collective balance depends on restrictions imposed by the lessons of history and our doubts about the reliability of alliances in long term planning; by the need for infringement of sovereignty; by the submarine and air menace to our sea communications; and finally by the difficulty in controlling effectively so many individual governments.

If we apply collective balance to the forces of the United Kingdom, bearing these restrictions in mind, we find that we lose little and gain much. We should, therefore, accept wholeheartedly the policy of collective balance provided :—

(*a*) We are allowed to retain the forces which we consider necessary to defend our vital interests and to meet our moral obligations.

(*b*) Account is taken of the vulnerability of countries with whom we are to accept collective balance

(i) to forcible conversion to Communism :

(ii) to internal Communist disruption.

(*c*) Account is taken of the vulnerability of our sea communications and we are allowed to retain a degree of national balance during the defensive phase.

(*d*) Any organization set up is kept within manageable proportions by restricting collective balance to groups of countries with common interests.

EPILOGUE

This paper has been written from a Service point of view. No attempt has been made to estimate the financial implications. If, when this is done, it is found that the Outer Ring has to contribute far more than the Inner Ring, then the Outer Ring must realize that no amount of money or equipment can possibly repay the Inner Ring for providing the battlefield if war comes. It is the Inner Ring which must bear the bulk of the devastation.

THE FUTURE OF MARITIME POWER

By Rear-Admiral R. M. J. Hutton, C.B.E., D.S.O.

On Wednesday, 17th January, 1951

Admiral Sir Charles Daniel, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., in the Chair

The Secretary (Lieut.-Colonel P. S. M. Wilkinson): Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser of North Cape, who was to have taken the Chair this afternoon, has been called elsewhere, but Admiral Sir Charles Daniel of the Imperial Defence College has very kindly consented to take his place.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I share your disappointment at the absence of the First Sea Lord, but I am very happy to have the privilege of introducing Rear-Admiral Hutton, my colleague at the Imperial Defence College, who I will now ask to address us.

LECTURE

THE subject I am tackling this afternoon is a vast one, and I must make it clear at the outset that in my approach to the problem I am only looking a short way ahead. As we all know we are on the threshold of an atomic age, and it is very apparent that crystal gazing into the future, when the most powerful nations in the World may have very large stocks of atomic bombs and affiliated devices for destroying mankind,may cause a complete change of outlook on the waging of war. It is not my intention to do that; so let us look at the situation for the next few years, which is quite long enough in these days of rapid change.

There is no doubt that the aim, on the highest plane, is the old historic and platitudinous requirement, "The Control of Sea Communications." Now what do we seek to achieve by that? I suggest we want:—

(1) To ensure that seaborne trade, which carries strategic war materials, reaches the main support areas in sufficient volume to maintain our war efforts in each theatre of war. Under modern conditions the range of these materials is very wide indeed.

(2) To deny a similar use of the sea to the enemy.

(3) To protect the transfer by water of land and air forces to areas where they can be used most effectively against the enemy.

(4) To prevent the enemy using the sea for the same purpose on any large scale.

(5) To provide close support for our land forces when engaged in an initial assault on enemy territory, or on the flanks of the land battle.

All these subsidiary aims, arising from our overall requirement for the control of sea communications, are evident in the past history of maritime war in greater or lesser degree, and there is nothing to make one believe that any of them can be entirely disregarded in the future, though there will be a great change in emphasis. If war should come again it will undoubtedly be global, so let us examine these subsidiary aims and see how they are likely to be affected.

Seaborne Trade. The very essence of our Commonwealth and our likely powerful Allies, separated as they are by vast distances of intervening oceans, enhances the fact that, however such a global war may develop, seaborne trade between them will be as vital as ever, and that the materials carried will be as voluminous and important as in the past.

Denial of the sea to the enemy. It may well be that war on a scale when the enemy is based on a continental land mass will reduce the importance of this old historic role

of naval strength, as nearly all the materials the enemy requires will either be available in his own territory or obtainable across land frontiers.

Transfer of land and air forces to areas where they can be best used. This is self-evident geographically and needs no further elaboration.

I do not believe that the corollary of this aim, the prevention of the enemy using the sea for moving his forces, is as unimportant as might appear at first sight. In a global war there are areas, such as the Mediterranean in particular, where movement by sea might be of significance from an enemy's point of view. The strain that can be imposed on rail and road by the movement of modern armies and air forces and the equipment they require will always cause a bottleneck, except in the most highly developed countries. I hate figures, but a 5,000 ton ship can carry a very large quantity of fuel, ammunition or stores. To give just one example: if we had to send the coal required by London into the city by rail instead of ship, it would require a hundred trains per week of maximum capacity of twenty ton waggons.

Support for land forces engaged in an assault across the sea. In strategy this is, perhaps, the supreme contribution that allies, strong in maritime Power, can provide for their cause. It works in two ways against a continental Power which is thrusting outwards from a landmass across land frontiers. It enables the Allies to strike hard and quickly at points of their own choosing, and though we all know that massive thrusts such as those in the Pacific, North Africa and Western Europe in the 1939-45 War, take considerable periods to mount and deliver, smaller assaults, which may have effects on the conduct of operations out of all proportion to the numbers employed (MacArthur's left hook at Inchon in the Korean War is a good example), are feasible in even the early stages of war.

Further, the threat of the unknown place of such attacks causes a wide dispersion of enemy resources. There is no better example of this than the end of the 1939-45 War in Europe when Hitler, with his intuition and aided by some clever moves on our part to convince him that his intuition was in fact real, could never be divorced from a curious certainty in his own mind that an assault on Norway would be undertaken as part of our overall strategy to liberate Western Europe.

In consequence, when D-Day dawned the Germans had some ten divisions and four equivalent divisions in Norway for purely defensive reasons. One would have thought that the impact of invasion on Western France would have clearly shown the German High Command that here was the vital theatre. But it did not, and no real attempt was made to move all their forces out of Norway until we were on the threshold of Germany. Then it was too late, and our air forces were taking their toll of German shipping in the Sound and Kattegat. The result, when finally victory was achieved in the West, was the surrender of 195,000 fully equipped Germans who had never fired a shot in the final battles. I give this illustration as the best and most far-reaching, but in fact all round the edges of the *Wehrmacht's* deepest penetrations there were similar, if not such spectacular, wastages of effort. In a future war the interplay of offensive threats and defensive fears which an allied combination strong in maritime forces induces on an enemy is likely to be just as important as it was in the past.

THE CONCEPT OF MARITIME POWER

Before I go on to examine how we can exercise these forms of control effectively by the best use of maritime power, it is as well that we should be clear in our minds as to what maritime power means.

In grand strategy, maritime power is an amalgamation of sea, air and land strength essential to any country where the sea is a substantial or determining factor. It applies in offence or defence, and it must always affect the Commonwealth and this Island in particular. All three Services and the Civil Powers are deeply implicated. To illustrate my point: what would have happened after the Battle of Britain, if the Channel had gone dry? It means the sum total of personnel, installations, geographical circumstances and weapons, which enable allies to control and use transport overseas in war-time.

By personnel I mean the manpower of the Commonwealth and our Allies in their civil and military roles who are directly or indirectly engaged in a war at sea. In this connection the scientist, the technician, the industrial worker, the aircrews employed in the maritime role, the soldier defending a naval base or taking part in an operation to capture a new one, are all instruments of this power, quite apart from the naval crews of warships.

By installations I mean the economic, industrial and scientific capacity without which we could not wage maritime war at all, and the world-wide links of bases from which a war can be prosecuted.

In addition the Merchant Navy, their ships and men, play a vital part, as it is of no use being able to control sea communications if you cannot make proper use of them. The shortage of shipping was a live factor in deciding the grand strategy of the 1939-45 War. In fact it is no exaggeration to say that, except in the early stages, shipping was in even shorter supply than men and weapons. For instance Russia had to be supplied through the Arctic Ports; our Middle East Base had to be built up round the Cape of Good hope for a long time, when the Mediterranean was virtually closed to convoys beyond Malta; our American Allies had to convey their whole striking forces across the Pacific to stage their final assault on Japan.

In the future, though the problems may not be the same, the effort to deploy the Allied Forces correctly will require millions of tons of merchant shipping, quite apart from the economics of trade and food. We must never forget that in two wars this question of requirement and loss of merchant ships in the war at sea has been a near balance between victory and defeat. Nor must we forget that these ships, though manned by intrepid men with the sea in their blood, have not all the advantages of the Regular sailor of the Royal Navy. They serve in ships built for trade, mostly incapable of high speed to evade danger and without much power to hit back, or much protection when attacked. I stress these points because it is vital that their morale should be sustained.

Although maritime air forces play a considerable part in protecting shipping, the element in which merchant ships and their crews operate is the sea, and without warships to add to their protection their morale may be strained to breaking point if they incur heavy losses. The human factors in war must never be overlooked.

So you see that the true conception of maritime power is far from being one of naval might alone.

THE CHANGE IN THREATS TO SEA COMMUNICATIONS

Although the aims of maritime power which I have described have not changed materially, the methods and the ships by which power can be sustained are altering rapidly owing to the continuous effect of two potent factors in war at sea. First, the very marked increase in speed, range and striking power of aircraft; and

secondly, the threat of underwater attack by the continuously increasing efficiency of submarine and mine warfare.

What are the trends ?

Bases

As is well known, bases are extremely costly to maintain, but a group of countries such as those of the Commonwealth and the Allies, which are dependent upon the sea for inter-communication, must have a sufficiency of them. Without them maritime powers become impotent.

Apart from the fact that our potential enemies have no substantial surface fleet, the development of radar has made surface attack less likely. On the other hand the dangers of air attack necessitates increased anti-aircraft defences and fighter protection ; and the submarine menace means the use of more complicated booms, nets and fixed anti-submarine defences and an organization to keep the base clear of mines. Even all this very expensive equipment cannot ensure that a base will be secure, particularly from the air. It follows that naval forces will have to depend upon fewer bases than they have in the past, and also be able to replenish at sea.

Submarine and Air Attack

The broad oceans are still wide, and initial air attack on the shipping of the Free World is unlikely to be severe ; but very long-range shore-based aircraft working in co-operation with submarines to report the whereabouts of shipping could be carried out from the outset. There is no ground for complacency about submarines. Quite apart from the universal use of the Schnorkel, developed by the Germans to enable the U-boat to charge her batteries submerged, the advent of the " True " submarine capable of high underwater speed, long endurance, the ability to submerge to great depths and to remain underwater for longer periods is very formidable.

When considering inshore approaches (by which I mean narrow channels similar to those through the North-West Approaches leading to Glasgow and Liverpool and also coastal waters through which traffic must pass), there is an additional threat from shore-based aircraft.

This is all familiar, but the difference lies in the fact that the attack may start on the first day of war ; in the increased range from which torpedoes can be fired ; and in the fact that rockets will be added to bombs. Further, there will be considerably less warning about the approach of enemy aircraft, and the moment of bomb release will be beyond the range of some of the anti-aircraft weapons of the last war.

This raises the question whether ships should be placed in convoy or not.

The advantages of the convoy system are that it ensures a concentration of the defensive force ; it simplifies evasive routeing and diversions due to the sudden development of threats ; it forces an enemy to concentrate in order to achieve substantial results ; and it improves the morale of the crews of merchant ships if they know that they have an escort with the power to ward off attack and to pick them up if their ships are sunk.

On the other hand in the event of the escort being overwhelmed too many eggs may be in one basket ! The convoy itself provides a number of targets for the modern torpedo, which can be fired at longer ranges ; and it is uneconomical in shipping because the convoy must proceed at the speed of the slowest ship. There is also liable to be congestion in the ports, and the smooth working of the labour force is upset either by too great a pressure or by comparative idleness.

On balance, it seems clear that the concentration of defensive force and the control of movement overrides the dangers to individual ships sailing independently, and that it will be essential to revive convoys in areas where attack is severe. The pattern may not be very different from the last war, but it will obviously be necessary to have far more dispersal in the ports for discharging and loading cargo.

The Mine Threat

The very great advance made in the construction of mines during the 1939-45 War—moored, magnetic, acoustic and finally the Oyster type which can be laid by surface ships, submarines and aircraft—are a considerable threat. There are many areas in our coastal waters which are liable to be mined, and the effect of the German mining offensive on the East Coast and in the Thames Estuary is well known. It is imperative that we should have a sound mining organization and a large number of minesweepers ready to operate from the outset of a future war, equipped with improved types of minesweeping equipment.

SUMMARY OF DEFENSIVE PROBLEMS AND COUNTER MEASURES

Unlike the past there is no potential enemy which possesses a powerful surface fleet which could produce a real menace to the control of our sea communications by surface attack. The danger is nearly all concentrated in the air or under the water.

What are the principal counter-measures which countries dependent upon maritime power must take from a defensive point of view?

On the broad oceans long-range shore-based aircraft can help. They can reconnoitre large areas, attack submarines detected on the surface and reduce their ability to concentrate. Modern equipment will give them some power to track and attack submerged submarines once detected, but limitations on their endurance will not permit them to carry out extended operations.

That is why the navies of the World need aircraft carriers equipped with the latest anti-submarine and fighter aircraft. These carriers can best carry out their role when organized in hunter-killer groups working in the convoy areas with their own screen and fast anti-submarine vessels, or they can operate with convoys themselves.

Surface vessels needed to protect the convoys will consist of fast light craft of the destroyer and frigate type, of good endurance and sea keeping qualities, fitted with devices for submarine detection with increased range and lethal weapons of destruction which can be employed with accuracy at high speed. The countries dependent upon the sea are converting a substantial number of destroyers which are surplus to the needs of the present and forseeable requirements of surface fleets. These all have the necessary speed to compete with the increased speed of submarines, and their equipment is being altered for the anti-submarine role. A number of new frigates for anti-submarine work are being constructed. They are divided into two types, known as first and second rate. One of the problems is the very great cost of modern fighting ships, and the destroyer of to-day is not incomparable in price with the smaller type of cruiser of the not distant past.

This is not the place or time to go into details of the equipment which is being fitted in our modern ships. But there is a great and encouraging change in anti-submarine equipment. Modern detecting gear is capable of finding submarines at increased range and depth, and the days are gone when it was essential for two anti-submarine vessels in company to hunt a submarine. Weapons are changing too, and

the production of a lethal and accurate weapon which is capable of destroying a submarine under much improved conditions from an attacker's point of view is an accomplished fact.

In those areas closer inshore which I have previously described, the high speed and range of modern aircraft will require that our convoys in certain areas must have fighter protection, because there will be little or no warning of enemy approach. As a matter of principle it is preferable that shore-based aircraft should take over this duty, as they will have better performance than carrier-borne fighters and are also able to operate on occasions when deck landings are impossible owing to the weather.

The surface escorts, in addition to their anti-submarine role, will require modern anti-aircraft guns and equipment and better radar. Also a number of them must be equipped with the simpler forms of fighter direction gear.

So far I have said little about the possibility of attack by surface ships, not because such dangers are non-existent, but because it is apparent that the whole trend of the attack on maritime Powers has shifted even more markedly than in the past to the dangers of underwater damage by aircraft, submarines and mines. A raider in the guise of a fast cruiser, or an armed merchant cruiser disguised as an ordinary merchant ship, can sink a number of ships in a very short time if she is able to gain contact with a convoy and destroy the close escort. Operating in unfrequented areas she can sink a number of independently routed single ships, and this can have a cumulative effect over a long period.

So there will still be a requirement for covering forces in certain areas to prevent raiders reaching the open oceans. As I see it these covering forces will not resemble the powerful Fleets of the past, but will be organized in a small composite balanced force with teeth and eyes. A capital ship, or cruisers with an aircraft carrier and destroyer escort is an example; alternatively the air component can be provided by Coastal Command aircraft. It will be the duty of such forces to intercept the enemy before the raider can reach an area in which it can cause damage.

Destroyer raids on shipping, and, under certain conditions in traffic lanes close to an enemy, attacks by the E-boat type of craft will always be a possibility and special techniques and ships to deal with them will be required again.

I have dealt with the defensive future that affects maritime power at some length, because this Country which is dependent upon the sea for its livelihood and existence, and being so close to the land mass of Europe from which an enemy would attempt to strike, must look to the protection of its vital ocean trade routes, sea approaches and coastal traffic lanes as its *first* commitment.

There are other pressing considerations too. It is not as if these Islands were only vulnerable to attack from the sea; the Channel, our old historic safeguard, which has served us so faithfully as a security against any form of attack in many wars, provided we had a strong fleet, and as an anti-tank ditch in the last war, is no longer our security. Air power in its true sense, added to the developments of land power in its ability to provide the sites for long-range rockets and missiles, has impinged on the maritime power of nations which are geographically close to a hostile enemy.

These factors have forced upon us, for our own preservation, the need for a continental strategy to prevent an enemy from overrunning our neighbours and also the vital necessity to defend our Country from the air. This has meant an alteration

in the balance between expenditure on each of the three Services and on Civil Defence for which in any case, our pockets, both national and individual, are not inexhaustible.

Therefore it is inevitable that we cannot keep all the forces for the offensive role at sea that we should like to have. Nor can we have enough to satisfy our needs for our global commitments as a whole. The situation might be sombre indeed if we did not have powerful friends and Allies who, collectively, have strong maritime forces, particularly America.

So when I pass to the offensive roles it must be realized that I am talking about maritime power as a whole, and that the purely British contribution may not be large. My use of the word " we " will therefore be in the collective sense.

OFFENSIVE CONTROL

In maritime war there is no surer way of safeguarding communications than by destroying the enemy's surface ships and submarines before they can succeed in reaching the areas in which they can do damage. Unfortunately modern war is making this steadily more difficult to achieve. Nevertheless in a global war the enemy is not well placed geographically, and a small covering force such as I have described, in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific should have the ability with good air reconnaissance to destroy any surface ships that emerge.

With regard to enemy submarines, the mining of the ports and harbours that they use as bases and the narrow channels through which they have to pass to gain the open seas will either contain them or at least impose some losses if they wish to operate effectively. Such minelaying can be undertaken by aircraft, submarines and fast minelayers.

Minelaying

Aircraft have the advantage of being able to penetrate deep into enemy harbours and at great distances, and they are not affected by the enemy's seaward defences. On the other hand it is not easy for aircraft to lay mines really accurately, and a considerable number is required to achieve results.

A small field can be laid accurately by submarines in selected areas through which ships must pass, and they have a better chance than other methods of achieving surprise by their mining, although it is difficult for them to penetrate the seaward defences of a port.

Surface minelayers are more liable to attack on passage or to detection in the laying area than aircraft or submarines. They can lay a substantial field accurately and, provided the operation is well planned to make the best use of disguise or darkness, surprise should still be possible in laying the minefield.

Raids on Enemy Coasts

In the opening stages of a future war it does not appear that much could be achieved by raids by surface forces, partly because the enemy would not depend upon sea transport to any extent except in land-locked seas where surface raiding forces could not penetrate under modern conditions; but should our enemies succeed in occupying territory facing the wider oceans—a not unlikely contingency—raids by our light forces to disrupt communications would be profitable.

For such raids to be successful the cover of darkness is required, and it has to be accepted that the development of radar has lessened the chances of surprise.

But it takes time to provide cover on an enemy-held coast, and the whole history of raids by light craft tends to show that the enemy is never so well prepared to counter them as we think he ought to be.

In addition to their mining and anti-shipping activities, submarines have also the important role, when on patrol, of attacking enemy submarines entering and leaving their bases and, if the enemy submarine menace proves severe, this may well be their primary task in the future.

Attacks at Source

By this method we attempt to destroy the enemy's power to dispute our control by striking at the various sources from which that power emanates, such as enemy ports, naval and air bases and industrial installations.

We can do this in a variety of ways. We can use carrier-borne aircraft as we did against the Italian surface ships at Taranto and in Northern Waters against German submarine depot ships—specific raids on a limited scale against a worthwhile objective. We can carry out raids and assaults combined with land forces as we did at St. Nazaire, Vaagso and in innumerable assaults in the Pacific. As these will also be limited in scale and likely to be more hazardous than in the past, we must be sure that the objective is really going to prove of value to the war effort as a whole. We can undertake clandestine operations as we succeeded in doing in our preliminary attacks on the "Tirpitz," and take a lesson from our old enemies by using methods similiar to the Italians in their successful limpet mine attacks on our heavy ships in Alexandria, and on our shipping in Gibraltar Bay.

So far these are all small operations, but the American thrusts in the Pacific, mounted from the sea, make impressive reading, and with the increasing range of naval aircraft it is quite factual to picture the launching of many hundreds of aircraft in a simultaneous operation from even medium sized task forces, and a thousand from a large one. Our Allies will have no major fleet to overcome with years of hard fighting, and the great advantage of this form of attack is that is has the ability to achieve surprise from its seaward approach, while the mobility of its base does not make it easy for the enemy to find and attack.

In Northern Waters and in the Pacific there would undoubtedly be opportunities, and as a war progresses there would in all probability be other areas in which we could stop the enemy from expanding his sea forces for attacks against us. Lastly, shore-based heavy bomber aircraft could be brought into the maritime role, and weapons of mass destruction such as the atom bomb could be used to destroy enemy ports and submarine bases.

Invasion in the Future

One of the apparent lessons of the 1939-45 War was that, by the use of maritime power, we were able to land large military forces and to keep them supplied in the face of the enemy. Further, these forces were built up to withstand enemy attempts to throw them into the sea.

The nations strong in maritime power, by virtue of their alignment and their geography, are again committed to a continental strategy. There is no escape from this if the Free World has to survive on its present basis. If Western Europe and the Middle East were overrun would it be possible by the use of large scale assaults to repeat the invasions so successfully carried out between 1942 and 1945?

It is in this situation that even a few of the weapons of mass destruction show their significance as, although it seems feasible to carry out operations on the scale of invasion opposed by conventional attack, the target provided by the armadas of assaults on the grand scale would be most suitable for the atom bomb. One can argue that the offensive from the sea could be dispersed on a wide enough front to lessen the dislocation that atomic attack would cause, but this would make the operation much more difficult from the point of view of the landing forces.

Another consideration is that assaults on this scale involve tremendous effort and take a long time to mount, though the evolution of assault craft in the form of high speed landing craft for troops, tank landing craft and many types of gun support and rocket ships which were not available to the Allies in 1940, should in future reduce the time required for mounting. However, these factors are more than balanced out by the length of time required by defending forces to take steps to prevent invasion from the sea on extended coast lines. In fact, despite vast expenditure of equipment and labour and years of preparation, neither the Germans in Europe, nor the Japanese in the Pacific could produce an impregnable defence; and there is no reason to suppose it could be done in the future by any conventional mixture of arms and weapons.

From this analysis it is suggested that comparatively small scale raids for limited objectives, operations to capture islands and operations on the flanks of our military forces engaged with the enemy can be as potent as ever, but that full scale invasion on the hostile territories of land masses *may* be impossible if the enemy is using atom bombs.

This does not mean that I believe maritime power will be unable to land and deploy very large forces on a continent, much of which is under enemy domination. It will be quite feasible to put such forces ashore in areas in support of our own forces fighting the enemy, and indirectly through allied countries on a continental land mass which has not been overrun.

These factors emphasize how very important it is for nations dependent upon maritime power to be able to retain their footing in those areas of Western Europe and the Middle East which are vital to them, in order that they can exploit the advantages that movement of forces of all arms across the sea gives them.

The Situation in Narrow Seas

Quite apart from invasion problems, what is the future of maritime power likely to be in the narrow seas such as the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea or the southern North Sea and the English Channel?

These fall into three categories. Waterways where the countries dependent upon sea transport possess both shores, and from which for all practical purposes the combined Services can prevent the intrusion of enemy forces on any scale; disputed waterways on which both antagonists border in whole or in part; and waterways in the possession of the countries dominating the continental land mass. The Red Sea, the Mediterranean and the English Channel, and the Baltic in the 1939-45 War are, respectively, good examples of each of these categories; but, of course, the situation in the land-locked seas may be quite different in the future. It is clear, however, that waterways of the last category will be as impossible for surface forces as they were in the last war.

There are some who say that the future air threat will make the operation of surface ships no longer a practical operation in disputed waterways; the Mediterranean is quoted and it is stated that aircraft carriers cannot be employed there.

I feel these gloomy prophets are over pessimistic. I remember so vividly the days of 1938-39, when we used to have strategical paper exercises at the Combined Royal Naval and Royal Air Force Staff College sessions concerning the running of convoys to Malta. France was presumed an ally, and the enemies were Germany and Italy with the Italian Fleet and strong German air forces backing up the Italians in Italy, Sicily and Sardinia. The results were always that, by the time our forces were well inside the Narrows, South of Sicily, the convoy would have been so severely dealt with by what appeared to be equitable umpiring that it had ceased to exist. Two years later I found myself embarked on one of the early "through-to-Malta" convoys. We had a sweepstake on the result. I selected what I thought was an optimistic loss of three ships but we actually lost only one, and when in a much worse situation with France an unfriendly neutral. Of course these operations did become progressively more difficult and costly, but we still succeeded in holding Malta by getting through the minimum of supplies, even though nearly the whole of the Mediterranean seaboard on both sides was either hostile or unfriendly. I make this point to illustrate that there is a tendency to overrate what our enemies can achieve.

The whole pattern of the War at sea in the Mediterranean was a classic example of how maritime power should or should not be fulfilled.

From 1940 to 1942, the enemy, overwhelmingly strong at sea and in the air, never really succeeded in securing his lines of sea communications to Rommel's armies in North Africa. When we became strong our maritime forces from the United Kingdom and the United States smashed his supply lines in a matter of months. In not dissimilar circumstances in adversity and success we maintained 7,000 miles of sea communication—the enemy could not control 70.

In the future, though the air threat in the narrow seas will increase, I see no reason why, with careful planning and strong concentrations of maritime forces with their air component in aircraft carriers, operations should not be carried out in the Mediterranean with part of its land borders dominated by an enemy.

CONCLUSION

We may not be able to use maritime offensive strategy in future in the same way as in the past, owing to the fact that our potential enemy is not dependent upon the sea. But, to continue any war, there is a *vital* requirement to carry out the defensive tasks I have elaborated and to deploy our forces where we need them by control of sea communications, and the use of maritime forces in their offensive role will still be considerable.

The trend of war at sea is developing increasingly towards underwater attack on our ships, and we must put our greatest effort into the training of our manpower, the development of our ships and maritime aircraft and the production of weapons to defeat this menace.

During the last war we learned the necessity for really practical inter-service co-operation. Integrated staffs and combined headquarters with speedy communications progressed. In future this need for quick decision and action between headquarters, ships and aircraft will be intensified, together with a flexibility of outlook which is not hidebound by the past in meeting the unexpected.

Finally, as long as ships are the means of transport of the bulk of the Armed Forces, raw materials, food and trade across the seas, maritime power will be of paramount importance.

DISCUSSION

AIR COMMODORE C. E. CHILTON: I think that the Lecturer suggested that enemy submarines attacking convoys are best dealt with by carrier-borne aircraft. Although this might well be true in certain circumstances—say in the Pacific, it is not true when applied to the North Atlantic route because weather and sea conditions will prevent carrier aircraft operations for some of the time. Long-range, shore-based, anti-submarine aircraft from Coastal Command are, therefore, necessary as well as carrier aircraft and, generally speaking, by virtue of their size and extra weapon capacity, etc., the very long-range, shore-based aircraft is a better "tool for the job" within its economic range. On the question as to the need or otherwise for convoys in war, I know that the Ministry of Transport dislike the convoy system because of the loss involved in "turn round time" but surely the experience of two World Wars has proved beyond doubt that it is the only way to retain any form of control over shipping losses. The loss of "turn round time" must be solved by improving loading and unloading facilites at minor ports, etc. I assume that the capacity of the main ports will be fully extended already by use of lighters and special unloading ramps wherever the ships can be got alongside. We must also try to reduce the number of convoys in war by stockpiling essentials in peace.

THE LECTURER: I did not mean to convey the impression that only carrier-borne aircraft would be used. What I really meant was that they were most economical in the open oceans. We all realize that the whole question of maritime-air is a combination of effort. I should be the very last to suggest that there would be no case for using long-range Coastal Command aircraft out on the wide oceans as long as we have a sufficient number to spare. The overriding factor, I think, will be whether we have enough, and I trust you will agree with the view that the shore-based maritime-air power will have a very full job in looking after the areas close to our own shores, leaving the carriers to operate in the wider seas.

With regard to attacks on convoys, from a purely naval point of view, if our ships were not in convoy and were exposed to attack, not only from the air but from submarines and mines, I think that every naval officer would agree that we should get ourselves into a most impossible position in a very short time. I agree entirely with your remarks concerning convoys.

COLONEL F. H. SMITH: The late Prime Minister on his visit here to receive the Chesney Gold Medal, stated that the most critical period during the War was in 1942, owing to the heavy shipping bombing losses incurred during the slow turn round of the vessels loading and discharging in the ports. Voyages across the Atlantic in all kinds of difficult weather were subject to losses from attack by submarines, but the losses in port were largely due to attack by aircraft. It is, therefore, imperative that we train our Merchant Navy officers and stevedores responsible for loading and discharging to ensure rapid turn round in ports, and thus avoid the serious risks incurred through unnecessary waste of time discharging and loading in the docks. Again, if vessels and transports of the "self-discharging and loading" types could be designed so that they could be turned round in a much shorter time of vulnerability in port, it would help materially to solve this problem.

THE LECTURER: I agree that the question of the turn round of ships in ports will be much more important than it has been in the past, and that we must have far more dispersal; but I think that this question of new design is a difficult one. After all, the only way in which you could get a new design would presumably be by a very large subsidy from the Government for shipping. I do not think that it is very likely that shipowners would embark on such a project on their own. I am not sure of the new design which you have in mind, but the shipowners look at it from the point of view that their ships are designed for commercial purposes. To get a radical change in design merely because of the threat of war would not be effected by shipping companies without a subsidy.

I think that the way to get over that difficulty is to go in far more for dispersal in ports. We have to consider what we can do in the way of greater use of tugs and lighters

and increasing the use of smaller ports, and have a flexible mind on the subject. We all see the great dangers that there may be of our ports being congested by great numbers of ships, and of course the speed with which ships can be turned round by port labour is most important.

LIEUT.-COLONEL C. E. PIERSON: What is the Lecturer's opinion about the counter-attack in Europe? It was obvious in the last war, with trained German armies thoroughly capable of holding Western France and with Italy in the Mediterranean, that we would have great problems with great regard to counter-attack; and in his *Overture to Overlord*, Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Morgan makes it clear that the problem of subsequent policy was even greater than that of attacking the fortress itself. I take it that the appreciation of the situation may be much simpler should the dreaded event of a Russian attack take place, and that the extra duty thrown on the Navy of providing support and landing facilities should be made less arduous in the plan for counter-attack and liberation.

THE LECTURER: I take it that what you really mean is that if Europe is overrun, will it be possible to liberate it again by an operation such as Overlord? I endeavoured to stress, of course, that it is vitally inportant to us that Europe should not be overrun. From the conventional arms point of view I do not see that there is any reason why we should not land on the continental land mass as we did in the last war, because I do not believe that any country will ever be able to make its coasts impregnable to such a form of attack. However, the other point is that it would take a long time to achieve and one wonders what there would be left underneath to liberate.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have nothing to add except to agree with what the Lecturer has said about the importance of not allowing Europe to be overrun. It only remains for me to express on your behalf a warm vote of thanks to the Lecturer. (*Applause.*)

FLYING BOATS IN WAR.

By Air Vice-Marshal P. H. Mackworth, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C.,

On Wednesday, 7th February, 1951, at 3.0 p.m.

Air Marshal Sir Aubrey Ellwood, K.C.B., D.S.C., in the Chair.

The Chairman: It is a particular pleasure for me to introduce the lecturer this afternoon, Air Vice-Marshal Mackworth, because we have been very closely connected, both of us having been Senior Air Staff Officers at Coastal Command, and later still in Transport Command. Air Vice-Marshal Mackworth was Air Officer in Charge of Administration at Transport Command and therefore did a very great deal in helping me into the saddle when I took over command a year ago.

Air Vice-Marshal Mackworth is, I think, one of our oldest flying boat pilots, and has therefore been able to watch at close quarters the development of this particular type of aircraft through the 1914-18 War, the period between the Wars, and through the 1939-45 War. I am sure, therefore, that you will agree with me that we could not have anybody better fitted to give a lecture on flying boats in War than he is, and I will now ask him to deliver his lecture.

LECTURE

DURING the life-time of most of us here today this Country has come near to disaster, in two World Wars as a result of submarine attack on our shipping. The air has taken part in the eventual defeat of the submarine on both occasions. In the 1914–18 War military flying was but beginning to feel its power—yet its share was not unimportant; in the 1939–45 War its role was vital. The flying boat was prominent in the anti-submarine battle in both Wars. In the first War it shared the task with the float plane; in the second the land-plane gradually took the predominating part.

These things have not gone unobserved outside our Country, and the only nation in the World today who might become a dangerous enemy is building a great submarine fleet of modern design—a design far more deadly than anything experienced before.

What should the pattern be if there is another conflict? We cannot afford to make mistakes. There are many who say, "why bother with these flying boats; they are nice for those who like yachting, but the land-plane is more efficient and less bother." There are also many who retort, "the flying boat can do many things that the land-plane cannot; we must have them."

I am going to try to trace the development and performance of the flying boat through the two Wars. From this I shall attempt to deduce—without sentiment—what our policy should be in the future, what our flying boats should look like and what operational roles they should carry out.

THE 1914–18 WAR

Before the Royal Air Force came into being in 1918, the flying services were operated by the Admiralty and War Office; it fell naturally, therefore, to the Navy to foster the development of the flying boat.

At the beginning of the War it was a toy, quite unsuited to serious operations but, nevertheless, useful for training and gaining experience in the use of this type of aircraft.

One example was the F.B.A., a small flying boat engined by a 100 h.p. rotary engine. On patrol it could carry a pilot, two bombs of about 30 lbs. each and a spark wireless transmitter operated by the pilot. Its endurance was, at best, about an hour and a half. At about the end of 1916, the H.12, an American boat, engined by British Rolls Royce motors, came into service. It was a really practical and efficient aircraft of considerable endurance, eight or nine hours, and could carry a fair load of bombs, usually two A.S. bombs of 230 lbs. each and two of 100 lbs. An improved British type, the F. series, soon followed and was built in large numbers by all sorts of firms—including even piano makers!

Operations

Flying boats were used for many types of operations—Zeppelins were shot down by them on two occasions—but they were employed mostly on anti-submarine patrols round the coasts of the British Isles and in the Mediterranean. Some were towed on high-speed lighters behind destroyers across the North Sea and launched from there to attack targets otherwise out of range. A fighter was even mounted on a flying boat and could be launched in the air—the first composite aircraft, foreshadowing the development of this idea many years later.

The anti-submarine operations themselves were mostly conventional patrols or convoy escorts, though some peculiar experiments were tried. One boat was fitted with a hydrophone so that, when it had landed safely at sea, it could listen-in for a submarine. It was then supposed to take off and bomb the submarine. This was not one of the brighter ideas as any of you who have come down at sea will appreciate. The patrols were not very scientific—there were no boffins in those days—and anti-submarine bombs, dropped from 800–1,000 ft., with primitive bomb sights, were used instead of the depth charges of the 1939–45 War, dropped at zero altitude.

Not unnaturally the number of kills was small, but the submarine crews had a perhaps exaggerated fear of aircraft, the aircraft's presence only was sufficient to keep them down where they were ineffective. I believe there was no record of a ship being torpedoed whilst under air escort in that War. The only instance I know, though no doubt there were others, was when a submarine decided to fight it out with a flying boat off the Scilly Isles. The submarine managed to put a bullet through the radiator of the flying boat but a member of the crew climbed out on the wing and held a rag in the hole. The attack was completed successfully and the aircraft got back safely to its base.

Performance

For an aircraft these boats were very fairly seaworthy, their engines gave very little trouble and, as I have said, they could carry a reasonable load of bombs for an 8-hour patrol. A closed cockpit was another refinement, many years ahead of its general adoption. In fact, in their class, they were one of the most successful aircraft of the day and far more efficient than the float planes. Land-planes were hardly used at all, as the general unreliability of most engines of those days made them unpopular for flying far out to sea.

Of course the limited range of the flying boats—the actual cruising speed was only 60 knots—and their crude navigational facilities, particularly radio aids, restricted their range of operations. But this limited range was not important as the submarine of those days had not evolved the pack tactics which enabled attacks on convoys to be made far out at sea in the 1939–45 War. Instead they concentrated in the focal areas of sea traffic and these areas were mostly within the range of the aircraft then available.

DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN THE WARS

Between the Wars the flying boat developed slowly and changed little in general characteristics until a year or two before 1939. Metal hulls were substituted for wooden ones, more powerful engines were fitted, while more efficient streamlining improved performance ; and generally improved facilities for the crews, particularly the navigator, were provided. Only a few rather larger aircraft with three of four engines were produced.

Operationally the only real advance was in mobility, and flying boat routes were developed to most parts of the Commonwealth and Empire. The flying boat lent itself well to this role as crews could live on board, and refuelling facilities could be easily provided on local contract, utilising cans or oil drums carried in local craft at any port, lake or river where sufficient sheltered water was available.

An interesting divergence of views on the correct development of this type of aircraft arose. One school of thought favoured the " boat with wings " : seaworthy enough to be able to operate from roughish water and which, in the event of a forced landing in the open sea, could usually be expected to get away with it. The 3-engined Iris was an example of this type. It had a very strong hull with a steep V bottom to stand up to landing in rough water. But this, and its weight, naturally reduced its performance and it had great difficulty in getting airborne, needing a very long run. At the same time a failure of one of its engines inevitably involved a forced landing.

The other idea was to make the flying boat an efficient aircraft, as light as possible, and able to fly well after engine failure, but only capable of taking off and landing in sheltered waters. This is, of course, the line of development which finally emerged and it has been followed ever since.

The Short Sunderland

Just before the 1939-45 War the large and well armed 4-engined Short Sunderland was produced and became the standard British flying boat used during the War. In fact it is still in use. It was of long-range, had first-class navigational facilities and with four engines had little fear of involuntary landings. One of the first 4-gun rear turrets was fitted, and a good supply of depth charges could be carried. It was able to give a good account of itself when attacked in the air as many actions in the Bay of Biscay, when attacked by numerous enemy aircraft, proved.

The Catalina

The first American Catalina purchased for test flew the Atlantic to this Country in the Summer of 1939. It was followed later by large numbers of this most successful aircraft. The Catalina could fly with ease on one of its two engines and had an enormous range and endurance, though its cruising speed was low. An endurance of 23 hours and sometimes a good deal more, was possible. The low speed was not important for reconnaissance and convoy escort duties, when endurance was the predominating factor. These aircraft were extremely reliable and gave most excellent service. One of them in my group completed over 1,300 hours operational flying without ever having its engines removed.

The General Reconnaissance Land-plane

Just about the time of this big advance in flying boat types in the Royal Air Force a new feature in Coastal Reconnaissance aircraft was introduced. A number of Coastal Reconnaissance Squadrons were equipped with the Anson, a twin-engined land-plane.

The old trouble of loss in the event of engine failure was thereby largely eliminated, as the Anson had quite a good single-engine performance and was, moreover, very reliable in service.

The Anson was joined early in the War by the Hudson—a very modern American aircraft of good range and high speed. Later, the Whitley and Wellington bombers were introduced to the Coastal role to be followed eventually by the very long-range Liberators in large numbers. This first-class aircraft was at last successful in closing the gap in the Atlantic convoy routes.

THE 1939–45 WAR

As is well known the anti-submarine campaign of 1939–45 did not follow the pattern of the 1914–18 War. After a time the enemy submarines were forced away from the focal areas near the coast, and long-range and endurance on the part of the aircraft became of prime importance. The development of search radar and the Leigh light increased enormously the aircraft's killing power when it was found that offensive patrols, including particularly those across the Bay of Biscay, were more effective than purely convoy escorts. Convoy escorts were not abandoned, of course, but were restricted to daylight and when the convoy was threatened. As we all know the submarine was beaten in the end, and the enemy lost as many as 250 as a result of attacks from the air.

The flying boat and land-plane took part equally in these and other activities, according to the location of their bases and their particular suitability. The very long-range flights were handled by the Catalinas and later by the Liberators, whilst the Sunderlands were particularly useful in the Bay of Biscay, as their defensive power proved most valuable when attacked by enemy aircraft.

The Catalina suffered some disadvantage in the Atlantic, due to its low speed, when it had to fly a long distance against a strong wind before getting to its patrol area. This, and its poor defensive armament, made it also very vulnerable to air attack. During the latter part of the War these aircraft were mostly transferred to overseas theatres freer from air attack, such as the Indian Ocean. Here, away from Atlantic gales, their low speed was not so important, and their enormous endurance made them of special value for convoy escorts and long reconnaissance patrols designed to intercept an enemy fleet approaching the coast. In the Indian Ocean shipping was at a very low density compared with the North Atlantic, and correspondingly there were fewer enemy submarines. Offensive patrols were of lesser importance and convoy escorts predominated.

The radar aids, Leigh lights and other anti-submarine equipment were used by land-planes and flying boats alike, but the fitting of the latest radar search equipment was more easily and satisfactorily mounted on the former.

As the War progressed the number of land-planes employed on Coastal Reconnaissance duties greatly outnumbered the flying boats, but this was probably due to the vastly greater production capacity for this type of aircraft and possibly that it was, for this reason, cheaper to produce. It is true, also, that in the British Isles suitable places for sea-plane bases are surprisingly few. So many areas of water are either too exposed in rough weather, are too small, or are surrounded by hills.

In most overseas areas, particularly in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, this is not so, and excellent sea-plane bases can be developed with little effort whereas the building of an airfield is slow, costly and difficult and may even not be practical at all.

Mobility and Flexibility

I commanded a Group in India which was principally engaged in general reconnaissance operations, and my first squadron to arrive was a Catalina Squadron. It flew out from England piecemeal, the aircraft taking part in operations en route even as far away as North Russia. One pilot was awarded a D.F.C. for sinking a submarine as he passed through the Mediterranean.

The base selected for them was a reservoir near Madras, but when the flying boats arrived the base was but half built, no slipway was ready and the only facility for refuelling was a raft towed by a dilapidated motor boat requisitioned locally. In spite of this the first aircraft to arrive was on patrol within 48 hours, and the squadron's flying intensity, which was very high indeed, never dropped from then on. It was a fine example of the mobility and flexibility of this type of aircraft. Later on this squadron did a great deal of excellent work in landing agents on the Malay Peninsula. Such an operation involved a flight of well over 2,000 miles, including an entirely unassisted landing and take-off in an unknown bay in enemy territory.

Some Sunderlands of the Ceylon Group were also used to evacuate a body of troops which had been cut off near the Burma frontier in a location where a landing strip was not possible. A lake was used and the troops got out safely. A similar use of Sunderlands was made earlier in the evacuation of Greece and, I believe, as many as 100 soldiers were taken off at night in a single boat. Such a condition of overload is permissable in a flying boat in emergency, but it would not be possible in a land-plane.

We had a flight of Catalinas operating for weeks at a stretch from Masirah, an island off the coast of South Arabia. The facilities of this advanced base comprised a sheltered area of water, moorings, a local motor boat—mostly broken down—and a large pulling boat for carrying fuel and everything else. The camp consisted only of some disused fuel stores adapted very crudely as quarters. Whenever submarines were operating in the area the camp could be quickly manned entirely by air in the squadron's own aircraft. In this case an aerodrome from which rations could be drawn was located some 12 miles away, but no suitable general reconnaissance land-planes were available. In other islands of the Indian Ocean, where no landing grounds were possible at all, similar or better facilities could be provided for flying boats with little trouble and were invaluable.

Sometimes, of course, it happens the other way about. In the Azores it was possible to construct two first-class airfields, although no sea-plane base could be found. Time, and particularly economic factors, were not so important as the base was required for large scale use for an indefinite period.

The earlier part of the War produced some excellent illustrations of the flexibility of flying boats in similar circumstances in the Atlantic. A first-class base for them was found in the Shetland Islands though a good land-plane base was never achieved there. Iceland, in the first occupation, provided sea-plane facilities pending the construction of an airfield.

After the War ended the flexibility of the flying boat was still of value. With the acute shortage of shipping, Sunderlands were used for much of the evacuation of the Royal Air Force from Iceland, also for small parties from the extremely inaccessible Faroe Islands and other places. It has been a great regret to many that regular use was not made of the many highly trained flying boat squadrons in the huge trooping scheme undertaken to and from the Far East.

Sunderlands took part in the Berlin Air Lift, and today a squadron of them is serving in Korea with their usual efficiency and versatility.

A specialized development of the flying boat, was started towards the end of the War which was designed for the Island hopping stage in the Pacific. It was a jet-propelled single-seater fighter, built by Saunders Roe, which was intended to operate whilst airfields were under construction for the land-plane fighters. This boat was still under development when the War ended, but was subsequently finished and flown very successfully. It had an excellent performance though not so high as a normal jet fighter, and would have proved a very useful acquisition. It might have a future should similar conditions recur.

THE FUTURE

What is the future of military flying boats likely to hold? The original conditions of safety for over-water flying, which fostered their early development, have now largely disappeared.

At the same time I do not think it should be overlooked that a crew on military operations hundreds of miles out to sea do feel happier in a flying boat than in a land-plane. Things can happen due to enemy action, stress of weather, or risks of possible fuel shortage, which do not occur in peacetime flying, and can cause a ditching in which a flying boat will often be successful. However, unless the flying boat has features which cannot be obtained from the land-plane it should, logically, disappear in the interests of standardization, production, ease of servicing and training.

I propose, therefore, to investigate briefly its respective quality, compared with the land-plane, in the role of anti-submarine aircraft and similar capacities.

General Air Performance

The general performance required for such an aircraft is very long-range and endurance, and the capacity to carry the considerable and bulky loads required for detecting and attacking new type submarines by the latest tactical methods. The aircraft should be able to fly quickly to and from the patrol area and when employed on surface reconnaissance, but at the same time a low cruising speed under good control is most important when attempting an attack.

Unlike anti-ship reconnaissance the fact that an aircraft has passed through an area is no guarantee that no submarine is present. A submarine may become visible, and I mean visible in the widest sense, a few minutes after the aircraft has gone. There is therefore a vital need to have as many aircraft as possible in the threatened areas. There will never be enough. Therefore we must keep the size and cost of the aircraft down, so that we can have as many as possible. Unfortunately this will mean a sacrifice in range, but for the very distant patrol areas either a limited number of special long-range aircraft may have to be produced or, better still, flight refuelling could be used which would pay heavy dividends in time on patrol.

Investigation shows that we shall probably find that an aircraft of about 100,000 lbs. would give a fair compromise. This is really too large, on account of expense and because this weight requires specially strong runways, but it seems unavoidable. At this overall weight, and in fact for much heavier aircraft, the land-plane will be faster and carry more load than the flying boat. It is interesting that this advantage reverses eventually, but at sizes which are far too large and expensive for these operations. Sir Arthur Gouge suggested that it occurred at about 130,000-150,000 lbs. Short's investigations are very much higher—bigger than the Brabazon or Princess.

Another big problem is the carriage of sono buoys, markers, attack weapons, etc., in such a way that they can easily be dropped. Here again the land-plane scores, as the flying boat hull must be strong and water-tight and not adaptable to bomb doors. This can be overcome, in the opinion of Sir Arthur Gouge, but it is not easy.

Maintenance

Maintenance, refuelling and rearming in the field have always been one of the bugbears of the flying boat. It is indisputable that the necessity to take everything required to an aircraft at moorings involves difficulties and delays not suffered by the land-plane. No doubt some improvement of the antiquated system of mooring, on the lines adopted in civil aviation utilizing floating docks, could largely overcome this at main bases; but moorings would still be necessary at advanced bases.

In other respects there is little to choose between the two types, though the large hull of the flying boat is very useful to provide the crew with good operational stations, defensive armament and rest facilities on long flights.

Technically therefore the land-plane has a considerable advantage over the flying boat. Tactically there is not much to choose between them, though the land-plane will gain some advantage in range and speed over its rival.

Suggested Uses

Strategically the ability of the flying boat to operate from a very primitive advanced base can be extremely valuable, as I have tried to show. Without the delay, expense and heavy use of manpower and materials required to build an airfield, the flying boat can be on the job quickly and move again elsewhere when the threat is removed. Such an advantage is tremendous in a form of warfare in which the enemy can switch their operations quickly from one area to another.

It may be that very long-range land-planes could be used from some existing base in many cases but, even here, the very long flights involved would seriously reduce efficiency as time on patrol would be so short. To have a base close to the scene of operations may well raise time on patrol four or five times.

A careful examination of the shipping routes of the World, and the distance of the possible sea-plane and land-plane bases in British or friendly territory, shows that the North Atlantic requires very long-range aircraft. Elsewhere a combination of land-planes and flying boats, of moderate size, could cover most of them except around South America. Here either Allies to loan bases or carrierborne aircraft would be necessary.

It seems to me, therefore, that the bulk of our general reconnaissance aircraft should be land-planes of about 100,000 lbs. with possibly a smaller type as well; and to these should be added a number of flying boat squadrons, mainly located overseas where their flexibility and ability to use advanced bases, denied to land-planes, would be invaluable.

A small number of boats would still be needed at home for both convenience of development and for use in areas such as the Shetland Islands where land-plane bases are not practicable.

Type Required

A flying boat to satisfy this type of role needs some careful forethought and specialized design. An adaptation of a civil design is not likely to produce what is wanted.

The basic requirement is a boat which will give satisfactory service when operating from advanced bases. Care should therefore be taken that it is kept as simple as possible, and electrical and radio equipment must be exceptionally well protected from damp. If it is to be easily serviced and refuelled in primitive conditions it will certainly be a big advantage to keep the size down. The Catalina was ideal in that respect, but I cannot see any hope in getting anywhere near that size again when the complications of modern equipment are allowed for.

I suggest that a patrol cruising speed of about 150 knots would be adequate, provided that it will fly slower under good control. A point-to-point speed as high as possible is advisable so long as air miles per gallon are not excessive.

A really good flight-deck is wanted, where the crew are all together, but with space for the complicated equipment and plotting necessary. The flight-deck of the Sunderland is a good example. Elsewhere really comfortable rest stations, with facilities for providing hot food, should be provided. This helps to keep a crew fresh on a long flight. A tired crew is almost valueless for reconnaissance work.

Probably the designers' biggest problem, as I mentioned earlier, will be the stowage and method of dropping the numerous sono buoys, markers and weapons required. The wings are usually filled with tanks and, if stowage is necessary in the hull, facilities for reloading the dropping gear reasonably quickly must be practical when flying in bad weather.

An operational range of something over 2,000 miles, or of about 15 hours duration, carrying a war load, would be reasonable but tankage for the maximum point-to-point distance, without a war load, should be incorporated.

I would hope that a boat of about 75,000–80,000 lbs. all-up weight could reasonably satisfy these requirements. Personally I would rather make sacrifices in endurance or war load than be forced to take something much larger. Flight refuelling could help out for special long-distance emergencies.

The Advanced Base and the Depot Ship

If one or two specially equipped depot ships could be provided they would add enormously to the efficiency of the advanced bases. I picture a series of main bases at widely separated strategic points, rather like naval dockyards, to which all boats in the area would return for major overhaul. Operations would be conducted from the main base or a convenient advanced base in accordance with the situation. The depot ships would be used to open up advanced bases as necessary and enable immediate and efficient operations to begin as soon as they arrived. The depot ship would carry moorings, marine craft, fuel, warlike stores, spares, etc., and provide accommodation for the flying and ground crews. They might even carry special rafts by which flying boat hulls could be lifted for servicing—usually the biggest headache at such a place. If regular operations appeared likely the base could be developed by providing accommodation ashore and the depot ship could proceed elsewhere. Such a depot ship has been planned: it is expensive though it need not be large. But loss of merchant ships and their cargoes soon far exceeds expense of this sort.

CONCLUSION

I have concentrated on the use of flying boats in anti-submarine operations which will be their main role in any foreseeable major war. For reconnaissance against surface vessels the flying boat, equipped for anti-submarine warfare and

provided with good defensive armament, is ideal. Normally the faster it can fly the better.

There may well be other uses of the flying boat, such as the fighter type I mentioned earlier, or in the role of transport aircraft. In itself the flying boat can make an excellent transport, but whilst so few are used in civil aviation for reasons rather illogical in themselves, there are too few bases to make it worthwhile to use them as part of our small air transport service in peace time. In war-time their flexibility, and the invulnerability of their ' aerodrome ' to damage by enemy action, may make them invaluable. Any flying boats left in civil aviation would be highly suitable for the purpose. A number of Princess flying boats could have been used many times to some effect in the last War, in Crete, Singapore, Burma and on many more such tragic occasions. A flying boat can land at night anywhere in sheltered water, whereas aerodromes can be made unserviceable by bombing, or be overrun by the enemy. It is unlikely that such surprise arrivals could be interfered with by enemy intruder aircraft. Troops and portable stores can be landed or taken off when any other methods are impossible.

I have been associated with flying boats a number of times from the very beginning of my career and, like most other flying boat pilots, I have a great fondness for them. Consequently, I have tried in this lecture to be as unprejudiced as possible. I believe that it would be a great loss to our Commonwealth, dependent on sea traffic as it is, if the flying boat as a military or civil aircraft was allowed to die.

DISCUSSION

GROUP CAPTAIN D. I. COOTE : I would stress even more than the Lecturer has done the capabilities of flying boats operating with depot ships. During the War I had command of a flying boat squadron in Iceland where we operated from a depot ship ; at 4.30 one afternoon we received orders to leave for West Africa, and by midnight the last aircraft had left Iceland. We operated for a fortnight in the Mediterranean on the way, and arrived in West Africa one evening to find another depot ship waiting for us. We were able to operate from there the next morning. With flying boats it is possible to operate absolutely immediately from advanced bases with depot ships. I think there is a tremendous advantage in that.

THE LECTURER : It certainly makes a very great difference.

AIR COMMODORE C. E. CHILTON : When making out a case for the flying boat I think that we must be careful that we really can justify it. I suggest that the conclusion the Lecturer arrived at was the right one, but it was not necessarily arrived at by the right reasoning. I believe that the answer lies in the field of economics, and as the Lecturer has said, we will need lots of aeroplanes for anti-submarine work, so we have to determine what we can afford. In my view, the very long-range work should be done by land-planes. If you accept that view it is quite easy to work out the economic range of flying boats and then apply the operational factors.

I agree that we want flying boats because they provide a better degree of flexibility, and I believe we should say that for " X " miles from base, the flying boat is more suitable : " X " might be, say, between five and seven thousand miles. I think that it is well within the capacity of the British aeronautical industry to produce a twin-engined flying boat of about 65,000 lbs. which will be able to cover what I call " medium range work " and yet, at the same time, carry the necessary weapons. It may not take off quite so well as some of the four-engined type of planes or fly as fast, but I think that we should have a flying boat of this type and make up our minds to accept certain limitations and sacrifices.

I am not too keen on flight refuelling because it puts too much of a strain on the crew. You can only carry a limited crew, and if you double the endurance of the plane with the

same crew it becomes a very tiring business. However, it would be acceptable to add, say, two or three hours petrol time by flight refuelling immediately after take-off.

One other factor which the Lecturer did not mention is the question of joint operations with carriers. I do not believe that the Atlantic life line can be covered exclusively by shore-based aircraft, and I think that the middle of the Atlantic may well have to be covered by carrier aircraft.

As regards the mobility of flying boats, I agree that they can operate without prepared bases, but the Lecturer mentioned Redhills Lake in South India. As you are all probably aware, Redhills Lake had to be artificially raised by some two to three feet in order that flying boats could operate for the rest of the War, and the same thing applied to another lake in Ceylon which also had to be raised artificially. Incidentally, the water level was reduced after we left. As the Lecturer pointed out it is difficult to find flying boat bases ready-made on the lines of the one we found at Redhills Lake and this reinforces the argument for a small flying boat.

With regard to the question of fighter flying boats, the Lecturer stated that it would probably have to have an inferior performance to that of the equivalent land-plane. I do not think that that is necessarily true. I believe that modern development in aeronautical design, particularly with reference to the hull, can produce a fighter flying boat which is in all respects pretty well on a level with land-planes.

THE LECTURER: You mentioned the economics of the flying boat and a size of 60,000 lbs. I did not stress that point sufficiently, but I had very much in mind the necessity for keeping the size down at all costs. If we could have one of that size it would be a very fine thing, but the methods of seeking the Schnorkel type of submarine are very complicated, and it means more equipment and more space in the plane. There is no advantage in constructing a flying boat of that size if it has to leave behind the best of its equipment because it cannot be accommodated. If, however, a flying boat of that size could be constructed which could carry all the necessary equipment, it would, of course, be of great advantage because it could land in shallower places.

With regard to flight refuelling, the conclusion to which I and others came when we studied it was that you should set off in company with your refuelling aircraft. Assuming that the tanker holds about the same amount of fuel as the patrol aircraft, you fly out one-third of your endurance together so there is no great difficulty in intercepting each other. You then transfer one-third of the tankers' fuel, which fills the patrol aircraft full and the tanker has one-third left with which to return to base. The patrol aircraft is then left with one-third extra fuel which, if it is operating, may treble its time on patrol.

I did not mention carriers because the question was whether we want flying boats at all, and if so where they fit in with land-planes. Carriers come in in parallel with, and not instead of, either land-planes or flying boats. Certain convoys will probably have a carrier with them for special reasons. On the other hand it may be that carriers are not available or they may be a bit too vulnerable to submarine attack themselves, so we should not try to close the gap with the carriers alone.

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER MALLESON, R.N.: Strategically the Indian Ocean seems to be the most promising place for the operation of flying boats, assuming that the Americans would cover the Pacific and assuming that the Atlantic is easily covered by long-range land-planes and carriers. In the centre of the Indian Ocean the only islands are coral atolls, which are ideal flying boat bases but which are not suitable for land-planes. I cannot see us having sufficient carriers to cover the Indian Ocean, and I feel that flying boats based around the perimeter and in the centre of that Ocean for day operations, backed up by small airships for night operations, might prove to be a solution to anti-submarine measures, not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the central part of the Atlantic Ocean East of the West Indies.

THE LECTURER: I thought I rather stressed the point that the Indian Ocean rather suited flying boats, and I quoted a number of examples. It is the area in which they will

show to the best advantage. The easterly part of the South Atlantic, rather than round South America itself, under present conditions may also be a good area.

I do not understand what are the particular merits of having airships at night. What is wrong with aircraft ?

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER MALLESON, R.N. : My own experience of anti-submarine operations is that no aircraft in which I have flown have been really efficient at night, whereas the airship does maintain a much higher percentage of its efficiency. I know there is not much interest on this side of the Atlantic in airships, but we who introduced them have found the work carried on by the Americans who are enthusiastic enough to keep four airship squadrons in full commission.

THE CHAIRMAN : If I may put in a word, it seems to me that this discussion is rather diverting from the real subject of the lecture which is, after all, the use of the flying boat in war. These points are very useful, but it is almost becoming a discussion on the tactics of anti-submarine warfare and various methods which might be used, which is not really the subject of the discussion.

MR. J. R. BUSHBY (Short Bros.) : In view of what the Lecturer considers to be the optimum size of the tactical flying boat, can he suggest the tactical reasoning behind the specification for the Shetland, an aircraft of considerably greater range and performance than that of the Sunderland ?

THE LECTURER : We cannot afford the larger type really because we cannot have enough of them. We have never had enough. Again, with large types of flying boat it will be found that bases are more expensive, and the flying boats themselves are expensive, to produce and maintain.

A MEMBER : It may well be that in a future war we shall have to face anything from fifty to a hundred submarines being at sea before war is actually declared. Have we anything to deal with that ?

THE CHAIRMAN : The Lecturer has said that he would like to leave that one to me !

Again, if I might suggest it, that point is slightly off the subject. It is really a matter of anti-submarine warfare rather than a question of whether we should use flying boats or land-planes. I think that we are agreed that we have not nearly enough of any type of aircraft today, and are fully alive to the threat from submarines at the beginning of any war. Beyond that I cannot say any more.

In thanking Air Vice-Marshal Mackworth for his very interesting lecture, I should first of all like to repair an omission. He did ask me to say in my opening remarks that he has suffered from a very bad cold and found it very difficult indeed to get here at all today. He was afraid that he might not be able to get the lecture over. I think we shall all agree that his fears in that direction were unfounded, but I must apologise for not having explained that before.

So far as I am concerned, I do not think that I have very much to add to what has been said both by the Lecturer and by those who have made contributions to the discussion. We have a term in the Royal Air Force—" The flying boat union," sometimes used somewhat opprobiously. The Lecturer is an old member of that union, and he might have been expected perhaps to make out more of a case for the flying boat as opposed to the land-plane than he has. I think he can justly claim that he has given an unprejudiced view and has, in fact, impartially examined the question and decided, if anything, in favour of the land-plane rather than the flying boat for the various reasons which he gave. I think that he was right in doing that, but I would say this, that I believe there will always be certain times at which the flying boat will be most useful to us, and in certain areas at all times. A good deal has already been said about the areas in which the flying boat could suitably operate, such as the Indian Ocean, and I think that is incontestable ; but the time I am thinking of is at the beginning of a war when we do not know quite where the intensive operations will take place. I think that to tide over the time when

airfields can be constructed in certain parts of the World, the flying boat will come into its own, because it can, as has been shown this afternoon, operate from improvised bases where it is wanted. Therefore at the beginning of a war I certainly think that the flying boat will be a most useful asset to our forces.

In certain parts of the World it will, I think, always be a useful asset because of the difficulty of preparing airfields, but again the time factor comes in. Operations at sea have a habit of moving from one area to another with considerable rapidity. As an example, if you remember at the end of the last War all the anti-submarine activities were devoted to the South-Western approaches, and the whole of Coastal Command was concentrated in the South-West in order to deal with the particular threat which was expected in connection with Operation Overlord. As soon as that Operation was safely over and the troops in France were under way on their journey to Germany, the sea situation, insofar as submarines were concerned, completely changed, and it resulted in the whole of Coastal Command being rapidly moved back again from the South West to the North. By that time, of course, we in Coastal Command were operating more land-planes than flying boats, and there were ample airfields already constructed during the five years of war. Our land-based squadrons could move without any difficulty, but I would suggest that if the same sort of thing happened in a part of the World where land bases did not exist and could not be made in a very short space of time, movement of the necessary forces to undertake operations in difficult waters could be more easily undertaken by flying boats than land-planes. That is a case where the flying boat comes into its own.

A good deal has been said about the question of range, and I am particularly interested in that because I do believe that sometimes the enormous potentialities of aircraft with really long ranges are apt to be forgotten. In particular I think that people in general are apt to forget the potentialities of the long-range bomber, which can reach almost any part of the World without having to change its base. I think it is very important to remember, however, that the problem of the bomber is somewhat different from that of aircraft engaged upon anti-submarine operations. The problem of the bomber is to get to the target area, get rid of its bombs, and then get back to its base as quickly as possible. Therefore, if it can do that without having to change its base, so much the better. The problem of the anti-submarine aircraft is to stay in the operating area as long as possible. So, however long the aircraft range may be, we still want to have the base as near as we can to the operating area because of the need to stay as long as possible over it. Again, the flying boat will provide us with that facility because of its flexibility which has been referred to this afternoon.

The Lecturer made a passing reference to the possibility of using the flying boat in the transport role. I do not want to say very much about that. He did point out how valuable was the flying boat of the Princess type now under construction, and how useful it might have been in certain circumstances in the last War. I think that he is right, but he made another very pertinent remark, namely, that if the flying boat were to be used for any military purpose it was not satisfactory that it should be an adaptation of a civil aircraft.

In the military transport role we have to think in terms not only of passengers, but also of heavy bulky equipment which will be needed for all three services perhaps. That is, I think, where the flying boat may not be quite such a suitable aircraft as the land-plane. To start with, my own feeling is that it will be more difficult to design a boat into which really heavy equipment can be loaded. Then of course there is the problem of loading itself which may have to be done not from permanently prepared docks, but under improvised conditions, which will add to the complications. I do not say that these difficulties are insuperable, but they will add to the complications of designing a boat for the full role of military transport.

So far as flight refuelling is concerned, I do not know whether the Lecturer is allowed to have another crack, but there is one question which I should like to ask. Would not

flight refuelling really entail two aircraft of the same size and weight, and therefore carrying two crews ? At the same time there would still only be one aircraft on patrol. Is there any good reason why one aircraft, carrying two crews if necessary to guard against fatigue, could not do the same job and carry the fuel on its own ?

THE LECTURER : It is rather difficult to explain in this way, but assume that the endurance of the aircraft is 15 hours, which is split into units of 5 hours. The tanker will do 5 hours out for one-third of the time, it will deliver 5 hours fuel to the aircraft going on patrol, and will have 5 hours fuel with which to fly back. The patrol aircraft, therefore, does 15 plus 5 hours which is 20 hours flying altogether. Suppose the patrol area is 7 hours flying from base and allowing 7 hours for the return flight, the aircraft could stay on patrol for 6 hours. Total flying of the two aircraft involved would be 30 hours. Without refuelling the patrol aircraft could stay on patrol only 1 hour in its 15-hour flight.

THE CHAIRMAN : I will accept the mathematics of that with good grace !

All I have to do now is to thank Air Vice-Marshal Mackworth for having given us an extremely interesting lecture on what is obviously a very important subject. (*Applause.*)

AIR COMMODORE G. CHILTON : On your behalf I should like to propose a vote of thanks to our Chairman, Air Marshal Sir Aubrey Ellwood, who gave a very valuable lecture before this Institution in 1947, on the part Coastal Command aircraft played in keeping the U-boats out of the Channel during the invasion period. If you have not already studied that lecture I commend it to you, as flying boats played their part to the full during this phase of the 1939-45 War. (*Applause.*)

MAGINOT MENTALITY

By Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Viscount Trenchard, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., D.C.L., LL.D.

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I HAVE listened to many discussions and read a number of articles on plans that are being made for defence in order to prevent war, or, should war come, to ensure that the civilized Powers are not placed at a disadvantage.

Much is being said about the Atlantic Pact, the Brussels Pact, and arrangements for the defence of the Far East, Korea, Formosa, Malaya and the Middle East. Papers and periodicals publish large numbers of maps of various parts of the World illustrating the positions of overseas bases, the dispositions of potential enemy forces and sources of raw material; for maps have always influenced military thought and planning, and they always will.

At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth Century, maps in British schools showed Great Britain in the centre, America on the left and Europe and Asia on the right. Moreover, the Mercator Projection (which shows the whole World on a flat surface, thus distorting the relative size of the countries) was very misleading.

With the rise of aviation and consequent discussions on the use of air power, it was apparent that the old maps were not only inaccurate, but gave a completely wrong military impression. In fact, the study of aerial warfare has made it necessary to alter our conventional ideas of the map of the World.

When I was Chief of the Air Staff, 30 years ago, I obtained a map with the American continent in the centre, instead of Britain. This gave me quite a different idea of the World from a military point of view.

Many years later I found that the Brookings Institute at Washington, U.S.A., had published a map of the World divided into two hemispheres. This showed that the " land hemisphere," embracing all Europe, Asia, Africa, North America and the greater part of South America, contained 94 per cent. of the World's population and 98 per cent. of its industrial activity, whereas only 6 per cent. of the population and 2 per cent. industrial activity are to be found in the " water hemisphere."

This, in my opinion, is a more accurate conception of reality than is provided by the old Mercator maps, to which we have all been so long accustomed, and it proves that to all intents and purposes of strategy we have only to deal with one hemisphere.

I feel that the Services and political authorities have not yet fully realized how air power has altered the World; how distances have shortened. Space on this planet has been conquered; there is no such thing to-day. It does not make sense to talk about the Atlantic Pact, the Brussels Pact, or the *Middle* East or *Far* East. It is now *one* world.

During the 1914–18 War, defensive weapons became so formidable that trench warfare was forced on the opposing armies, and because of this many people thought that this form of combat had come to stay. So much was it believed that the French built their Maginot Line and we fortified Singapore, Hong Kong and other places without making aerodromes; yet the next war proved all these defensive measures to be quite useless. This was due in a large part to the development of air power.

During the 1939–45 War we learned that it was essential to have aerodromes surrounding all the enemies' territory at strategic points, from which bombing raids could be carried out. This was necessary because of the comparatively limited range of fighter aircraft providing cover, but we are under no such limitations to-day. I have said that space has been conquered on this planet. We can now build, and have built, fighter and bomber aircraft with a range of 5,000 miles and more. These machines can carry a load of bombs or an atom bomb to any part of the "land hemisphere."

In the 1939–45 War it took hundreds of aircraft to do the work which one can do to-day carrying the atom bomb. It is no exaggeration to say that one or two bombers can do the damage a thousand did on Cologne or Hamburg—and can travel ten times the distance to do it.

It has been said, perhaps with truth, that the military staffs of all nations always make their plans and prepare for the *last war*. As far as I can see, that is what is being done now; we are preparing to fight the next war on the basis of 1939–45—like the Maginot Line after the 1914–18 War. If this is so, and a third world war comes, I fear we shall have a rude awakening.

In the last great war air bases were fought for all over the World. In the islands of the Pacific, in North Africa, in Southern Europe and many other places, with all that it meant in transporting millions of men to hold air bases or islands; the millions of tons of war material, the thousands of ships to carry them and the ships to protect the transports from submarines. It was necessary to have the air bases to provide cover for the ships and armies. But with the tremendous increase in range and striking power of modern aircraft, these scattered bases are unnecessary, and to plan on the lines of the 1939–45 War over again is to be caught in a vicious circle.

Yet, we are still talking of "balanced forces" between the Navy, Army and Air Force—which presumably means that we intend to use ships and their escort vessels, that we mean to maintain garrisons in far-distant places, and keep those garrisons supplied with millions of tons of war material, and that the ships and garrisons will have to be protected from the hazards of submarines and air attacks on their lines of communication throughout the World.

The Western democracies are at a disadvantage with regard to manpower for armies. They are at a disadvantage economically in that they have high standards of life to maintain. Can the Western peoples keep up their standard of life and provide sufficient of their "balanced forces" in all parts of the World to repulse aggression at any point chosen by the Communists? The answer is NO.

Can the Western democracies build up an invincible fleet of long-range aircraft whose striking power would deter any aggressor? Could this fleet actually repulse aggression with few or no ground troops to help it? The answer to the first question is YES, and to the second question YES—after the three or four years it would take to build the necessary aircraft.

I do not suggest that we should withdraw our troops from Germany and Austria; indeed, it is essential to maintain and even build up our position in Europe; on that vital front we cannot afford to yield an inch. Moreover, at the present moment we have not the long-range aircraft and therefore it is necessary to have a strong army and tactical air forces on the Continent while we are building a powerful air fleet.

The next few years should be a period of transition during which time we should place the weight of our defensive preparation on the side of long-range aircraft, and

thus, as our air-power increases, the strain of maintaining large ground forces overseas would be progressively reduced.

My object in writing this article is to ensure that we begin to build these essential types of machines *now*, and not wait, as we did in 1939, until after war has started. Then we were fortunate in being granted time, but in the next war time may not be on our side.

I would recommend that those who are prepared to consider these matters should read the new book, *Air Power : Key to Survival*, by Major Serversky (Simon Schuster, New York, 1950). This book is nearer to my own views on defence questions than anything I have heard or read, in this Country or any other, about the future of world defence.

The peoples of the West are at an advantage in that they have a high standard of general education and technical development. They can maintain their standard of life and at the same time develop one type of force which can strike anywhere on the earth. By the might of her Navy, nineteenth-century Britain ruled the majority of the World, and by the might of an air fleet of ten times the range and five hundred times the striking power of the last war, Western civilization can face and overcome the menace from the East.

If we wholeheartedly and unreservedly put our weight into producing the machines, to be operated from *home bases* in Britain and the U.S.A., this would give us far greater security than establishing or maintaining these far-distant bases, which are only moderately safe in the World to-day.

By this means we should save untold manpower and material, and the saving thus achieved could be put into the provision of more and more long-range aircraft. It is the greater range of aircraft and not the atom bomb that has changed warfare.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH NAVAL OPERATIONS DURING THE KOREAN WAR[1]

WHEN hostilities began on 25th June, 1950, H.M. Ships, under the command of Rear-Admiral W. G. Andrewes, Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Station, were dispersed in Japanese waters on a cruise. Under the direction of the C.-in-C., Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, Admiral Andrewes concentrated his available forces and offered them to the United States authorities for humanitarian purposes. Then, on 29th June, His Majesty's Government placed our ships at the disposal of the Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East.

At this time there were 22 British warships in Far East waters. Their duties were widespread and included the Malayan patrol, the defence of Hong Kong, and the Yangtse Estuary patrol. Dispositions had to be made quickly and, by reducing other requirements to a minimum, it was possible to put a high percentage of the fleet at the disposal of the Commander, United States Naval Forces. By 30th June the first British ships, which included the light fleet carrier " Triumph " (Captain A. D. Torlesse, D.S.O.) ; the cruisers " Belfast " (Captain Sir Aubrey St. Clair-Ford, Bt., D.S.O.), " Jamaica " (Captain J. S. C. Salter, D.S.O., O.B.E.) ; the destroyers " Cossack " (Captain R. T. White, D.S.O.), " Consort " (Commander J. R. Carr) ; the frigates " Black Swan " (Captain A. D. H. Jay, D.S.O., D.S.C.), " Alacrity " (Commander H. S. Barber), " Hart " (Commander N. H. H. Mulleneux, D.S.C.) and several auxiliaries, had started work with the United States Navy, and at this time British forces on the spot were numerically about as strong as those of the United States Navy. Although over 1,000 miles from the nearest British base, our ships were logistically self-supporting. From the outset they played a most active and prominent part in establishing that complete naval supremacy so essential to the conduct of operations on land.

H.M.S. " Jamaica " and " Black Swan " were despatched up the East coast to join a United States force in harassing the enemy's left flank. At dawn on 2nd July these ships were engaged in the first naval action of the War, when they were attacked by a force of six North Korean E-boats. The action was brief and decisive, all the E-boats being sunk except one. On the same day the " Jamaica " joined in the first bombardment of the War. The ships continued harassing work and it was during a bombardment that the " Jamaica " suffered the first casualties of the War at sea when she was hit by a shell from a shore battery.

Meanwhile on the West coast the " Alacrity " started a patrol destined to grow into the West Coast blockade which has, since the 5th July, been the main task of the British Commonwealth ships and has prevented supplies reaching the enemy by sea either from outside Korea or along the coast. H.M.S. " Triumph " and " Belfast " and the destroyers joined up with other American units and on 3rd July the combined carrier force was in a position to fly off strikes over enemy territory. From then onwards the " Triumph " worked with the United States 7th Fleet until the arrival of additional U.S. carriers at the beginning of August enabled her to be released to join British Commonwealth forces blockading the West coast of Korea, where the aircraft were employed in seeking out and destroying enemy craft in the creeks and harbours.

[1]A Sketch map of Korea faces page 304.

By 5th July the British Commonwealth Fleet had been reinforced by the British destroyers " Comus " (Lieutenant-Commander R. A. M. Hennessy) and " Cockade " (Lieutenant-Commander H. J. Lee, D.S.C.), the Australian destroyer " Bataan " (Commander W. B. M. Marks, R.A.N.) and frigate " Shoalhaven " (Commander I. H. McDonald, R.A.N.), with the Canadian destroyers " Cayuga " (Captain J. V. Brock, D.S.C., R.C.N.), " Athabaskan " (Commander R. T. Welland, D.S.C., R.C.N.), and " Sioux " (Commander P. D. Taylor, R.C.N.), and the New Zealand frigates " Tutira " (Lieutenant-Commander P. J. H. Hoare, R.N.) and " Pukaki " (Lieutenant-Commander L. E. Herrick, D.S.C., R.N.) on passage to Japan. This contribution from the Commonwealth Navies is considerable in relation to their peace-time size. It is of interest to note that the total number of officers and men of the Navies of the British Commonwealth serving at this time in the Far East was in the region of 10,000, and of this number approximately 7,000 were engaged in operations in Korea ; a very high percentage when the bases at Singapore and Hong Kong, and the naval commitments there, are taken into consideration.

There are always small difficulties to be overcome when the Navies of two nations start working together, and it was most fortunate that the British ships had carried out joint manoeuvres with the U.S. 7th Fleet earlier in the year. United States methods were adopted, and the Commander 7th Fleet chose to send a signal of congratulations to Rear-Admiral Andrewes on the 5th July on the excellent manner in which the British ships had taken to these methods.

Rear-Admiral Andrewes assumed responsibility for the West coast blockade on 5th July, and a United States Admiral was in command on the East coast. An escort force, commanded by a Captain, R.N., was also formed to convoy troopships and storeships to and from Japan, and both this and Admiral Andrewes' force was composed of ships belonging to the British Commonwealth. To carry out a blockade efficiently it must be 100 per cent., and to achieve this means the continuous employment of a number of ships. At the start of the operation the ships available were few and therefore had to be kept on patrol to the maximum of their endurance.

The destroyers and frigates were often operating under difficult navigational conditions and in channels around the islands which had not been charted for many years. A summary from the log of H.M.S. " Cossack " gives a slight idea ; between the 24th June and 16th August she steamed 14,424 miles on operational duty, an average of 272 miles a day. The engine-room crews were hard put to it to keep the ships at sea, and their task can best be appreciated when it is realised that the complements of British ships in the Far East were at peace-time strength, which means that four men must do the job of five, which leaves little margin for sickness. Complements have since been brought up to war establishment.

The blockade has been maintained from the day it was ordered and every ship has steamed thousands of miles in a climate ranging from the tropical to the arctic. The absence of the spectacular is a measure of the complete success achieved. In addition to this primary duty, and without relaxation from it, the British Commonwealth ships have played a full part in the special operations of war. Many bombardments have been carried out, notably of Mokpo, Kunsan, Inchon, and the islands off the West coast while United Nations land forces were holding the Pusan perimeter. H.M.S. " Belfast " carried out one of the first observed bombardments at Yongdok on 19th July, when a total of 380 rounds of six-inch were fired and enthusiastic observers reported that Yongdok no longer existed.

While the ships of the West coast blockade force were able occasionally to bombard, the ships of the escort force, under the command of Captain A. D. H. Jay, D.S.O., D.S.C., and later Captain J. H. Unwin, D.S.C., were continuously escorting ships to and from Japan. Their work was monotonous in the extreme, and here again the few ships available were hard worked and shore leave became a rarity. Many of the ships were overdue for docking and refit, but throughout no ship of the force broke down, which speaks highly for the skill of the officers and men.

The early part of the War cannot be left without mention of the British hospital ship " Maine " (Master, Captain S. V. Kent). This ship was built at Spezia in Italy in 1925 and was named " Leonardo da Vinci." In 1943, she was taken over by Britain and renamed " Empire Clyde." In 1947, she was converted into a hospital ship and renamed " Maine," replacing a former ship of that name. She is a vessel of 7,515 tons. She was at this early period the only hospital ship in Japanese waters, due to the unfortunate sinking of the American hospital ship " Providence " in a collision off San Francisco just as she started for Korea. The " Maine's " first trip was on 14th July, and from then until the 24th August she was employed on the evacuation of wounded from Korea. During this period she steamed 4,654 miles in the process of evacuating 1,316 casualties. Her hospital staff worked unceasingly, and it is of interest to note that on three of her trips the ship managed to depart from port on another trip within four hours of arrival, having evacuated 250 wounded.

On 25th August H.M.S. " Ceylon " and H.M.S. " Unicorn " sailed from Hong Kong with 1,500 troops of the 1st Battalion, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and the 1st Battalion, The Middlesex Regiment, and 800 tons of stores for Pusan. This operation was performed in a most expeditious manner, and on 29th August the ships arrived at Pusan. Disembarkation was completed and all stores landed by 9 a.m. on the 30th, a considerable feat in view of the cranes available. The ships' companies worked throughout the night to complete this task.

Meanwhile the logistic support of the Fleet was being arranged. H.M.S. " Unicorn " (Captain H. S. Hopkins, C.B.E.) brought replenishment aircraft for the " Triumph " and later for the " Theseus." The superior accommodation in this replenishment carrier left room for many tons of bulk stores much needed by the Fleet operating over 1,000 miles from its base. Besides the " Unicorn," the Admiralty used H.M.S. " Ocean " and H.M.S. " Warrior," the two latter as troopers, to carry out men and material from the United Kingdom.

The Fleet Train grew in size, and among the ships employed were the " Fort Charlotte," " Fort Rosalie," " Choysang," " Green Ranger," " Brown Ranger," " Wave Emperor," " Wave Laird," " Wave Prince " and " Wave Sovereign."

It should not be supposed that the naval war in Korea had settled down to a routine affair. The blockade was working smoothly, and it seemed about this time that the ships could be rested for short periods in turn. But the Inchon landings were about to take place and all ships were required for support and escort duties. This remarkable amphibious operation, mounted in such a short space of time, will long be remembered. H.M. Cruisers " Jamaica," " Ceylon " and " Kenya," with the " Triumph " providing air spotting, formed part of the bombarding force. The destroyers and frigates formed escorts and carried out close and outer screen duties at the port of Inchon. Most of the ships were at sea by 11th September and the Commonwealth ships employed for the duties of escorting and screening were the frigates " Mounts Bay," " Tutira," " Pukaki " and " Whitesand Bay." This force

remained at sea until 14th October, operating in and around the approaches to Inchon.

As a result of the retreat of the North Korean forces it became evident that many of the islands on the West and South-West coasts of Korea would need early liberation. The destroyers and frigates carried out the majority of these missions. The Australian destroyer " Warramunga " (Commander O. H. Becher, D.S.C., R.A.N.) in September carried out one of the most successful. Not a gun was fired, though the ship was at action stations all the time. Instead, the " Warramunga " sent ashore rice in place of shells to feed hundreds of South Korean islanders and several lighthouse-keepers who were marooned by the War on their islands.

A similar exploit was that carried out by H.M.S. " Ceylon " (Captain C. F. J. Lloyd Davies, D.S.C., R.C.N.). The ship sent a landing party to reconnoitre a small island called Chaya-ku-Ko, which lies off the Korean coast near Inchon. On the far side of this bare island the party found a hut in which were twenty orphaned children under the care of one woman. The temperature was below freezing point. There was no fire, the children were almost naked and very sick.

A message was sent back to the cruiser, and the Chaplain broadcast an appeal to the ship's company for gifts of surplus clothing. Within an hour his cabin was piled with offerings of shirts, coats and woollens. Two " mercy " boats were landed with food and clothing, a medical officer and the Chaplain. A working party was also landed with axes and saws, and felled enough firewood to last the orphanage the rest of the winter. Meanwhile, stores of food were unloaded and clothing was unwrapped for the children. Sailors stripped the rags from them and re-dressed them in thick clothing.

A special Royal Marine Independent Commando was sent out to Japan early in the War. These troops are specially trained for raids on enemy communications behind the front line. Suitable targets were few, but they carried out a number of raids, operating from ships of the United Nations. When the Inchon invasion took place they carried out a diversionary landing at Kunsan from the British frigate " Whitesand Bay " alongside American special troops.

One of their toughest fights took place when they fought their way from Hamhung up the tortuous mountain road to join the American Marine division at Hagaru. The Commando, under Lieutenant-Colonel D. P. Drysdale, M.B.E., R.M., fought its way with American troops through the mountainous passes and at one time had Chinese Communists firing into the vehicles from the ditches six yards away at the side of the road. It was here that the Commando was split, their rear party being cut off when a phosphorus bomb set fire to an ammunition truck, making it impossible for the following vehicles to continue up the road. The ones ahead kept going until they joined the 7th U.S. Marines at Haragu at 11 p.m. The Commandos were mustered and there were no more than 63 present. That night 55 more fought their way through.

The Communists were in the hills all around the camp at Hagaru and preparations were made to attack in the morning. Only sniping took place the next day, but at about 11 p.m. the U.S. Marines on the left flank, on a hill near the camp entrance, were pushed back. " B " Company of the R.M. Commando, consisting of 32 men, was sent up to retake the left flank of the hill and did so just before dawn.

Let us now sum up the part of the British Commonwealth Navies in the Korean

operations during the fourteen days covering the Inchon landings and the subsequent operations up to 30th September. During this period ships of the Commonwealth Navies steamed 56,456 miles, and the carrier-based aircraft of H.M.S. " Triumph " flew 112 sorties over an area of 251,000 square miles. The guns of the Force fired 2,690 six-inch shells, 1,274 smaller calibre shells, and 215,000 rounds of Oerlikon and Bofors into enemy gun emplacements, ammunition dumps, troop concentrations, tanks, island strong-points, and shipping. The bag included the first enemy aircraft to be shot down by gunfire from any United Nations warship ; one ammunition dump blown up and two damaged ; 11 junks sunk, two damaged ; two 50-ton coasters, one 100-ton coaster and one 70-ton coaster sunk ; a 500-ton freighter damaged, and twelve mines destroyed. A number of enemy troops were killed and wounded. H.M.S. " Jamaica " had the pleasure of shooting down the enemy Stormovik aircraft which attacked the U.S.S. " Rochester."

H.M.S. " Theseus " arrived in Korean waters on 8th October and replaced H.M.S. " Triumph." The main assignment of the " Theseus " at this stage was the harassing of the enemy during their retreat North of the 38th parallel. The enemy were adept at camouflage and it was during one sweep that aircraft spotted heavily camouflaged junks. Photographs revealed that they were in fact minelayers. An attack soon prevented any further activities on their part. The " Theseus " soon proved her worth, and by her achievements during the next two months earned the Boyd Trophy, a silver medal of a Swordfish aircraft. This trophy is awarded annually for the finest feat of Naval aviation by an individual or unit in the Royal Navy. The award was made to the 17th Carrier Air Group (Lieutenant-Commander M. P. Gordon Smith, D.S.C., R.N., of Victoria, London), operating from the " Theseus." This is the first time that the trophy has been awarded to a Carrier Group.

During December and January the Air Group operated in close support of the British and United States troops on the West flank. A liaison officer was landed and stationed ashore with the 5th U.S. Air Force. As many as 50 to 60 sorties were made a day in support of the ground forces. During a period of three weeks in December 650 sorties were flown, and in a period of eight days in January 301 sorties were flown, and it was during the latter month that the 2,000th sortie during Korean operations was flown. During the above operations the total " bag " of destroyed targets included :—190 buildings occupied by enemy troops, 32 railway bridges, eight tunnels, 30 box cars, 21 trucks and lorries, five locomotives, 12 factories and warehouses, five power stations, 19 oil dumps and tanks, 86 junks and other shipping, and some 2,000 enemy troops killed or wounded. In addition to the above, such targets as gun emplacements, jetties, airfields, railway sheds, etc., were attacked. Throughout these operations the " Theseus " was screened by British and Commonwealth ships.

One of the most hazardous naval operations was carried out by five British Commonwealth destroyers, three Canadian and two Australian, and one American when, in darkness and through the swept channel of a minefield, they navigated 30 miles of the shallow water of the Daido Ko estuary to cover the withdrawal of civilians, non-essential military personnel and wounded from the Phongyang area.

The force, led by H.M.C.S. " Cayuga " (Captain J. V. Brock, D.S.C., R.C.N.), with H.M.C.S. " Athabaskan," H.M.C.S. " Sioux," H.M.A.S. " Warramunga," H.M.A.S. " Bataan " and the U.S.S. " Forest Royal," ploughed through heavy seas and thick snowstorms to the mouth of the Taedong River, which serves the principal West coast port of Chinnampo. Their orders were to provide necessary gunfire

support and anti-aircraft fire during the loading of casualties and port personnel in the dock area, which is some 30 miles up the Daido Ko estuary. During the operation Sea Furys and Fireflys from H.M.S. " Theseus " carried out air patrols over the flotilla.

Captain Brock had intended to wait until daylight rather than face a night navigation of the unlit estuary with its treacherous shoals and minefields, but a signal that the withdrawal programme at Chinnampo was ahead of schedule decided him to take the risk of a night voyage up the river. Slowly the six ships began the passage of the swept channel through the minefield, in many places only 500 yards wide. Visibility was almost nil and it was three o'clock in the morning before look-outs could make out dock buildings dimly in the darkness. Captain Brock took up position and his ships were at action stations waiting for dawn and possible enemy air attack. That day the transports were loaded with wounded, Republic of Korea civilian refugees, and nearly 2,000 troops. Altogether about 7,000 persons were withdrawn and without interruption from the enemy.

When the last transport had left the port, Captain Brock decided to remain at anchor for another night in the dock area, and next morning, after ordering the remaining civilian population out of the military area, his ships shelled oil storage tanks, dock and harbour installations, and supply dumps. The commercial and civilian parts of the town were left untouched.

From the start of the Korean war it was realized that the British and Commonwealth ships would need a base to provide amenities for the crews, and storerooms for provisions, ammunition, and all the various commodities required by ships. A team was landed early on and, as time went by, a depot ship was chartered. To avoid delay, a ship belonging to Messrs. Butterfield and Swires, a British Far Eastern firm, was chartered and alterations were undertaken in Hong Kong dockyard. As a temporary Headquarters ship, the C.-in-C., Far East Station, sent his despatch vessel, H.M.S. " Alert " (Commander R. de L. Brooke, D.S.O., D.S.C.) to northern waters.

The chartered vessel was converted for her new duties and christened H.M.S. " Ladybird." She was well equipped and had a communications set-up equivalent to that carried by a cruiser flagship. A canteen was started on shore, a large building being taken over. Playing-grounds had to be found, so that the crews could get exercise, storerooms had to be provided, and in all these problems we leant heavily on the shoulders of our American comrades. With their advice, and thanks to our doggedness, we did in an amazingly short space of time achieve a great deal. Co-operation was the keynote throughout, and the success of this can be seen from the results achieved. British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, American, French, Dutch, and Siamese ships were all co-operating under the flag of the United Nations for the first time in history.

THE QUEEN OF THE LAND BATTLE AND THE ALL ARMS TEAM

By "TRADESMAN"

IN last November's issue of the JOURNAL, "Musketeer" reiterated the Infantry claim for better treatment as "The Queen of the Battlefield." The aim of this short article is to present a different point of view—that of the supporting arms whom "Musketeer" believes to be responsible for most of the Infantry's troubles.

In his article "Musketeer" makes four points which concern all arms :—

(*a*) The Infantry are the basic arm.

(*b*) There are never enough infantry in peace or war, therefore, there should be more infantry.

(*c*) The Infantry have the most exacting role, therefore they should be given the pick of the Army.

(*d*) Nobody pays sufficient attention to the Infantry.

Let us acknowledge straight away that there are very few people who do not believe the Infantry are the basic arm. In fact, we are becoming heartily tired of the steady stream of infantry propaganda articles reminding us that this is so. But, though we acknowledge this state of affairs, we cannot help feeling that there is something incongruous about it. This is not because we wish to oust the "Queen," but because it seems strange that, in this year of Grace 1951, the basic weapon of the West is still the individual infantry soldier with his rifle and bayonet. Our infantryman can be given a slight equipment superiority over his eastern counterpart. Man for man he may possess greater brain power and initiative, but his town breeding and more civilised existence sets him at a disadvantage with his hardened opponent. We are also faced with a shortage of manpower which the East does not suffer; and yet we are forced to squander this precious commodity because we can find no better method of winning land battles. An infantry soldier takes twenty odd years to build, while tanks, bombers and fighters can be manufactured in a few months. Unfortunately experience has taught us that these modern weapons cannot replace infantry. Therefore, while we acknowledge the Infantry as the "Queen," the Infantry in their turn must realize that much of their success depends on the support which they receive. It is our task as supporting arms to give them the superiority they need over their Eastern opponents.

"Musketeer" demands more infantry. He traces the reduction of infantry battalions in a division from twelve in 1914 to nine to-day, but he does not show the corresponding increase in support which they have received from aircraft, tanks and guns. If the Infantry are to be increased, something else must go—but what? The inevitable answer is cut the "tail." Though some reduction of "tail" is desirable and possible, it is unlikely to produce enough to increase the infantry content of the division. The unpalatable fact is that the Infantry can only be increased at the expense of the supporting arms, but it is in the supporting arms that the West has the greatest lead over the East.

Even though we may not be able to increase the infantry "slice," can we meet "Musketeer" half-way by agreeing that the standard of officer and man posted to the Infantry should be raised? He complains of

> "... the practive of posting to it (the Infantry) the leavings of other Services and arms, including jail-birds."

But is there any foundation for his complaint in the Army to-day? As far as officers are concerned, the Infantry is the most popular choice of arm of cadets passing out from Sandhurst. The Infantry are now receiving the best cadets. The new Pay Code has removed most of the incentives which used to compensate for the harder and longer training needed by the supporting arms. It is the supporting arms, and more specially the technical corps, which are finding recruiting difficult. The same is largely true of the other ranks. There is too little reward for the hours of tedious work needed to make skilled tradesmen. The problem of whether skilled men should be allowed to join the Infantry is outside the scope of this article, but it might be well to consider whether the Country can afford to allow such men to join the arm which suffers the heaviest casualties.

" Musketeer's " fourth point is a plea that the Infantry should receive more attention. This is even harder to substantiate. The great majority of formation commanders are drawn from the Infantry. At the Staff College about 45 per cent. are infantry officers. The Royal Artillery are their nearest rivals with 25 per cent. Lack of attention to infantry problems can only be the fault of their own officers in command and on the staff.

Recriminations and bitter debate between arms, however, will get us nowhere. Propaganda and " Empire Building " only tend to destroy team work which is the real essential in battle. The quotation from Field Service Regulations which " Musketeer" used to show the return to sanity in 1935, contains the key to the whole problem.

" Practically all success in war, *which is won by the proper co-operation of all arms*, must in the end be confirmed by the Infantry. . . . "

We cannot defeat the horde armies of the East by playing their strongest suit. Our strength lies in our ability to handle modern weapons with greater skill than our opponents. The secret to success is excellent team work of all arms and services. Our aim should be to build up this team.

At present the *esprit de corps* of the Army is focussed on the Colours of the infantry battalion. Surely, this is too narrow a basis? It excludes most of the members of the team. The all arms team to-day is the division. We have divisional signs. Why not divisional Colours? All members of the team could then share the same allegiance. Divisional pride was strong in both world wars. Why not harness it to cement the all arms team which in the end will give us victory?

OBEDIENCE TO LAWFUL COMMAND

By Admiral of the Fleet The Earl of Cork and Orrery, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

THE article which appears under the above heading in the February issue of the Journal requires some answer, and, as the initiator of the two debates held in the House of Lords upon the subject, I will try to supply it.

In spite of the somewhat pontifical language used by the writer, there is another side to the question—the human side—one which is too often overlooked, to use the words of Lord Wright in another connection, " by writers in their study often removed from the realities of life."

The first debate held in April, 1950, was to draw attention to the situation created by the alteration by amendment to paragraph 443 of Chapter XIV of the *Manual of Military Law* which deals with the Law and Usages of War on Land, together with the result of the " Peleus " trial, one of the first " war criminals " trials to be held.

To refresh the memory of your readers upon the change referred to. The *Manual of Military Law*, 1929, Chapter XIV, deals with the punishment of war crimes, and paragraph 443 gives a list of the more important violations of the recognized rules of warfare by members of the Armed Forces. The paragraph concludes with these words :—

> " It is important, however, to note that members of the armed forces who commit such violations . . . as are ordered by their Government, or by their Commander, are not war criminals, and cannot therefore be punished by the enemy. He may punish the officials or Commanders responsible for such orders if they fall into his hands. . . ." (The *Basic Field Manual* of the U.S.A. contains a similar paragraph.)

In April, 1944, appeared an amendment No. 34 to the *Manual* which cancelled the concluding paragraph mentioned above and substituted :—

> " The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of an order of an individual belligerent Government or of an individual belligerent Commander does not deprive the act in question of its character as a war crime, neither does it, in principle, confer upon the perpetrator immunity from punishment by the injured belligerent. Undoubtedly a Court confronted with a plea of superior orders adduced in justification of a war crime is bound to take into consideration the fact that obedience to military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty of every member of the armed forces, and that the latter cannot, in the conditions of war discipline, be expected to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the order received. The question, however, is governed by the major principle that members of the armed forces are bound to obey lawful orders only and they cannot escape liability if, in obedience to a command, they commit acts which both violate unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of humanity." (The U.S.A. *Field Manual* was similarly changed at the same time.)

It is true, as stated, that the Lord Chancellor on the occasion referred to, alluding to the terms of the amendment, said " this has been the state of the Law within memory of man, and long before that," but in so far as members of the Armed Forces were concerned, those primarily affected, the law was given to them by a Government publication which instructed them that " the *Manual* is to inform

officers who may have to deal with the subjects of which it treats, which they may come across in the course of their duty." They were further told that the *Manual* could be considered as the best guide available on the subjects of which it treats. There is no doubt that the original text, which was Oppenheim's, stated the generally agreed Rule of Law, and similar paragraphs occurred in the Manuals of the Dominions, the U.S.A., and the majority of the foreign military powers, and have so appeared in several editions since approximately 1914—a long time! Why, then, was it changed in 1944?

We are told as follows in *The History of the United Nations War Crime Commission* :—

> " During the second world war opinion developed against these rules, and criticism was repeatedly expressed in the international bodies whose activities have been recorded in the preceding pages. . . . Professor Lauterpacht observed that the British Military Manual had no statutory force and could, therefore, be amended in the face of developments."

What were these new developments? Professor Lauterpacht had become the editor of *Oppenheim's International Law* and in the sixth edition of the work, in the second volume, which deals with " war," he makes this remark :—

> " . . . the political authorities of the belligerents will frequently incline to take into consideration the danger of reprisals against their nationals which are likely to follow as a measure of retaliation for punishing a ' war crime ' *durante bello*."

By the end of 1943, however, victory was in sight, and plans were being made for Courts to try the war criminals of our enemies when they fell into the Allies' hands. The danger of reprisals on their part would then be non-existent, and the very natural demand for exemplary punishment of enemy scoundrels was loud and insistent.

The accepted rule that members of the Armed Forces were exempted from being tried as war criminals, if acting strictly to orders of their superior authority, appeared to leave a loophole of escape for the majority of the war criminals and therefore had to go. We believed we were about to enter into a period of prolonged peace and the necessity for providing for the protection of our own men in the future was lost sight of. It is impossible to believe that, had those who brought about the change we are discussing foreseen the present state of the World, and the enemy and the potential enemy countries we now face, the rule, which gave our own men some protection, would have been so lightly swept away, without at the same time revising the regulations under which they would henceforth have to serve.

The mischief that the change has brought about is not in its wording but in its possible recoil, for we have now laid down and proved by our action that we intend to disregard the defence of " superior orders," and the enemy will therefore be justified in following our example.

This would not be so serious if far stricter rules had been framed to regulate the use of this power. At present, however, all " war crimes " are punishable by death and " war crimes " are many and varied. The composition of the military court to try them is in the hands of the injured belligerent and need only consist of three enemy officers; it is not bound by the strict law of evidence; there is no appeal. It should be added that for a death sentence by a Court of three members unanimity is required; if more than three, a two-thirds majority. No great problem to secure that in a Communist court.

What it comes to in practice is this, that if our Government adopts any methods of which the enemy disapproves, all those whose military duty it is to carry out the orders risk being shot or hanged at the sole discretion of the enemy. Our officers and men may be placed in an intolerable position largely due to our own action.

A recent question put to the Government in the House of Lords on the " scorched earth " policy reported to have been ordered in Korea, elicited the following statement from the Minister, who replied : " It is true that installations of specific military value to the enemy have been destroyed when this has been rendered absolutely necessary by military requirements. Particular care has been taken to ensure the safety of public utilities when at all possible." Is it to be supposed that Communist officers, Chinese or Korean, will see eye to eye with United Nations' officers as to the necessity for such destruction, or the care taken to ensure safety ? No officer or man who has, in compliance with his orders, taken part in such destruction can be safe from having to face a Court of three Chinese or Korean officers as a " war criminal." Formerly he could have been so, but now we have published abroad that obedience to orders does not constitute a defence, though it may be some mitigation. By our deeds we have proved how little value we attach to such an excuse, and have clearly shown what we will do to those of our enemies who we consider to be offenders. Can we then complain if our enemies follow our example ?

Your correspondent quotes the case of the s.s. " Peleus," but in a most perfunctory manner. The case was perfectly clear. The Captain of the submarine, after sinking the ship without warning, decided to destroy all wreckage, irrespective of the fact that a few survivors were known to be on the rafts, etc. He excused his action on the ground of " operational necessity," and the safety of his ship and crew. He did not succeed in showing that any such necessity existed, and was shot. The justice of the sentence was not questioned in the debate referred to. Your correspondent also mentioned the fate of the engineer officer, who, of the same rank and age as his Captain, remonstrated when the intention to destroy the wreckage was first announced, but later took part in the firing on his own volition. He received a sentence of imprisonment for life. The Doctor was sentenced to be shot. He was ordered by the Captain to fire on the wreckage and did so, but as a medical officer was exempted by German Naval regulations from using weapons for offensive purposes, and he was sentenced to death.

The test cases were, however, those of the sub-lieutenant aged 20, and a seaman aged 19, and these are hardly referred to. Nobody can dispute that it was their military duty to use arms at the command of their Captain. To refuse duty under war conditions to their Captain would have laid them open to severe penalties, and would have been quite contrary to the training they had received. Both these young men were quite inexperienced ; they were on their first cruise ; they had only been at sea for three months. Who were they to argue with their Captain, an experienced officer who gave them a personal order, as to what was necessary for the safety of their ship and her crew ? The sub-lieutenant was shot, the young seaman received 15 years imprisonment. To dismiss their case with the remark that " the other accused were punished for their share in the crime in the degree in which personal responsibility for it lay upon them " is hardly in accordance with facts. Surely the sub-lieutenant's responsibility did not equal that of his Captain—but they faced the firing squad together ! As Lord Maugham observed : " it is perfectly plain that the younger members of the Forces often have no moral choice as to whether they obey an order or not." As the verdict against the Captain was not criticized in the debate,

I will not comment upon your correspondent's remarks upon it, and his concluding paragraph is answered in Major-General Wade's article immediately preceding that of your anonymous correspondent.

The second debate on this subject, which took place in the House of Lords in July of last year, was upon a resolution which claimed that the amendment of 1944 caused paragraph 443, Chapter XIV, of the *Manual of Military Law* to become inimical to military discipline, unjust to all serving in the Armed Forces *when under active service conditions*, and should be revised. The contention was that, whereas a rule which put the responsibility upon the shoulders of those gave an order was fair and just, it was unfair and unjust that those whose military duty it was to obey their orders should bear any responsibility for the results of doing so.

If those working under orders are to be held responsible for the result of an order, it must give rise to questioning of all orders, which, in itself, is inimical to military discipline. Obedience to orders is the keystone of military efficiency—and it is upon the amount of mutual trust that exists between all ranks of any military organization, each confident that the other will play his part, that efficiency depends. If it is now to be laid down that junior officers and men are to share the responsibility for the result of orders given, we shall soon have the cry " no responsibility without representation," and where will that lead to? There are only too many who will attempt to exploit such a situation. Lord Hankey, in his speech, said the rule gives too great an opportunity to the " bad hats, shirkers, and the sowers of sedition," and Lord Winster observed that as the rule now stands he would call it " the sea lawyers' charter."

Although in the debate in the Lords the words " under active service conditions " were stressed more than once, the examples taken by those who opposed the resolution ignored this qualification, and references were made to such instances as troops being called out in support of the civil authorities, etc.—an entirely different position. Nor did it seem relevant to have made use of extreme cases of criminal behaviour by German authorities, e.g., such as driving women and children into a church and setting fire to it, or of the shooting of 50 Royal Air Force officers who were recaptured after an attempt to escape. As Lord Chatfield observed: " It is misleading to bring exaggerations into an argument on principle."

In that same debate, Lord Maugham, speaking in support of the resolution in so far as it advocated a revision of the offending amendment, put his finger on the spot when he said " . . . when a man is told to carry out an order when he is waiting battle, it is hopeless for him to say that he thinks it unlawful and wants to consider it. He cannot do that, the matter has to be decided in an instant."

Lord Maugham suggested the following amendment: " provided, however, that if the defendant shall establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that he had fair grounds for thinking that the order was lawful, or that his rank or position was not such that he had any responsibility for acting in pursuance of the order, or that he had no real chance in relation to carrying out or refusing to carry out the order, the defendant shall be entitled to be acquitted." This would, indeed, be a great advance upon the amendment adopted, for it at least allows that " obedience to orders " can, under certain conditions, be a complete defence, and not merely a circumstance which may be considered in mitigation.

But does not the real answer lie in the need for a complete revision of the whole subject as dealt with by the Geneva and Hague Conventions? These are now hope-

lessly out-of-date ; we have a patchwork code unsuitable to modern war conditions. In these days such offences as firing on undefended localities, bombardment of hospitals and other privileged buildings, improper use of privileged buildings, purposeless destruction, etc., are obviously offences with which in many cases men might be charged, although it was quite impossible for them to form any judgement upon the orders which brought the result about. It must be remembered that " reprisals " are still legitimate, which adds to the difficulty of deciding whether an order should be obeyed or not. No officer by sea, land or air can be safe from having a trumped-up charge brought against him on such grounds—and having to face a hostile tribunal on a capital charge, when it is quite obvious that he could not possibly have known what or where privileged buildings were in the area to be bombed or shelled. Such offences as marauding, pillaging the dead, or looting have always been military crimes, and could well be left to military law to deal with.

There is all the difference in the world between such war crimes as may be ordered by senior officials with ample time for deliberation and a certain licence of judgement, and offences committed by those actually engaged in active operations. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the United States Chief Prosecutor for the Nuremburg Tribunal, remarked : " the case may be greatly altered where one has discretion because of rank or opportunity " ; and the American High Commissioner in Germany is reported in *The Times* of 1st February as saying that he had " differentiated between those engaged in confused, fluid, and desperate combat action," and those who initiated the " waves of frightfulness." Finally, let me quote Lord Wright, who says in his preface to *The History of the United Nations War Crime Commission*, dated 31st March, 1948 : " I desire to take this opportunity for urging a revision of the Hague Convention relating to war on land."

It is indeed high time !

THIS QUESTION OF SUPERIOR ORDERS

By Captain Russell Grenfell, R.N.

In the February number of the Journal there appeared an unsigned article on "Obedience to lawful commands." Whether any special significance attaches to its anonymity I cannot tell. But it seems to me that the article calls for comment.

The general argument running through the article was to the effect that superior orders that can be regarded as incitement to breaches of International Law are unlawful and should not be obeyed by subordinates to whom they are given. In support of this argument, the writer of the article (hereafter to be referred to as The Writer) quoted the phraseology of the Naval Discipline Act, where obedience is required only to "the lawful commands" of a superior officer; and as The Writer chose to interpret the word "lawful" in relation to International Law, he was able to contend that an order from a superior officer involving a breach of International Law was automatically unlawful under the Act. And he referred with approval to the Lord Chancellor as saying in the "Peleus" debate in the House of Lords that this had been the state of the law within living memory "and long before that."

It is true that the term "lawful command" has appeared in the Naval Discipline Act for generations. I do not, however, believe that, as originally drafted, it was meant to have any concern with International Law. I believe that the traditional meaning of "lawful command" as mentioned in the Act was that it was lawful only in the sense of not violating any part of the Act itself or other canons of the English national law. For instance, an order by a superior officer to run away in action or desert to the enemy would be contrary to certain sections of the Act, and subordinates would therefore be justified in disobeying so obviously improper an order.

But though this may be one meaning of "lawful command," can it be proved that there has not always been another which does envisage legality under International Law? I think it can. For one thing, in a good many years service I never once heard it suggested that orders that might violate International Law were invalid. But there is a better piece of evidence. The *Manual of Military Law*, before it was amended in 1944, read as follows:—

> "It is important, however, to note that members of the armed forces who commit violations of the recognised rules of warfare as are ordered by their Government or their Commander are not war criminals and cannot therefore be punished by the enemy."

There is to my mind only one conceivable interpretation of this passage: namely, that superior orders have traditionally taken priority over International Law. Also the passage clearly refutes the Lord Chancellor's claim, at all events as represented by The Writer, that it had always been illegal to obey superior orders that involved breaches of International Law.

However, in 1944, the above passage in the *Manual* was amended to read:—

> "Members of the armed forces are bound to obey lawful orders only, and they cannot escape liability if, in obedience to a command, they commit acts which both violate unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiments of humanity."

The Writer said that this amendment did not reflect a change in the law but was "only one of emphasis," bringing the statement of the law "more closely into line with the consensus of world-wide legal opinion." This, however, was a manifestly

wrong statement, the amendment of the *Manual* representing a drastic alteration of the law, from immunity for those who act under superior orders to non-immunity.

What also of this " consensus of world-wide legal opinion " ? Is there such a thing on this subject ? The defeated nations of the last War (200 millions) do not subscribe to it. Nor can it be maintained that the Communist Powers (700 millions) allow their Service men full freedom of conscience in obeying the orders of their superiors. In fact, this talk of a " consensus of world-wide legal opinion " is palpable nonsense.

One of the new tests of international criminality, the outraging of the " general sentiments of humanity," is equally open to question, since what may outrage one section of humanity or even of a single country may not outrage another. I presume that the Chinese, as the principal practitioners of " death by a thousand cuts," will hardly be outraged by that form of execution. Yet some Western nations might regard it as being an indisputable crime against humanity. The Writer did not attempt to resolve this kind of difficulty.

Instead, he concentrated his attention on one particular case of atrocity by the Germans. This was the episode of the " Peleus " (already mentioned) in which various members of a German submarine were found guilty of a war crime through obeying their superior officer's orders to shoot the survivors of a torpedoed Greek steamer in the ship's lifeboat. This was undoubtedly an ugly thing to do, about which it is only too easy to feel moral repugnance. But moral repugnance is not necessarily evidence of legal criminality, even though the German crew were themselves shocked at the action.

This action, brutal though it was, was not one of mere savagery. The Commanding Officer had been warned before sailing to keep the presence of his submarine in that area as secret as possible ; and he thought, rightly or wrongly, that if he killed the survivors and demolished their boat it would promote concealment. The safety of his ship and the success of his operations were the motives underlying the U-boat Commander's behaviour. But were these any excuse for the ruthless thing that he did ?

One would think not . . . and yet ? When the " Bismarck " sank, some hundreds of German sailors were left floating in the sea and the two British ships on the scene began to pick them up, as humanity required. But then there came a report of a submarine, and the rescue ships steamed away, leaving the remaining Germans to their fate, most of whom drowned. Again ,the safety of the ships and the success of their operations were the governing motives. Of course, there is an undoubted difference between leaving people to drown and actively killing them. Nevertheless, a German lawyer could truthfully argue that the bulk of the " Bismarck " survivors were eventually just as dead as those of the " Peleus."

I repeat that the " Peleus " shooting was an ugly business. But it is fair also to remark that it was the only instance out of the whole U-boat warfare that became the subject of a war-crime trial, while there were many cases—as a friend of mine in the Trade Division of the Admiralty told me round about VE-day—of German submarines taking considerable risks, sometimes with fatal results to themselves, in towing boatloads of torpedoed survivors towards safety. The British ships saving the " Bismarck's " men, though I should have done as they did, allowed themselves no risk in rescuing their helpless enemies.

Can we say, moreover, that our own hands are so clean that we can afford to sit in judgment on German perpetrators of unpleasant deeds in war? The Writer declared that there was no parallel between the killing of the Greek civilians in the "Peleus" case and the killing of German civilians by air bombing. The Germans might, however, have a different opinion about it. It is, indeed, well known that not a few Englishmen feel extremely uncomfortable on that point. The Writer holds that indiscriminate air bombing is quite legal, since the civilian must "take his chance of being hit." But in Mr. Churchill's book, there is a reference to the instructions given to General Mackesy for the Narvik campaign as containing this stipulation :—

> "It is clearly illegal to bombard a populated area in the hope of hitting a legitimate target which is known to be in the area but which cannot be precisely located and identified."

That seems to hit off air bombing exactly; and had a victorious Germany decided to put any of our bomber airmen on trial, they could have produced this instruction as plain evidence of guilt from British sources.

The Writer may possibly claim that the law on this subject was altered as the war progressed; but if so, who by? The trouble with International Law is that it is invariably out of date when most wanted. It is drawn up in peace time, usually by politicians who want to gain credit from being on the side of the angels; but the moment it becomes operative in war it also begins to stagnate, since there is no possibility of an international conference of all the belligerents to agree to such modifications of the existing law as the conditions of the new war may and always will render necessary. During hostilities, therefore, International Law degenerates into a wary competition in breach of the rules by one side and immediate counter-breach by the other on the plea of reprisals. The term "unchallenged rules of warfare" consequently begs a very large question, since there are hardly any rules which are not challenged during a conflict by one side or both, either openly or implicitly by constant disregard.

Moreover, until 1945 International Law was a mainly academic phrase. A former Lord Salisbury described it as having "no existence in the sense in which the term 'law' is generally understood. It depends generally on the prejudices of writers of text-books. It can be enforced by no tribunal, and therefore to apply to it the term 'law' is to some extent misleading."

However, in Britain International Law has now become something that the Service man will break at his peril, and it has been made plain to him that an order from a superior officer that is contrary to that law must not be obeyed. It may therefore be asked why he has ever been required to obey his superior officer's orders. The answer is that from the dawn of organized warfare unquestioning obedience by fighting men to their superiors has been found essential to successful military operations. The ancient Romans had no doubts about it. In the eighteenth century, Lord St. Vincent was even prepared to sink one of his own line-of-battleships in order to exact obedience to military command when this was in jeopardy from mutineers. If, therefore, as The Writer implies, the new rule that orders in breach of International Law are invalid was introduced at the instigation of legal opinion, it may well be that the lawyers concerned, not being personally responsible for the military consequences of their opinions, took too narrow and legalistic an attitude and did not realize that they were tampering with the foundations of the national security.

How is the man in the ranks or the junior officer to know what is a legal order by International Law? Not all the international lawyers themselves agree about this, and when they do they frequently take months of argument to reach their decision. That the fighting man should be able to know the answer in a split second in the presence of the enemy is as fantastic as the implication that the private soldier should march to war with his knapsack stuffed with tomes by eminent international jurists.

The adverse possibilities of the new situation in terms of military security are obvious enough, anyway to the Service man. Admiral Maund in his account of the attack on Narvik describes how, when the bombardment of the sea-front began, a number of women and children were seen running out of the houses and away along the front, and the senior bombarding destroyer hoisted the Cease Fire. She was ordered by Lord Cork (in command) to carry out her orders. Under the present rules, she might have refused. And what is the Captain of a battleship now supposed to do under the Naval Discipline Act if, after giving the order to open fire on any target, his Gunnery Officer were to say: "Oh, no, I can't do that. It would be called a crime against humanity."

This new rule that subordinates are in future their own judges of whether an order they receive is internationally and therefore militarily legal is a challenge to the ancient principles of Service obedience that must be of the gravest concern not only to the Service authorities but to every officer and man in all the Armed Forces of the Crown. It is a challenge to the whole conception of that military discipline which all countries in all ages have found it imperative to enforce. It is monstrously unjust to the Service man in that it makes him legally liable to capital punishment whether he obeys an order or disobeys it; a situation that can undoubtedly be described as a violation of fundamental human rights. And it plays straight into the hands of any disloyal or traitorous elements in the fighting Services, who can now indulge in legalised incitement to disobedience and even mutiny.

THE KOMMANDATURA'S DEBUT

By Brigadier C. E. Ryan, M.C.

IT was at Yalta that the setting up of an international Secretariat was envisaged, to serve the Allied Commandants responsible for administering occupied Berlin. Its title—Kommandatura—is a curious Russo-German hybrid, by Komendatura out of Kommandantur.

On 1st July, 1945, some weeks after Berlin had fallen to the Russians, British and American advance parties moved from their respective zones into the city. The route lay for some sixty miles through the Russian zone. Owing to some misunderstanding, the British party, instead of going through Magdeburg to cross the Elbe, held on along the autobahn which brought them to a temporary, yet substantial, wooden bridge over the river North of the town. The Russian sentry on the bridge was adamant in his refusal to let the party cross. To a remonstration, that it was on its way to Berlin at the express invitation of the Russian Commander-in-Chief, his retort was, " If Marshal Zhukoff meant you to cross this bridge, he would have told my general, who would have told my captain, who would have told me." There was nothing for it but to make a détour into Magdeburg.

One was prepared for devastation in Berlin. Incongruous notes were a Union Jack, here and there, at a window ; German girls in summer frocks, emerging, trim as butterflies, from dingy, rubble-covered cellars ; and, at busy crossroads, Russian army girls, mounted on low wooden pedestals, controlling the traffic confidently with pairs of coloured miniature flags, which they manipulated with a smart precision. The street surfaces generally were in surprisingly good repair, but broken bridges imposed some deviations.

Near the fashionable quarter of Dahlem, in the American sector, a former *Bürgermeisterei* of Zehlendorf Bezirk was chosen to house the Kommandatura. Most of the building was in fair shape. Such renovation as was needed was speedily effected by a swarm of German builders and decorators, to whom a tin of tobacco or packet of cigarettes left thoughtlessly on a desk was fair game.

A British, an American and a Russian staff officer, with their interpreters, assembled round a table for their first meeting, a blank sheet of foolscap before them, to create something where nothing had been before.

They were not yet concerned with any major issues. The immediate task was to devise office and housekeeping machinery. They agreed easily that office hours should begin at 9 a.m. daily. Going on to the lunch interval, they met their first difficulty. " We feed at 12," said the American. " And we lunch at 3," said the Russian firmly. Any contribution to this from the British side seemed superfluous. The American found a way out of the impasse by proposing that the staffs should feed together in the spacious basement on the premises, each nation in turn providing lunch for a month at a time. The compromise resulted in lunch at the very British hour of 1 p.m. It was no slight commitment, seeing that, with staffs, interpreters, visitors, technical sub-committees, clerks, drivers and military police, the numbers that sat down often exceeded fifty.

The Russians were the first hosts. Soup always, cabbage cooked in many ways, meat, rye bread and cheese figured on their menus. The Americans came next, with their standard army rations ; and then the British. A little administrative difficulty arose here. The Russian and American hosts had both provided wine. This was an unprecedented ingredient for British army rations, but prestige being at stake, the

R.A.S.C. contrived somehow to include it. Before the British tour had ended, the French had arrived. They took the duty seriously, installed a maître d'hôtel, and the guests were treated to much the same rations, but served now in epicurean style.

The monthly rotation of duty nation governed many matters—chairmanship of main and satellite committee meetings, use of language for the master copy of minutes, responsibility for calling meetings, sending instructions to the German city authorities, drafting press communiqués, and the rest. Four flag poles were erected in front of the building. Pride of place was given to the flag of the nation on duty, next to it was that of the next for duty, and so on. Even in such a simple matter small points cropped up. Flags, Union—to give them their official nomenclature—are an Ordnance Stores item, supplied in stock sizes. Similarly the other nations had several standard sizes for their flags. Despite the choice it was difficult to ensure an approximation even to the ideal of having all four flags of one size. Asked whether it was their practice to lower their flag at dusk, the Russians said their flag was never lowered; so all four flags remained hoisted. Four military policemen, one of each nation, stood outside the building to check the comings and goings. Three of them vied with one another in the realms of spit and polish; it was interesting to note, after a time, a perceptible shine on the belt of the abstainer.

Direct exchange of view between the Russian Chief of Staff and his American and British colleagues was hindered by the language difficulty, but he readily fell in with a suggestion that he should intervene personally in discussions with "O.K." for approval, and "N.B.G." for veto, as the occasion seemed to him to demand. At the Commandants' meetings, the drill was for speakers to pause after each paragraph or so, and for interpreters to translate what they had said into the other two languages. This imposed a tediously slow procedure. After each meeting the three Chiefs of Staff sat round a table and, again through interpreters, agreed official texts, in the language of the month, of the minutes and the press communiqué. Any resultant orders or directions for the *Oberbürgermeister* were then translated into German. German was used, rather than one or more of the Allied languages, in the interest of unity and simplicity. There was less chance of misunderstanding that way, and no scope for evasions through ingenious translations.

The French, and the Russians perhaps even more so, were astonished to find that the meaning of English terms was not always identical for Americans and British. And they were amused at the amicable bickering that went on when the two were trying to arrive at an agreed English version of a French or Russian document. The long, three-storeyed building lent itself conveniently to division into four. The Russian and French staffs had their offices, one on either side of the entrance, on the ground floor. Above the entrance, on the first floor, was the main conference room, on either side of which were the British and American staffs. Suites of smaller rooms on the second floor made of it a veritable warren, in working hours, of sub-committees whose terms of reference covered, between them, every phase of the life and activities of a great city. Even in such a trifle as drafting a notice to direct visitors to the various staffs, a point of language came in; the Americans pointed out that the British "first floor" was for them the "second floor."

A friendly discussion cropped up somehow, one day, on the various idiomatic terms for "bigwig" in various languages. The American "big shot" was familiar, and we had the variant, "big noise." The French weighed in, characteristically enough, with "big vegetable." The Russian contribution was the picturesque "big fircone."

No " curtains " divided the staffs. They went freely in and out of one another's offices. They wrote no minutes to one another ; everything that could be arranged, was arranged verbally by personal discussion. Some of the interpreters spent as much time in other offices as they did in their own. They were often hardpressed, for, in addition to oral interpreting, they had much written translation work to do, and there was not a little surreptitious raiding of their services from the third floor, when the sub-committees found themselves in any difficulty.

The junior members of the staffs were better linguists than their seniors. One Russian officer had a quite remarkable command of spoken English, seeing that the only conversation he had ever had with an English speaking person, before coming to the Kommandatura, had been with a buck negro in an American circus that visited his home town which, as he put it, was as far to the East of Berlin as New York was to the West of it. He had learned his English from books and radio broadcasts.

There was no segregation by nationalities at lunch. Soon, there were few present who could not exchange at least courtesies with anyone at the table in the appropriate language. If there were no interpreter actually at the table, there would always be one not far off. An animated conversation took place, one day, between a successor of the original Russian Chief of Staff and the daughter of the French Chief of Staff—in English.

In leisure time, too, the staffs preserved cordial relations, and would visit one another at their messes and billets. Russian hospitality, ever lavish, was, on the occasion of a birthday party, truly formidable. The man to man relationship with them was easy, good sense and personality playing their parts in it.

At work, they were supple enough in immaterial matters, and in matters upon which there had been no orders from the bridge. One of them, in an expansive moment, sought to consign all contentious issues, not indeed to the devil but, on the contrary, to a higher level. " Let the generals argue ! " he cried, and reinforced his words with a gesture, as though he were brushing a buzzing fly away from the side of his head.

There were indications that, for them, orders and instructions were more rigidly binding, subordination more emphasized, than with us ; and that horizontal water-tight partitions prevented a junior from making any suggestion to his superior that might conceivably be construed into a querying of orders or a criticism of arrangements in being. A junior officer, taking some telephoned instructions, one day, was observed to stand at the instrument as though on parade, with his senior present. Every now and then, he stiffened to attention to acknowledge some item, with a click of his spurs, and a " Very good, comrade colonel."

Though signs were not long wanting of tough problems ahead, on the whole the wheels of the Kommandatura began to turn fairly smoothly. The biggest problem, perhaps, was that of feeding the three million inhabitants crowded into the 40 per cent. remnant of the dwellings that used to house the pre-war population of four and a quarter millions. There was no lack of variety of business. The resuscitation of a hundred and one services on a city-wide basis and the various interests of the occupying forces brought a host of four-nation sub-committees into being to deal with such matters as food, fuel ; trams, buses, underground ; legal and police affairs ; denazification ; black market ; education ; hospitals and health services (there were some prophets of disaster here) ; welfare, refugees ; the Allied victory parade ; international garrison sports meeting at the Olympic stadium, and so forth.

The Russians were enthusiastic supporters of the opera, and advocated the grant of the highest scale of rations—the heavy workers' scale—to German opera singers. One Russian officer expressed surprise that many of us, instead of attending nightly, preferred to wait for a change of programme before our next visit. There was a gala night when the Sadler's Wells company gave a superb performance, which a notice in orders advertised as " The Battered Bride."

Admittedly, much of the petty detail that went to make up the routine business of the Kommandatura in the early days had no political implications. A broken sewer, for example, is passively neutral. To some, it seemed not too much to hope that agreement on the little things might keep this miniature four-wheeled model running without too much creaking, and lead on in time to wider agreement; the big fircones, alas, would not have it so.

THE EVOLUTION OF SELF-PROPELLED GUNS

By R. M. Ogorkiewicz, B.Sc. (Eng.)

THE introduction and large scale employment of self-propelled artillery by the armies of all the major powers has been one of the more notable military developments of the past decade. From small beginnings self-propelled artillery attained during the course of the 1939–45 War a position of considerable importance, and it may be of interest to examine some aspects of its development and the evolution of its equipment.

The Beginnings

Self-propelled artillery as such was essentially a development of the 1939–45 War. But neither the problem of the mobility of heavy weapons—to which self-propelled guns were offered as a solution—nor the conception of the equipment were new. Almost as soon as the first automotive vehicles appeared, attempts were made to harness them for military purposes. The earliest attempts were exemplified by the armed autocars built at the turn of the century, which were originally conceived as highly mobile carriages for the newly developed machine guns. Heavier guns, even of 75 mm. were sometimes mounted, particularly for use against balloons and dirigibles. The general tendency, accentuated during the first few months of the 1914–18 War, was, however, towards the use of lighter weapons and the armouring of the chassis. From this evolved the armoured car, in principle a very advanced, self-contained, mechanized fighting unit, but in practice one severely restricted by the type of surface over which it could operate. Its general utility being thus limited, it became more and more a specialized vehicle for reconnaissance and patrolling and tended to lose, outwardly at any rate, the characteristics of a gun motor carriage.

When the onset of trench warfare on the Western Front put an effective stop to the use of armoured cars, it brought forth the application of another type of self-propelled vehicle—the caterpillar tractor—in the shape of the tank. Introduced with the more immediate object of overcoming the twin problems of machine guns and barbed wire, the tank brought both new means of increased tactical mobility and a measure of mobile protection.

Of the two it was the latter, the armour protection, which made the stronger impression on most minds and was reflected in such things as the definition of the tank as a " perambulating fortress." Moreover, the early employment of tanks was dictated by the methods and needs of the older arm, the Infantry, which they were called upon to support as barbed-wire crushers and machine-gun destroyers. As a result of this, tanks came to be regarded much more as specialized pieces of equipment—not far removed from the siege machines of antiquity—than as a step towards a general increase in the mobility of armament. This was true even in France, where tank development was initially closely associated with the Artillery. The first armoured units were actually called " artillerie d'assaut " and were used as such but, nevertheless, tanks ended up as auxiliary weapons of the Infantry.

Thus, as in the case of the wheeled vehicles, the new means of mobility led, through a chain of circumstances, to what came to be regarded as a highly specialized type of fighting machine. Tanks took their place as yet another addition to the existing and well established armoury and for a considerable time exerted comparatively little influence on other arms. Outside a small circle of enthusiasts the more general advantages of mechanized mobility met with comparatively little understanding. Even where tanks were given an opportunity to develop further their

potentialities, as in this country in the Royal Tank Corps, such development was largely confined to themselves, apart from the rest of the Army.

Early Developments

There was, to be true, during and immediately after the 1914–18 War, a number of developments other than the tank in the tracked vechicle field. These consisted of a straightforward application of the tracked chassis, already proved in tanks, to increase the mobility of artillery within its traditional methods and organization. This Country, in the Gun Carrier Mark I of 1916, can claim to have produced, as such, the first tracked self-propelled gun. It was designed to carry either a 60 pdr. gun or a 6 in. howitzer, which, if need be, could be fired from the vehicle. However, the 48 vehicles built were chiefly used for the carriage of supplies and the development was not continued.

The French started a little later, but in 1918 they had no less than eight different models, ranging from a 280 mm. gun down to a 75 mm. on the 7 ton Renault light tank chassis. Complete mechanization was visualized by the Inspector of Artillery Equipment, but such views met strong opposition from other artillery men and the High Command. The superior cross-country mobility, speed in changing position, and economy in personnel were grudgingly conceded. But arguments were advanced against self-propelled guns on the grounds that petrol was an imported product, reliability and road performance poor, and, above all—thinking in terms of positional warfare—that the gun could not be placed in position without its motor carriage. The net result was that after the Armistice further development of self-propelled guns ceased completely. Only a few 280 and 194 mm. G.P.F.[1] on Saint-Chamond chassis were retained and these, with modifications, were still used during the 1939–45 War.

Following the French example, the United States took up the development of self-propelled guns during the last few months of the 1914–18 War and experiments continued until about 1922. At least 12 different models were built or sponsored by the United States Ordnance, from a light 5 ton 75 mm. to a self-propelled 240 mm. howitzer. Again, however, their development was dropped, although the "Caliber Board," established after the War to study the whole problem of artillery equipment, considered self-propelled carriages desirable for medium and heavy artillery. Much the same arguments were used against them as in France, chiefly that if the power plant of the carriage failed the entire unit was out of action. Therefore, the arguments ran, tractor drawn artillery was the more logical system.

In all three countries then, what were in many ways very promising beginnings came to nothing, and in the following two decades there was virtually no further progress in this field. A few isolated attempts were uniformly unsuccessful in reviving interest, since the Artillery saw no tactical need for self-propelled carriages and armoured forces concentrated on tanks.

A good example of this was the self-propelled 18 pdr., built in this country in the late twenties. It marked an important step forward from the original guns of the 1914–18 War to self-propelled artillery in the present sense, and three different models, one being the Birch Gun, were built. But although the development was sponsored by the Director of Artillery, it met strong opposition from the majority of the gunners, while tank leaders were afraid lest this development should be at

[1] Grande Puissance Filloux (long range gun designed by Colonel Filloux).

the expense of tanks. As a result it was abandoned and the place which the 18 pdr. might have occupied in the mechanized units was given to the smoke-firing close support tank which, incidentally, was considerably less effective and versatile than the self-propelled 18 pdr.

A similar fate, abandonment through the opposition of some and lack of interest on the part of others, befell the few experimental vehicles of other countries ; 37 mm. anti-tank and 75 mm. field guns built in Germany in the mid-twenties and 75 mm. howitzers tried during the thirties in the United States.

Towed Artillery

But, while the development of self-propelled guns remained stagnant, artillery did not, of course, remain unaffected by the progress of the automotive age. In addition to the mounting of guns on vehicles there was the other, and in some ways quicker, method of using the motor vehicle for towing in much the same way as a horse team.

An early, and not too promising, forerunner of this method was the steam tractor of the South African War. Then, in 1903, the first motor-towed guns were tried in Portugal and on the outbreak of the 1914-18 War the French Army could boast of the first motorized artillery unit—a battery of the 4th Heavy Artillery Regiment. During that war the use of lorries and tractors for towing guns became much more widespread and the process continued in the post-war period.

Apart from being faster than the horse traction previously employed, this method did not depart in principle from the methods consecrated by at least three centuries' usage—a fact which made it much more acceptable to the conservative minded majority. The guns went into action in much the same way as before and while they were in position the towing units were kept away. But because this departed so little from the previous method, it suffered from the same disadvantages ; the chief being that it still required considerable time and effort when going into action through the necessity of unlimbering and the associated motions.

Where wheeled vehicles were used strategic mobility was high, though tactical mobility was poor. With tracked tractors the reverse was true and they were in no respect better than tracked self-propelled carriages. The real advantage of the towed over the self-propelled gun was an economic one, since reliable and commercially available vehicles could be used, while only minor modification had to be carried out on the existing guns. This, however, was by no means universally recognized and seems to have been lost sight of completely when special tracked tractors were developed.

Special tractors were a necessity if better cross-country performance, without the crippling disadvantages of the slow speed commercial tracked tractors, was demanded. Before their development the combination of commercial lorry and small agricultural tractor was tried : the lorry carried or towed the gun, tractor, and trailer for road transport and the tractor was used for hauling the gun across bad going. This cumbersome and unsightly combination did not, as might have been expected, prove satisfactory and gave way to special artillery tractors. These varied considerably in appearance and performance and they included such types as the half-track Citroen-Kegresse tractors of the French Army, fully tracked " Dragons" and four wheeled " Ant " tractors of the British Army, and German three-quarter-track vehicles—the last two also representing the farthest point reached in the development of the mobility of artillery before the outbreak of the 1939–45 War.

Anti-tank Guns

During the years when all this development was taking place, very important advances were being made in the tank field. Although views on the employment of tanks differed considerably, important advances were made in tank design and in the thirties their numbers began to increase rapidly.

One immediate effect of this was a rapid development of counter measures, principally anti-tank artillery. At that time this meant guns of between 25 and 47 mm., miniature versions of contemporary field guns used defensively. The Germans, who led in this development and who had 75 anti-tank guns per division long before anyone else, were not, however, contented with a passive role for their 3.7 cm. Pak's. They began to emphasize the mobility of the motorized anti-tank units and the importance of an offensive employment. In keeping with this policy anti-tank units were designated as " tank hunters," or Panzerjäger, and in addition were used offensively in support of the Infantry. When war broke out they moved a stage further and, in 1940, introduced a few self-propelled anti-tank guns, starting with the Czech 47 mm. gun on a Pz. Kpfw. I light tank chassis. From this somewhat tentative beginning they moved on and introduced increasing numbers of self-propelled anti-tank guns, particularly in 1942, as a result of meeting the masses of Soviet tanks. Due to a shortage of suitable chassis, however, they had to rely largely on captured and on their own obsolescent tank chassis for this equipment.

Other armies followed suit out of sheer necessity for some more effective anti-tank weapon than the towed gun. Thus, after the first few days of the 1940 campaign, the French produced an improvised, wheeled 47 mm. self-propelled anti-tank gun. The following year saw the appearance of British 2 pdrs. mounted on light trucks and other rather primitive forms of self-propelled anti-tank guns in Libya.

The Americans, who were the last to enter this field, developed the offensive, mobile role of anti-tank artillery farthest in creating the " Tank Destroyer Command." From the very beginning tank destroyer units were " especially designed for offensive action against hostile armored forces " and they were equipped with powerful and very mobile weapons such as the 75 mm. gun on armoured half-tracks, later the 3 in. M10 and 90 mm. M36 on Sherman chassis and the 50 m.p.h. 76 mm. M18 which was specifically designed as a tank destroyer.

Armoured Divisions

Thus the appearance of numbers of tanks on all sides led to the development of self-propelled anti-tank guns, through the desire to increase the mobility, and hence the effectiveness of existing anti-tank weapons. This process was further accentuated by the progressive increase in gun size and weight, and the difficulty—sometimes, also, unwillingness—connected with the mounting of heavier guns in tanks. The other effect of this, or more strictly of the use of tanks in armoured formations, was a partial mechanization of field artillery.

In the first permanent mechanized formations, such as the French Division Légère Mécanique of 1934 and the Panzer Division of 1935, all artillery was towed. This was still true of all armoured formations during the first two years of the 1939–45 War. Even in the Panzer Divisions, guns continued to be towed about as of yore in spite of requests from some of the leading Panzer commanders for self-propelled guns. The lack of interest, if not actual opposition, on the part of the Artillery, combined with a shortage of suitable chassis after meeting other demands, prevented anything being done about this for some time.

But, although the German three-quarter-track tractors were the best vehicles for towing yet built, the use of towed artillery in support of tank units presented unquestionable difficulties, As a result semi-improvised self-propelled gun-howitzers, such as the 105 mm. " Wasp " and 150 mm. " Bumble Bee," began to appear in 1942. Further development was, however, severely restricted by the more urgent calls for mobile anti-tank and close support guns and, as a rule, only one artillery battalion in a Panzer Division was equipped with them. At the same time the need for them was somewhat diminished by the introduction of heavily armed tanks, such as the Tigers and Panthers, and there was a tendency to go over to rockets for area bombardment.

It was left to the United States, with their industrial resources, to be the first to put the whole of their armoured divisions' artillery on self-propelled carriages. They easily hold the record for the number of experimental self-propelled guns tried during the War and among the designs begun in 1941, was the 105 mm. M7, or " Priest." This became the standard divisional gun of American armoured formations as well as some British ones, receiving its baptism of fire at El Alamein. It also served as the model for the still current 25 pdr. " Sexton." Also begun in mid-1941, was the 155 mm. M12, which saw considerable service in Europe in 1944–45, demonstrating in action a remarkable saving in time and effort over the corresponding towed equipment. By that time the United States had a complete range of self-propelled guns, from a new, lighter 105 mm. howitzer to one of 240 mm.

Close Support Guns

In addition to the two broad lines of development mentioned, that of self-propelled anti-tank guns and a partial mechanization of field artillery, and the corresponding evolution of self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, there was yet another category of self-propelled weapons. These were first introduced by the Germans concurrently with their first improvised anti-tank guns and infantry howitzers, and they have most commonly been referred to as assault guns.

Unlike the opportunistic development, or at any rate beginnings, of other self-propelled guns, the development of these has been much more consistent. Their origin can easily be traced to the evolution of German infantry armament. Rightly concluding that neither the rifle nor even the light machine gun were by themselves adequate for the needs of modern combat, the Germans began to transform their infantry into a much more up-to-date and powerful instrument. Not only was every fourth company a heavy machine gun company, but they were the first to give each section a sub-machine gun, the first to give each battalion six 81 mm. mortars and each regiment a 12 gun anti-tank company as well as a company of infantry guns of six 75 mm. and two 150 mm. howitzers.

The introduction of the infantry guns was partly based on the not unsound principle that a gun on the spot is worth a whole battery later. But it was only in a small part a question of decentralization versus centralization of guns and certainly was not made at the expense of the divisional artillery. Far more, it was a genuine attempt to increase the striking power of the Infantry as such, irrespective of any artificial divisions or prejudices between arms as to the use of certain calibres or types of weapons. This departure from the rifle and bayonet principle, to which other armies still clung to a greater or lesser extent, certainly paid dividends in the early " Blitzkrieg " campaigns, though it was apt to be overshadowed by the much more spectacular accomplishments of the Panzers.

The problem of mobility of these infantry guns was, however, acute, particularly as they were sited well forward. One solution which was tried in the Panzer Grenadier units, was to place them atop modified tank chassis like the rest of the improvised self-propelled guns. The first of these, a Pz. Kpfw. I with a 150 mm. infantry howitzer, was tried in France in 1940, and was followed later by a few other models. This improvised type, however, because of its large silhouette and incomplete and thin armour, suffered from serious disadvantages when used well forward with the Infantry. A more thoroughly designed type was required and the Germans, anticipating many of the later lessons, produced their now well known assault guns.

Since the replacement of all the existing infantry guns was out of the question for reasons of supply, assault guns were used to supplement them, particularly under conditions which made the employment of the infantry guns especially difficult as, for instance, in assaults against well defended positions. In keeping with this policy assault guns were grouped in independent battalions and were allotted as required to infantry units. The first two battalions of the Sturmgeschütz were used in France in 1940, and from then on their numbers grew steadily, particularly as the Germans did not subscribe to any " infantry tank " ideas.

Although parallels have sometimes been drawn the differences between the two ideas were very considerable. As defined, the primary object of the infantry tank was " to assault to close with the enemy." Even when, finally, effective dual purpose guns replaced those intended primarily for self-defence against enemy tanks, fire support as such was regarded as of secondary importance. Unlike assault guns, infantry tanks were not, therefore, looked upon as a mobile source of fire power. Instead their employment was based on the old conception of tank as an armoured assault vehicle—a sort of armoured steam roller which would pave the way for the Infantry. Assault guns, on the other hand, from the start based their action on fire power, more mobile and more powerful than the Infantry's own weapons, and they worked with, not for, the Infantry.

German and Russian Developments

The original weapon of the German Sturmgeschütz was a low velocity 75 mm., the same in fact as that used on the early Pz. Kpfw. IV tanks, mainly firing H.E. In 1942, this gun was replaced by the high velocity 7.5 cm. Stu.K. L/43, which enabled it to engage very effectively enemy armour in addition to affording direct infantry support. This paved the way for the merger of the two classes of equipment, assault guns and self-propelled anti-tank guns, into a single Panzerjäger class. Included in this new class, which came into prominence in the closing stages of the war, were such vehicles as the 8.8 cm. Panzerjäger Panther and the light 16 ton Panzerjäger 38t, which was to form 61 per cent. of the total armoured vehicle production planned for 1945.

There is little doubt that the Germans intended to concentrate entirely on this type for close support and anti-tank weapons. By virtue of its low silhouette and good, all round—including the top—armour protection, the assault gun was superior to other types. Also, at the expense of traverse, it had more powerful armament or better protection, or frequently both, than a corresponding tank type and therefore could well take over from tanks many of the tasks in a fire fight, and thus give the tanks greater freedom to manoeuvre.

This was particularly true of the Russians who, benefiting from the lessons of the early German assault guns, introduced from 1943 onwards a whole series of

vehicles of this type. With their addiction to the use of field artillery for direct fire, the assault gun type of self-propelled gun appealed particularly to the Russians. At the same time it made possible, through quicker mounting of heavier guns on existing chassis, considerable increase in the fire power of tank units, and gun power was the thing Russians always regarded as most important in their tanks. Armed both with high velocity guns and gun-howitzers, Russian S.U.s[2] were used extensively in support of tanks, acting together with heavy tanks as a fire base on which the more mobile medium tanks pivoted. At the same time they were also used for direct support of the Infantry, in this role often mixed with tanks right down to platoon level.

The combination with tanks was hardly surprising, since in many ways German assault guns and Russian S.U.s were " turretless tanks " as much as self-propelled guns in the sense hitherto understood. That tanks and S.U.s varied only in small degree from one another was particularly noticeable in the case of the heavy types, the Stalin heavy tank and the S.U. 152 heavy gun-howitzer. Both relied on heavy, long-range fire power and were used in many similar roles. In the S.U. 152 the Russians also managed to combine the functions of a self-propelled gun-howitzer, of a heavy anti-tank gun, and of an assault gun suitable for use against fortified positions. By this they were not only spared the complication of having to build three seperate vehicles for each of these roles but, through versatility of the equipment, obtained considerable simplification of employment.

Conclusions

Thus the development of the assault gun type of vehicle becomes particularly significant both as a clear link between tanks and self-propelled guns and, what is even more important, as a very significant example of a much more direct and aggressive use of artillery equipment arising out of its increased mobility.

So far artillery has been regarded almost exclusively as a supporting arm since, in fact, other roles were difficult, if not impossible, with towed equipment, and infantry continued to be regarded as the basis of every army. In this order of things cavalry, and more recently tanks, have been given the role of a complementary mobile arm. However, with the adoption of self-propelled carriages, the gun became a much more versatile and direct source of fire power instead of being a slow supporting weapon. It could act either as an integral part of a completely mechanized force, as the fire base of the smallest infantry units, or in the more traditional artillery manner.

At the same time tanks have moved away from the narrow conceptions of armoured assault vehicles or of lightly armed raiders. Instead, they too are slowly being recognized as a much more versatile form of mobile fire power. Mobility is no longer used with the main object of transporting a shield of armour but, on the tactical plane at any rate, to increase the effectiveness of tank armament. Thus, in spite of outwardly different approaches, both tanks and self-propelled guns clearly become the means of increasing the mobility and effectiveness of heavy weapons; and, as a combination of the effective form of fire power and mobility, they all represent, irrespective of shape or name, the truly basic weapons of modern combat.

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[2] Samokhodnaya Ustanovka (Russian designation for a self-propelled gun).

MAGINOBILITY

THE CONUNDRUM OF TANK DESIGN

By "F.S.B."

NOT long ago a discussion took place in the correspondence columns of *The Times* on the design of Tanks. This may seem rather an unusual place to debate such a matter, since the details of tank design are among the most closely guarded of military secrets; and it may seem strange too that the general public should be interested in so technical—or tactical—a question. The tank, however, has a very special interest to the British people. It was a British invention which is generally credited with having ended the stalemate and the slaughter of the 1914–18 War, and with having brought victory to the Allied arms. It is natural that when war clouds again appear in the sky, many people should want to be assured that such potent weapons have been maintained and improved; and that British ingenuity is again being mobilised to save British lives and confound British foes.

Although the tank idea now enjoys almost universal support, tank design has always been a subject of lively controversy. To understand why this should be so it is useful to recall the great and strange events which followed the entry of the tanks into the 1914–18 War.

The tanks first went into action on 15th September, 1916, in the concluding stages of the first battle of the Somme. They achieved some success—though not very much—the season was late and the going bad; in short, there were good excuses for failure. The next year, at Ypres, they tried again, in much greater numbers, nearly 200 going into action; but the results were even more disappointing, though excuses for failure were even better.

Then, in November, 1917, came Cambrai, where some 400 tanks, by a surprise attack, burst clean through the formidable Hindenburg line and restored at one stroke the waning prestige of the Tank Corps. The secret of victory seemed to have been found at last. Joy bells rang out in London and everyone waited breathlessly for the invulnerable and invincible tanks to roll up the German line, and then to roll on irresistibly to Berlin. Alas for the high hopes: the irresistible and invulnerable tanks did not roll far. Within forty-eight hours, as soon, in fact, as the Germans had recovered from their surprise, the British advance was brought to a halt, and ere long the situation was completely restored. No really satisfactory explanation of the failure of the invulnerable British tanks to sustain the Cambrai offensive has ever been given. At the time, all concerned much preferred to explain how the initial success had been achieved.

Nine months later, south of the Somme, the Cambrai type of attack was repeated; with almost identical results. Again there was a spectacular initial success, and again all attempts by the tanks to exploit the success were complete and immediate failures, even though the Germans had scarcely any anti-tank weapons, and among these tanks were many new and improved types. Attempts to explain this second failure have been made, and it is not without significance that Field-Marshal Earl Haig's explanation, given at the time in his despatches, is quite different from that given later by Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, who was Chief of Staff to General Lord Rawlinson, the Army Commander conducting the battle, in his *Story of the Fourth Army*.

Many more attacks followed, and it was to the tanks that their almost uniform success, contrasting so sharply with the uniformity of failure of almost all previous offensives, has been generally attributed. But tanks were not used in all these attacks; and those made without tanks were, if anything, appreciably more successful, and less costly in lives, than those delivered with tank support. This striking fact, which cannot be disputed, seems to have been overlooked in the subsequent build-up of the tank idea.

At any rate it seems to be now generally agreed that the tank idea was completely vindicated by the 1918 campaign; though controversy has continued ever since between the exponents of mobility, the protagonists of armour protection, and the believers in gun-power. Obviously these three attributes are mutually exclusive. Great amounts of any one demand the sacrifice of one or both of the other two. The theories of tank tactics require, however, that the tank should possess all three; and the protagonists of any one can therefore always be shot down, in argument, by the protagonists of the other two. Provided the basic idea is accepted that fighting is best done in a vehicle, all the materials are present for an endless controversy.

It is time now to pass from the experiences of 1916–18—rather perplexing experiences it must be admitted—to those of the 1939–45 War. It must be conceded that these have, on the whole, enhanced the prestige of the tank idea, though they too are not without some curiosities. Soldiers continue to argue about tank design, but seem to be agreed that "Armour" must be both the spearhead of the attack and the main defence against the armour of the enemy. They are, however, also agreed that the truth of the old proverb, which asserts that attack is the best defence, has been amply vindicated.

The Maginot Line, that celebrated defensive masterpiece, has fallen into disrepute; but no good reason has yet been suggested why armour plates, the role of which is purely defensive, should acquire some offensive value when carried in a vehicle; in fact why portable Maginot lines should give better value for money spent on defence than the fixed variety. It has been said, of course, that portable Maginot lines, in the form of tanks, could always avoid or outflank fixed defences. That is quite true; but it is equally true, when other things are equal, that the most mobile soldier should be the man who carries least armour. If there is any validity in the mobility argument it leads inevitably to the conclusion that armour should be left at home.

Whatever may be the uses of armour and mobility, separately or in combination, they can do no more than bring the soldier into the best position for attack. The attack itself is not made with armour plates or petrol engines; it is not even made with cannons and machine guns; it is made mainly with bullets, shells, and other missiles. All these have to be transported to the battlefield, and are there only effective if, at the end of their journey, they are deposited in the bodies of the enemy. The soldiers who succeed in securing the first, or the most, hits on their opposite numbers, are the probable winners of any battle; and the problem of attack is to find the best way of bringing this about with the minimum expenditure of rounds. If riding in a vehicle will achieve this end, then, and only then, that is the best way to fight.

From such information as is available to the general public it is not yet possible to say how far these theories have been borne out in practice. It is clear enough, however, that, in spite of some great successes, tanks have by no means fulfilled all

the expectations of their backers. There have been great changes both in tank design and in tank tactics since the launching of the idea. The tanks, which started as the " Heavy Section " of the Machine Gun Corps and were designed to lead the Infantry into action, and which were afterwards cast for an independent role leaving slow-moving footsloggers far behind, now seem to have become the self-propelled section of the Artillery.

The latest battle tanks carry a mighty cannon, with a range of several miles; and though the thickness of their armour is still a closely guarded secret, it does not require great mechanical or military knowledge to appreciate that, when tank meets tank, the bigger the guns carried the thicker must be the armour to give protection, and the larger the engine to propel the vehicle. It would perhaps be indiscreet to inquire how much room and weight is left over, after the protagonists of mobility, armour, and gun power have all been satisfied, for the ammunition which is, after all, the business end of the whole contraption. Sceptics may at least be pardoned for thinking that there is something rather peculiar about the whole affair. Some may even go so far as to think that the tank designers have been set an insoluble problem; largely because the tank tacticians have been, and often still are, barking up the wrong trees.

THE DEFENCE OF MINORCA, 1756

A Report on some Contemporary and Unpublished Manuscripts by Major William Cuninghame on the Siege

By T. H. McGuffie

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THE roar of indignation and popular fury directed against Admiral Byng after the indecisive naval battle of 20th May, 1756, prevented the hearing of other voices dealing with other aspects of the Minorca affair. The picture was simplified into one showing the brave garrison of St. Philip's castle deserted and abandoned through the cowardice of a seaman who failed to beat the French though his fleet was superior and his instructions plain. William Blakeney, the British Commander on land, was, in contrast, painted with simple heroic strokes as the brave old warrior well over eighty years of age who did not take off his clothes or go to bed for seventy days before overwhelming assault beat down his resistance. While Byng went on to court-martial and execution, Blakeney was made a baron. Two 'Lives'[1] were published, and Blakeney's liking for punch, his love of dancing (even in 'broad-toed German shoes, an inch thick in the sole') and the fact that he was 'without any great passion for books' were sympathetically portrayed. Where Byng was lofty, proud, and a great duellist, Blakeney wined with his officers in taverns, was careless with money, and hated duelling. It might be true that drinking had caused 'a paralytick disorder,' bringing 'a tremor on his nerves,' so that he wrote even his own name with great difficulty.[2] But, generally speaking, this antique hero had a full meed of praise for his Roman virtues.

Blakeney could not, however, expect to escape scot free from the pamphlet which was trying to praise, exculpate or blame the Ministry for the great disasters of 1756. In 1757 a *Letter to the Rt. Hon. the Lord B——y, being an Inquiry into the merit of his defence of Minorca,* published anonymously, declared that the Commander had spent the whole siege shut up in his house, never in time of action at the batteries or on the ramparts, and that the suburbs of St. Philip's castle had not been properly destroyed, though ample labour existed, even if not employed. 'An old officer in the decline of his powers' had neither demolished the roads nor even the corn mills; the British troops had little knowledge of their positions and on the night of the storm after Colonel Jeffries' capture, 'one whole regiment' stood idle for two hours without an officer to command them, while the French poured in during a parley; and at the end, complete battalions had marched away to surrender 'through the gates without a breach and with full bellies, having suffered trifling losses.' Blakeney or his friends replied, with an attempted answer to all points, and it is from this *Full Answer* that many of the facts commonly quoted about the siege are taken.

Some documents recently deposited in the Royal United Service Institution library cast some authentic contemporary evidence on the land truths of the French

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[1] *Memoir of the Life and Actions of General W. Blakeney* (London and Dublin, 1756), *Memoirs of the Life and Particular Actions of that brave man, General Blakeney* (London, n.d.).

[2] *A Full Answer to an Infamous Libel, etc.* (1757), p. 34; *Memoirs of the Life and Particular Actions of that brave man, General Blakeney* p.13. (London, n.d.).

attack on Minorca, as well as painting a lively and clear picture of XVIIIth Century warfare between civilised states.[3]

The Journal of the Seige [sic] of St. Philip's Castle, Minorca, 1756, is a volume of 284 large pages, beginning on 1st March at Mahon, and continuing with daily notes, comments, copies of orders and letters, to the assault on 27th June, with a brief note on subsequent events until 21st September, 1756. Although in the writing of one Robert White 'Acting Register in the Vice-Admiralty Court of Minorca,' whose testimony is witnessed at the end of the book, the papers are in fact the daily record of Major William Cuninghame, volunteer engineer in the siege, written up during the course of the struggle. This account is in considerable detail. There are, for instance, nine closely written pages on the final night attack. Loose within the covers is a shorter and more impersonal account, covering 65 written pages, by 'W. C., Engr.,' which is an abstract of the *Journal*, with a (French) printed plan of St. Philip's castle; and a list of 23 points, undated and unsigned, written in a very crabbed hand, which deal with the Lieutenant-Governor's conduct of the siege in a highly critical manner.

The *Supplement* contains 21 pages headed 'Thoughts on the Defence of St. Philip's Castle,' by W. Cuninghame, dated 3rd April, 1756, followed by another 30 pages on detailed dispositions, reconnoitring, and a quarrel over some barley stores injured during siege preparations. A report on the state of the fortifications on 26th June, 1756 (the day before the storm), represents the damage as more widespread than serious, though with much repaired work, many broken palisades, and the glacis in several places much torn up; the proposed repairs are also recorded.

The comments on the works are followed by two very detailed analyses of the strength of the garrison on the 24th April and 18th May, 1756; infantry, marines, engineers, artillery, seamen, Greeks, Spanish labourers, hospital staff, civilians, Jews, the 827 women and children, are all listed, coming to a grand total of 4,309, of whom, on 18th May, 2,579 were private soldiers fit for duty. These figures are compared with the baker's return, showing 59 more men's allowances charged than actual mouths to eat them, witnessing to 'an infamous and fraudulent intention somewhere of cheating the Government and serving some vile private interest.' Whatever the reason for this careful record, it is of great interest as showing the real numbers concerned in the siege, which has up to the discovery of these papers not been perfectly clear. Some other returns of casualties show 23 killed on the night of the assault, with 30 wounded and 12 missing; a complete record shows 71 killed, 304 wounded and 15 missing in the whole siege; 23 died of wounds, and 10 died of sickness. The last is a very low figure, considering the crowded state of the fort and the length of the siege. Only one officer is shown as killed on duty, with two others killed off duty in the grand total of 400. A record of the disposition of the 240 guns shows on 28th June that 39 were disabled, and of the 81 mortars 9 were out of action; a note at the end says that if the 'serviceable' guns and mortars were properly proved and searched 'a great many' would be found unfit for service. Nearly 26,000 shot and as many bombs were fired by the combined guns and mortars of the castle during the siege. A copy of the articles of capitulation, in French and English, is followed by two short statements in French: one shows the disposition of the 90 guns and mortars placed in 10 batteries for the attack of the castle, and the other

[3] M.M. 225, *Journey to Minorca Overland, with Remarks on that Island.* M.M. 226, *Supplement to the Seige [sic] of St. Philip's Castle, Minorca, 1756.* M.M. 227, *Journal of the Seige [sic] of St. Philip's Castle, Minorca, 1756.*

gives a brief account of the assault which, without giving details, mentions that mines had caused considerable loss to the French at both the Queen's and Argyle redoubts. All three volumes are well and solidly bound on cream vellum, and contain the arms and book-plate of Wm. Cuninghame, Esq., of Enterkine. The solemn way in which the amanuensis, Robert White, swore to the nature of the contents of the two siege books and the provenance thereof, before Lieut.-Colonel John Cuninghame of the service of the States General, and Lieutenant James Cuninghame, R.N., in London on 26th February, 1757, indicates that some very definite purpose was in view, though nothing appears to have come of it.

Apart from the interesting statistics in the *Supplement*, the *Journal* has a very great value, giving as it does a complete picture of the siege from the engineer's standpoint. William Cuninghame in February, 1756, was in Genoa. on his way to Nice and Great Britain, with his wife. He had been promoted major in General St. Clair's Regiment, then under orders for North America, and had left Minorca to join, when he heard on 17th February that a French expedition was preparing at Toulon to assault the island. He immediately ordered 3,000 palisades (scantlings 9 ft. by 6 in. by 4 in.) and had them shipped for Mahon, and begged Edgecumbe, commanding H.M. Squadron in the Mediterranean, for a passage to Minorca, where he felt his long and intimate knowledge of the island's defences would be valuable. An order, dated 6th February, 1756, had also reached him from Blakeney, commanding his return. On 1st March, Blakeney received him ' with a great deal of affection ' on his landing from H.M.S. " Princess Louisa," and with Captain Bastide, the Chief Engineer, Cuninghame began preparing for defence. The works were strengthened, the regimental officers made acquainted with the works, landing places reconnoitred and buildings likely to be demolished surveyed, while the ' ladies ' (as opposed to the ' women ') were mostly sent to Majorca. Cuninghame also made arrangements so that, as a volunteer in the siege, he should be outside the scope of any possible capitulation, and free to join his regiment.

Cuninghame was not on good terms with Bastide, who seems to have resented his subordinate's energy and flood of ideas. These included the demolition of the Chief Engineer's house, which stood in the line of fire from St. Philips' castle, and the destruction of some windmills overlooking the fortifications. Business was agreed on in frequent councils of war. By 15th April the seven ships of the Mediterranean squadron were all at Minorca and news arrived that Admiral Byng ' with a strong fleet ' was under orders to join them. By the morning of 18th April the British garrison was gathering in St. Philip's, as a great French fleet, reckoned variously at between 90 and 200 sail,[4] was off Cuidadella. The roads were broken, springs choked, and the bridges destroyed. Edgecumbe's fleet sailed on the 20th, to Cuninghame's deep regret. In the withdrawal to the shelter of St. Philip's, there was a good deal of plundering and drinking by the troops and their women, much dissatisfaction and terror for the Spaniards, and some desertion by labourers and contractors. On 22nd April General Blakeney sent a polite letter to the French commander-in-chief, asking with what intentions he had landed, as no war had been declared. The Duc de Richelieu replied simply that his intentions were exactly the same as those of the Royal Navy towards French vessels (which for some months past had been intercepted and taken). He followed this with a courteous request to be told the exact truth about a Frenchman reported to be kept a prisoner to cook for some English officers,

[4] B. Tunstall, *Admiral Byng*, p. 103, ' 163 transports and 12 ships of the line, with other small craft.'

and complaining about the violence of an English lady, wife of one of Blakeney's officers, who lived at Cuidadella and who was apparently uncontrollable ; he accompanied this letter with a present of ginger-bread nuts. Blakeney replied equally courteously, clearing up the French cook matter and enclosing a letter from his officer (a captain in The King's Own) to his wife ' the terms very strong, as they tend to a restraint on the liberty of the tongue, which is a privilege most ladies, but more especially our British ones, are extremely tenacious of.' By the same drum Cuninghame sent to the French Chief Engineer a present of a horse and saddlery, in the hope (which was justified) that letters to Mrs. Cuninghame at Nice might later be sent through his hands.

The French continued to close in, and on 27th April the first musket shots were exchanged, while the French fleet of 18 sail stood off and on before the entrance to Mahon harbour. Shortly afterwards Cuninghame received not only a reply but a case of burgundy from the French Chief Engineer ; the fact that Cuninghame was referred to as in command of the British engineers enraged Captain Bastide ; and in fact the British had more dislike for other British than any had at this time for the French ; while the French Commander was having more trouble with the Englishwoman at Cuidadella than with her husband and his colleagues in the castle. By early May the British guns were opening occasionally on parties of French seen trying to establish positions across the harbour mouth, though the enemy was very slow in establishing his attack. In truth, St. Philip's was a very strong place, well built, and well designed, containing a central tower defended by a double circle of redoubts, with outlying strong points, protected on two sides by water, and standing on rock honeycombed by a great series of subterranean passages. These underground stores and passages still exist in excellent preservation. Early on the morning of 8th May the French opened fire, without much effect. According to his entries, Cuninghame at this time believed that though the English fleet might at any moment arrive, the probability was that Minorca might be given up as lost from the strength of the French by sea and land, and that the safety of Gibraltar would be the English Admiral's first concern. His apprehensions were of course proved accurate in every respect.

From this time, Cuninghame's entries deal increasingly with the damage done by the French fire, with the measures taken for repair and defence, and with the state of British and French batteries and guns. Occasional polite exchanges took place between the foes, accompanying letters sent to and from the besieged, and Cuninghame had the pleasure of receiving another case of white burgundy and one of red champagne from the French Chief Engineer. At one time the French complained to Blakeney that irregular shot was being fired by the castle, and enclosed some pieces of wire and horse-hair as evidence. These exchanges gave an opportunity for conversation, and on 17th May Cuninghame learnt from a French officer that Byng had arrived at Gibraltar. On 19th May Byng's fleet, described as ' upwards of 20 sail, some of them very large capital ships,' came into sight of the island ; the garrison sent out a boat, but failed to make contact. On 20th May Cuninghame's only marine comment is ' No British Fleet appeared all day.' This was the date of Byng's indecisive engagement, of which the besieged had of course no knowledge; though after the French had appeared under arms on the evening of the 22nd, and fired a triple discharge from their batteries from right to left, with a *feu de joie* from their small arms, the worst was suspected. From that date till the end, each of Cuninghame's entries finishes with, writ large, ' The Enemy's Fleet cruising off,' followed in much smaller writing by ' No British

Fleet appears.' Not until after the French assault on 27th June, when messages were exchanged prior to capitulation, did the English learn that the French had forced Byng to retire on the 20th.

From the steadily increasing fire of the enemy the assault was anticipated when it came on 27th June, at 11 p.m. though Cuninghame declares that the Queen's redoubt was abandoned prematurely and by mistake. It was in trying to remedy this and to find out what was happening that, during the darkness and confusion of the night, Colonel Jeffries, the Second-in-Command, and Cuninghame set out alone along the covered way and blundered into ' a parcel of skulking French Grenadiers,' who seized Jeffries, and severely wounded Cuninghame, the latter managing in the struggle to escape. No support whatever is given to Fortescue's story of Jeffries' capture ' with a hundred of his men.'[5] About 3 or 4 in the morning, the French beat a parley to bury their dead, and Blakeney held a Council of War, which decided to capitulate. Discipline in the subterranean passages broke down and there was some plundering and looting by the women and others there, while the French gave wine to our guards. The acceptance of very honourable terms on 29th July put matters on a proper footing.

Cuninghame had been carried in a chair from the hospital to the last Council of War with a strong fever on him. It is plain from his comments in the last phase of the siege and from the other papers that he felt strongly that, though honour might be satisfied, much more could and should have been done in the defence of the castle. In fact, as the siege wore on, it seems that the proud Scot had managed to quarrel with, or at least to differ strongly from, all his superior officers except Colonel Jeffries. After the capitulation, Cuninghame was taken to Mahon, where he was cared for by French surgeons until 21st September, 1756, when he was embarked and left Minorca. Cuninghame's last contact with the Lieutenant-Governor was by letter and was most unfortunate. He applied through his friend Robert White for a copy of the capitulation and of the resolutions of the Council of War. White's first request was ignored, and when he repeated it the General burst out : ' I have not time to be disturbed with those things. I am not to be a slave to everybody,' with some energy. ' Such,' comments the engineer, whose work is generally admired, ' was the return I had from Mr. Blakeney for all my services in the garrison.'

In the course of his various papers Cuninghame makes a comprehensive attack, supported by documents as far as possible, on Blakeney. He declares that work on the fortifications, proposed as far back as June, 1754, was completely neglected, until the actual threat in 1756 of an enemy landing caused some to be undertaken in a hurry ; that Blakeney in peace often allowed important letters to lie idle for as long as three months before forwarding them home, and never bothered to review the fortifications of St. Philip's from late in 1751 until just before the beginning of the siege. Therefore, not only were vital materials not available, but the suburbs immediately before the castle were not destroyed, so that their walls, timber, cellars and unchoked wells gave cover and many stores to the attackers. The old Spanish town wall, with its towers, was abandoned without a struggle, though the Spaniards during the earlier siege in September, 1708, with a much weaker garrison, had forced the Allies to bring cannon against it before retiring. Blakeney is also accused of not encouraging the inhabitants to volunteer, of failing to arrange for spies and secret information, of imperfect reconnoitring, of letting great quantities of naval stores

[5] J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, ii, 294.

and prizes fall unharmed into French hands, and of keeping many unnecessary mouths in the garrison. In general, the charges amount to idleness and a lack of intelligence in the defence of the island.

Cuninghame moreover declares that the loss of the Anstruther, Argyle, and Queen's redoubts had caused great loss to the enemy and little to ourselves, so that had no parley been agreed to, the French might have, with proper measures, been driven out again. Instead, the Lieutenant-Governor, who had never stirred from the castle during the whole siege, and who had to be turned out of bed when the attack began, never gave or sent any orders whatever during the action, though with a speaking trumpet he might have directed matters when things went wrong. Cuninghame then declares that had not Blakeney ' packed ' the Council of War just before the assault, and had not he himself read out from a prepared written opinion that he believed the place no longer defensible, the Council of War ' in spite of all the misfortunes that befell us ' would have voted to hold out ' at least till a practicable breach was made or all the outworks taken or destroyed.' It was ' most extraordinary,' said Cuninghame bitterly, that headquarters did so little on the last important occasion of the assault, though ' during all the time of the siege it was impossible for either Friend or Foe to ferret them out of their burrows, except when some alarm came of some hole being open to shells, on which an aide-de-camp was immediately hurried to Engineers to make it proof.'

A good deal of the material against Blakeney in the ' Letter ' attacking him is similar to Cuninghame's complaints, though not all. It is unlikely, for instance, that Cuninghame, who was responsible for the destruction of the roads, would say that the work was very poorly done ; or that he, who had arranged for the infantry officers to prepare and view the subterranean passages, would give information that because the fort was ' unknown ' to the British troops there was great disorder for the first ten days. Since he knew of the resolutions of the Council, it is also improbable that Cuninghame would have charged Blakeney with not ' taking a single minute of the siege,' a minor charge of which much is made.

Blakeney's *Full Answer* does not in fact refute these charges to any extent. A declaration that he ' frequently went to the top of the castle,' and ' went across the square to all Councils of War ' is not very serious. A statement that he ' exercised the sergeants and soldiers himself on the public parade ' probably refers to an occasion noted by Cuninghame rather laconically on 15th April, 1756 (before the first French landing), when he wrote : ' The General came over to St. Philip's about 8 in the morning, and instructed the sergeants and soldiers of the garrison in some few motions of the firelock. All the officers off duty attended.' Where Blakeney in his old age thought that under very trying circumstances enough had been done, the keen and rigorous Scotsman believed that, until every chance had been taken and the last shot in the locker spent, resistance should continue. As Blakeney was very short of officers (over 40 were absent on leave), attacked by 35 battalions and 90 pieces, blockaded by a French fleet, without much hope of relief, and his outworks penetrated, he might well be satisfied. All that Cuninghame saw was that still more might have been done, still more energy shown, and that the praise which the accident of political opportunism heaped on Blakeney was exaggerated. To him, the defence had been prolonged not because the English were good, but because the French were poor. The enemy was in fact taken aback by the strength of St. Philip's castle, and Richelieu's final assault was a desperate throw, forced on him by the difficulties of maintaining and supplying his army. Although Blakeney's defenders stated that the

French lost ' at least 5,000,' of which 1,200 fell in the night of the storm, and Fortescue says the siege cost the enemy ' at the least two thousand men,'[6] Cuninghame gives the French loss as above 500 killed and wounded in the night of the attack, and a total list of above 1,000. As from his residence in Minorca after the siege he was able to obtain much information, his figure is well worth credence. What gave the final touch to Cuninghame's anger was the arrival before Mahon harbour, on 19th July, 1756, of Admiral Hawke with 24 sail; this he mentions in his abstract *Journal*. The manner in which the defence of the island has been magnified is shown in the general assumption that the siege lasted 70 days. This was in fact the entire time from the first landing to the end. Not until 3rd May was any cannon shot fired at the French troops, and not until 8th May was there a regular exchange. Had the French been repulsed on 27th June, as Cuninghame believed they might have been, Minorca might have been saved, for the French were in fact tired and worn out, and succour was well on the way to the garrison.

On a careful consideration of this detailed and well substantiated contemporary account of the siege and surrender of Minorca and its defences, it is at least a strong possibility that under a younger and more energetic commander the island might have survived the French assault. The incompetent and complacent Byng may or may not have deserved to be executed for failing to relieve St. Philip's. The Ministry which allowed an old man like Blakeney, whose solidity is practically indistinguishable from stupidity, to remain in command at a threatened outpost cannot escape censure; and the singling out of such a man for distinction appears a mere contemptible political manœuvre. Cuninghame's vigorous and lively account of the affairs of Minorca during a highly important and critical period of our history is well worth study. There is a detailed account of the day-by-day activities and a long and important description of the final assault and capitulation. The engineer's pride, his ceaseless search for prevention and remedy, his personal antipathies and likings, are all clearly shown. He gives some interesting, and in places unconscious (or perhaps deliberately) humorous illustrations of the conventions of XVIIIth Century warfare. His spice of bias, his gradual falling away from friendship with Blakeney, and the continuance and increase of his collaboration with Colonel Jeffries, provide zest in writing and pleasure in reading. Cuninghame, throughout the siege, had a very clear idea of the importance which the sea operations had for the defenders of Minorca. His writing is clear, his figures appear to be well based and accurate, while he was free from the political taint of the home-bred pamphleteer and party hack. Blakeney and his men did much better than Government had any reasonable right to expect; had the whole affair simmered down without overmuch publicity, it is probable from the tone of Cuninghame's earlier writing that the account would have been purely descriptive and impartial. It seems that the puffing-up of Blakeney after the event caused Cuninghame immediately to marshal in clear and definite form his latent dislike of his commander and to give a point of extra sharpness to his criticisms. Through the popular interest and his own knowledge, Cuninghame brought together and preserved a unique record and many collections of facts and opinions which would have been otherwise scattered and lost.[7]

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[6] Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, ii, 295.

[7] Some further details from the *Cuninghame MSS.* will be found in three notes published in the *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol. xxviii, No. 115, pp. 133–5.

SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

By Air Commodore R. H. Spaight, C.B.E.

IT is perhaps an overstatement to say that Englishmen expect everyone in the world to react to any given situation in the same way as they would themselves. On many occasions this trait may cause no more than slight embarrassment, but in military thought it is dangerous. This is particularly true as far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned.

The differences between a European and that heterogeneous mass of people who make up the Soviet Republic are often mentioned but have never been thoroughly explained, at any rate at the popular level. It is understandable, therefore, that many people should expect the Soviets to act and react in military matters in the same way as the Nazis did in the last war. Nothing can be further from the truth. Soviet military thought has been built on very different foundations from those of other European countries. In some ways it is a century behind the rest of the World.

It is true that the everyday conditions in Russia, with the unlimited manpower and very limited machinery, at once put the Country in a category apart. The lack of contact with the outside world and the intensive communistic teaching, together with the primitive conditions which obtain in the greater part of the Country, have to-day provided a people who are hardy, obedient and completely indifferent to suffering or the loss of human life. But these factors, though they may influence the tactical employment of the soldiers in the field, do not concern higher strategic thought.

We knew that in the last war the Soviet methods were very different from those of the other Allies, or indeed those of the enemy. All who saw them were shocked by their crudity, but they were effective against a demoralized and weary enemy. The methods employed by the Chinese in Korea have a distinct family resemblance, and it is reasonable to suppose that the Soviets are using that campaign in the same way as the Nazis did Spain, in order to try out tactical methods and equipment.

To that extent a study of the Korean campaign, and, say, the drive through the Balkans and Buda-Pest to Vienna in 1945, may give an insight into Soviet methods in the field. But it will not give us a picture of the directing mentality behind the forces, or the lines on which the Soviets are likely to plan a major offensive campaign in the future.

Many of the Soviet field commanders have the simple mentality of General Nathan B. Forrest of American Civil War fame—" I get there firstest with the mostest men." All worship artillery as the God of Battles. Few have any appreciation of the capabilities of aircraft which, even in 1945, they never used outside the scope of long-range artillery. But it is not they who plan and direct operations; they only execute. The machinery of the Higher Command is slow—cumbrous—but it is thorough. Like all schemes produced by a committee its plans are lacking in flexibility and do not allow a commander to " take a chance." The same defects are apparent in the whole Soviet organization from their domestic agricultural system to their foreign policy. It is therefore only to be expected in the military sphere.

If we are to attempt to understand the Soviet military outlook we must study the military thinkers on whose work their theory of war is based. It is only when we are aware of the master of war who they follow that we can hope to anticipate

what they will do in actual operations. Whereas we are fully conversant with the great military thinkers of other nations, and perhaps even have some idea of the extent to which the theories of one or another are followed in any particular country, we are singularly ignorant both of Soviet military writers and of the line of thought which at present influences the Higher Command.

Some thought on the lines that the Russian Command has followed in the past may repay study.

Antoine Henri Jomini, one time Général de Brigade in the Army of Napoleon and later a full general in the Russian service, took a decisive part in the foundation of the Russian Military Academy. He was military adviser to the Emperor of Russia from 1813 until his death in 1869. In his later years he divided his time between France and Russia, and it is on record that he was frequently consulted by the Russian Emperor during the Crimean War, while Napoleon III sought his advice before embarking on his Italian campaign in 1859.

This remarkable man was born in the Canton of Vaud in Switzerland in 1779. Destined for a banking career he managed, at the age of 17, to get himself into a minor semi-official staff post in the French Army during General Buonoparte's first Italian campaign. He became Chief of Staff to Maréchal Ney and filled that post through the campaign which culminated in Austerlitz. He subsequently served with Ney in Prussia, Spain and during the retreat from Moscow. That he never attained high command is attributed by some to the personal enmity of Berthier, the Imperial Chief of Staff. Whatever the cause, Jomini became bitterly disappointed by his lack of promotion and, in August, 1813, rode off to the Allied Force and offered his services to Alexander of Russia. Strangely enough, as he was still a Swiss national, this does not seem to have been counted as desertion or treason.

While still with Ney, after the Peace of Amiens, he had commenced his military writings with the treatise comparing the campaigns of Frederick the Great with those of Napoleon. In Russian employ he continued his studies and his writing. His best known and perhaps his greatest theoretical work is the *Préçis de l'art de la Guerre*, published in two volumes in 1838.

One had often felt on coming in contact with the Soviet commanders during and immediately after the War that their concept of the art of war was definitely Napoleonic in character. It is reasonable to suppose that this man, who was recognized as an authority of the first rank in military affairs, who founded the earliest Russian Military Academy, and who was the most prolific writer on warfare in Russia in the first half of the XIXth Century, still is the predominant influence in Soviet military thought.

His fundamental principles of strategy are given as :—

" (i) Bringing, by strategic measures, the major part of an army's forces successfully to bear upon the decisive areas of a theatre of war and, as far as possible, upon the enemy's communications without compromising one's own.

(ii) Manoeuvring in such a manner as to engage one's major forces against part only of those of the enemy.

(iii) In battle by tactical manoeuvres bring one's major forces to bear on the decisive area of the battlefield or on that part of the enemy's lines which it is important to overwhelm.

(iv) Arranging matters in such a fashion that these masses of men be not

only brought to bear at the decisive place but that they be put into action speedily and together so that they may make a simultaneous effort."

It is interesting to compare these principles with the methods adopted by the Chinese forces in the Korean compaign; and it is almost impossible to escape the conclusion that the minds directing that campaign were influenced by Jomini. In considering the defence of the West, and in planning to meet possible Soviet aggression, it may be that a study of this authority by our statesmen and military leaders would pay a handsome dividend.

THE FORCES' FAMILIES

By Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

On 14th February, 1885, a certain Major Gildea (afterwards Colonel Sir James Gildea) wrote a letter to *The Morning Post* in which he stated his desire to start a fund to help the families of soldiers and sailors. His wording was as follows :—

> " Ample provision having been made for the relief of widows and orphans of our soldiers and sailors who may be killed, or die of disease or wounds in war, a further duty devolves upon this country. . . ."

the duty being to assist

> " . . . first of all married women, irrespective of their being on the strength or not ; second, aged parents who have been dependent on their sons when at home ; and third, in finding suitable employment for those who are willing to help themselves."

A month later he followed this up with a further letter in which he announced the names of the ladies who had helped him form the first committee. It was an impressive list beginning with Princess Edward of Saxe-Weimar and containing a number of ladies of title. The committee, incidentally, was composed entirely of women and it was not until 11th April that it was decided that " it being thought that the movement had now taken tangible form that the following gentlemen be chosen to act as trustees." There would appear to have been some competition to serve on so distinguished a committee.

The whole purpose of this fund was that it should, from the human relationship angle, be administered as far as possible by ladies, but that, in the words of the first rules, drawn up on 16th May, 1885, " treasurers may be gentlemen or not, as desired."

Early Committee Meetings

Between 14th February and 16th May a great deal of work was done. The letters to *The Morning Post* were just a part of a well designed publicity campaign because on the day when the first appeal was published, Gildea was already holding a meeting at Lady Stanley's house in Portland Place to decide the formation of his fund.

Thereafter meetings took place each week at Major Gildea's house at 20, Phillimore Gardens, W., an address which he asked should be looked upon as the offices of the fund and where he could be found " between four and six o'clock each evening." It is presumed that his military duties kept him occupied during the greater part of the day, because the following year we find him promoted to lieut.-colonel.

During this time of immense activity it is quite certain that his daughter Miss Kathleen Gildea (later Lady Wickham Legg), who was elected the first honorary secretary of the fund, must have undertaken a very considerable share of the work. The minutes of all the early committee meetings were written in her own bold hand-writing and, except for a slight tendency to dip her pen into the red instead of the black ink, they were extremely clear and lucid models of minute compilation. The work she did behind the scenes—and which was never recorded—must have been extremely great. One does not have to be an expert in calligraphy to sense that here was a lady of great capability and one who was undoubtedly a charming personality. It was, however, through Princess Edward that Queen Alexandra (then Princess of

Wales) became interested in the work. The first reference to this was recorded in the minutes of a meeting held on 27th March when H.R.H. " consented to patronize the work."

On 11th April the committee met to discuss the future name of this organization which had up till then, been referred to either as " a fund " or " the work." The first name considered was " The National Army and Navy Society." This was submitted to Princess Alexandra for her approval, but her reaction must have been immediate because a week later the Committee had to ponder and, one gathers, at some considerable length, to find an alternative title. It was then that the name " Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association " (the basis of the present title) was decided upon and received Her Royal Highness's approval.

Five weeks later the Princess attended a committee meeting at Lady Stanley's house and signed the minutes of the previous meeting in which the chief business had been the acceptance of the Rules of the Association.

Princess Alexandra maintained a life-long interest in the Association and took the chair at the Annual General Meeting in 1895. It is, however, interesting to note that in that capacity she was not supposed to speak and that her final observation on the meeting had to be conveyed through the Prince of Wales himself.

In reading through the minutes of the early committee meetings, one thing becomes self-evident ; that Sir James Gildea and his band of helpers wasted no time in getting down to their chief objective of providing help for the families of Service men. This is hardly surprising in view of the fact that Sir James had previously been Hon. Secretary to the Zulu, Afghan, Bombay, and Indian Patriotic Fund, an organization which apparently looked after the welfare of soldiers serving in those particular places. He must have come across many cases of hardship which could not be dealt with under the somewhat limited rules of that organization.

Speedy Activity

As proof of the speed with which activities began, we can record that at the second committee meeting—which took place exactly a week after the first—arrangements were put in hand to provide an adequate reception for the wives and children of Service men arriving from Malta and Gibraltar at Portsmouth on the " Himalaya." It was decided, in the first instance, to write to Miss Robinson, who apparently ran the Soldiers' Institute at Portsmouth, to " ascertain what she would charge for supplying them per head with a good tea on landing." But the tea itself must have been considered an inadequate reception, because within the week Lady Constance Stanley and Miss Kathleen Gildea paid a visit to Portsmouth to inquire into the necessity for distributing warm clothing to these women and children.

Nor was that all. Captain Auld, at Portsmouth, reported that there were always difficulties over luggage and that these women would undoubtedly need help in getting their baggage to their various destinations in England. In consequence, he was empowered to meet all these costs and told that he would, in due course, be reimbursed with any expenses he had incurred. One wonders whether he realized what he was letting himself in for, because on the 16th May he reported that he had spent some £56 3s. 10d. on this mission. He was duly repaid in full.

While no particulars are given of the landing of these women and of their reception, we can only assume that it all went off extremely well and that among their other manifold duties the committee and helpers who organized this reception must have put in a large amount of detailed work.

Expansion

During all this time the organization was expanding rapidly. Branches were springing up everywhere and the energy expended in this connection must have been great, because as early as the beginning of April—that is, less than three weeks after the fund had been started—Hastings and St. Leonards Branch made what was referred to then as the " third and last instalment " of sums totalling £676 1s. 1d., and on the same date the sum of £150 was received from Derby as a first instalment.

As regards individual cases, it is very difficult to obtain any detailed particulars of the type of person to whom help was given. All the minutes of meetings show that there was a short list of those who were given small sums of money to help them over difficulties. They normally received £2, sometimes £3, and on some occasions specified sums were given by members of the committee for particular women. The first names that appeared on the list were those of Mrs. Hopkins, Mrs. Elkins and Mrs. Amos, while there was a special gift of 10s. to a Mrs. Minwards. In April there is an item given for " all expenses attending the removal of Mrs. Aldersroft from the Union, Plumstead, Kent, to Watford." The " Union " presumably was the contemporary name for a " workhouse."

Quite a number of these cases requiring immediate attention were coming in and it was resolved early in April that members of the committee visiting cases should be empowered " temporarily to relieve their difficulties and to report their actions at the next meeting, and thus obtain authority for the committee to repay any disbursements they may have made."

While the committee remained small, with each member attending individually to cases, this arrangement appears to have been satisfactory, but with the organization growing so rapidly such a position could not last for long, since obviously a check had to be kept of money so freely subscribed. As early as June, some amended rules were introduced in which it was laid down that " except under very special circumstances, no case shall be relieved by a grant of money from the funds of the Association until the recognized form No. 7 has been previously prepared, filled up, and certified."

For the benefit of those helpers not cognizant with army procedure, Sir James Gildea had already had to point out in a circular to all branches that " a soldier who has made no provision whatsoever for his wife can be compelled to do so on application being made to the Secretary of State for War." It is, however, interesting to note that at this time the official family allowances ran at 1s. a day for the wife and 3d. a day for each child which, even allowing for the difference in value of money as between then and now, was not a very princely sum. Even when a soldier had been compelled to make an allotment, the sum could not exceed more than 6d. a day for n.c.o.s with the rank of sergeant and 3d. a day for those below that rank, so that the effort must have appeared to many to have been hardly worth while, especially as a full report of each case had to be given on the appropriate Army form.

It is a strange reflection that, even after sixty-five years of continuous effort, we have not been able to make supply catch up with demand, and that our organization is every bit as necessary now as it was then.

The Officers' Branch

In 1886, the Officers' Branch was established and in 1899 rented accommodation and, subsequently, built a block of 79 flats at Wimbledon, naming it Queen Alexandra's Court. These flats are occupied, rent free, by deceased officers' widows and elderly unmarried daughters of limited means. In 1946, The Queen's House, Camberley,

was opened as a residential home for ladies who, through age or infirmity, are unable to cope with the difficulties of doing their own housekeeping under present day living conditions. By its Charter, the Officers' Branch is precluded from drawing on the general funds of S.S.A.F.A. and has to rely entirely upon donations specially earmarked for this Branch.

The Nursing Service

In 1892, a nursing service was formed for the care of the Service families in garrisons at home and abroad. Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales became the first President. The sisters were henceforth known by the honoured courtesy title of "Alexandra" Nurses. The aim of the nursing service was to provide care for the families of regular serving men of the three Services, both at home and overseas. However, with the passing of the Health Act, the Alexandra Nurses at home were absorbed into the National Health Service. The cost of the fifty-nine nursing sisters in Commands overseas is now borne by the Service Department concerned, though they still remain under the control of the Association.

The South African War

The Association continued and developed its activities during the South African War. Its work was supported by the Lord Mayor of London who, in 1899, launched a special appeal for funds. In addition, the Marquess of Lansdowne (Secretary of State for War) and Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley (Commander-in-Chief) circularised the larger Army formations, inviting their assistance. The many thousands of Service families which had suffered from the effects of the War were thus given the help they needed.

By the middle of 1900, £500,000 had been expended in this way and further large expenditure was foreseen. In response to an appeal by the Princess of Wales, the money was forthcoming and the work went on. By the end of the War, in 1902, nearly a million and a quarter pounds had been spent by the Association—a measure of the intensity and scope of its activities.

The 1914–18 War

Work continued throughout the early part of the Century, though naturally on a somewhat reduced scale. When the 1914–18 War broke out, expansion was on the same pattern as that of the Boer War. Large funds were raised by public subscription and disbursed in relief to Service families. In 1915, a serious disturbance to the work of the Association was caused by the passing of the Naval and Military War Pensions Bill, the provisions of which cut straight across the Association's efforts. A vigorous protest produced no effect, and for a while there was confusion and unnecessary suffering. In the end S.S.F.A. had to be invited to continue its work with certain agreed modifications.

By June, 1916, £2,610,657 had been expended on relief by the Association, but it became clear to the Government that the provisions of the 1915 Act would have to be modified. Hence the Ministry of Pensions Act, 1916, which codified and simplified the regulations and appointed a single authority to administer them. The passage of this act must have done much to restore the confidence of its many workers in the value and importance of S.S.F.A.

Between the Wars

The annual reports throughout the succeeding years show modest increases in the value of the investments held by Headquarters, which produced the income

required to finance headquarters expenditure, and very great activity both in raising and spending money in the counties. Many hundreds of pages in the reports bear tribute to the nation-wide influence of the Association.

The Officers' Branch was also active and the Royal Family displayed a continuing interest in the development of the " Homes " at Wimbledon. The Nursing Branch figures largely in the report for 1919–20 and it is interesting to note its extension to overseas garrisons.

In 1920, the founder, Sir James Gildea, died after 35 years of devoted service in the cause which he had so much at heart. His successor as Chairman was Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Stopford.

In 1921, the Association was working in co-operation with the United Services Fund under an agreement which became effective from May, 1920. The U.S.F. (formed from the profits of the Expeditionary Forces Canteen—predecessors of N.A.A.F.I.) had at that time assets of some £7,000,000, but no machinery of its own through which it could administer money for relieving distress. Hence the alliance. Joint committees were formed from the Council down to Divisional Committees of equal numbers from each side. The two organizations parted company in September, 1922.

In 1921/22, the word " Airmen's " was added to the original title of " Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association " by the express wish of the President, Queen Alexandra.

In 1926, the first full-time Secretary, Captain Sir George Wickham Legg, died after 31 years service, and on 20th November, 1925, Her Majesty Queen Alexandra also died. Her Majesty Queen Mary graciously consented to become President in her place.

A skeleton war plan was issued to all branches in 1938 providing for cash credits and emergency action on the outbreak of hostilities or major national emergency. This automatically came into operation in 1939, on the outbreak of war.

The 1939–45 War

The work of S.S.A.F.A. in the 1939–45 War was based on the principle that no man can serve his country efficiently if he is worrying about his home affairs. Everything was done to ease the anxiety of serving soldiers, sailors, and airmen by caring for their families, and the Association adopted the slogan " we'll look after them." The Association was first mobilised on a war footing before Munich, and its responsibilities have grown enormously since that time.

During the years the work developed from its original, rather limited, sphere of dispensing charitable grants, to the much wider field of general welfare. Because of this, the S.S.A.F.A. voluntary workers are looked upon as friends and advisers of Service and ex-Service men's families in every kind of problem. The families, therefore, feel perfectly free to come to the Association whenever they need experienced advice and help, without any of the loss of self-respect which might have been created if it were purely a charitable organization.

S.S.A.F.A. is an important ancillary to the Navy, Army, and Air Force, and these Services have told the Association again and again that they could not do without it. Field Marshal Alexander, when he was Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, wrote that there was nothing which more acutely affected the morale of troops serving overseas, without the possibility of home leave, than the preoccupation of

family worries, and he stressed the importance of the work of the Association in helping to solve home troubles and domestic problems. A similar message was received from the Adjutant-General to the Forces with regard to the value of the Association's work in maintaining the efficiency and the morale of serving men.

In May, 1941, the War Office asked S.S.A.F.A. to form an Overseas Enquiry Service through which men, who had reason to be worried about the safety of their families in blitzed areas, could have visits paid to their homes and reports of the well-being of their families sent to them. This service was given strong financial assistance from the Treasury. Almost immediately after its inception, however, its scope expanded to deal with general family welfare problems, quite apart from those arising out of air raids.

After the end of the War with Japan, the importance of the department decreased, the volume of work falling in proportion to the releases of the men from the Forces.

Additional Amenities

S.S.A.F.A. Children's Homes were started in 1941 to cater for the need of families in sudden emergencies, such as the mother being taken ill or having to go to hospital. Due to the fact that this responsibility now rests with the local authorities under the Children Act, the homes have been progressively closed down with the exception of Springbok House, Chelmsford, which was a gift to S.S.A.F.A. from the people of South Africa.

The S.S.A.F.A. Married Families Club, which was opened during the recent War, at 14, 15, and 16, Nevern Square, Earls Court, London, S.W.5, is proving a great boon to Service and ex-Service men who visit London with their wives and families. The charges are very moderate, bed and breakfast, with bath, costing 6s. 6d. per person, while supper costs 2s. 6d. Children of five years and under are taken at 3s. There is a nursery where children can be looked after all day while their parents are out. The Club, which has 38 single and double bedrooms, is confined to members or ex-members, below commissioned rank, of H.M. Forces and their wives and children.

The Clothing Branch was originally established in 1895 and was organized on a war basis in December, 1939. Its objects are to provide suitable clothing, blankets, layettes, and footwear, when available, to the wives, families, and children of Service and ex-Service men and women. At the height of the War, the Department was issuing over a million garments a year, but this figure is now greatly reduced owing to the fact that the supplies of gift clothing received from overseas have now lessened to a marked degree. The Branch is, however, still issuing over half a million garments annually.

Present Objects

S.S.A.F.A.'s present objects are, briefly, as follows :—

(*a*) To provide a Welfare and Advisory Service for the families of Service and ex-Service men and women.

(*b*) To help them to obtain all benefits from statutory sources to which they may be entitled, and also from Service and Regimental Funds.

(*c*) To help with temporary grants those who are in distress.

(*d*) To represent the cause of these families to the appropriate Government Department when there is reason to do so.

As to the second object, S.S.A.F.A. works in close co-operation with other organizations sharing in this work. As evidence of this, it is of interest to note that more than £300,000 a year is disbursed by the Association in grants to cases on behalf of other Service organizations. It will be particularly noted that the assistance from the Association is only given after the statutory sources of help have been used to the full. Where statutory help takes time to materialise, S.S.A.F.A. does much to bridge delays by giving that prompt help which emergency distress demands.

Except for a Treasury grant in respect of specific work undertaken at the Government's request by the Overseas Service, and for the cost of the Nursing Service which is now borne by the State under the terms of the National Health Act, S.S.A.F.A. is supported entirely by voluntary contributions.

Due to many factors, chief amongst them being the high cost of living, and the mistaken idea that the Welfare State makes voluntary Associations unnecessary, donations have dropped considerably in the last few years, in common with those of other similar associations. During the past three years the Association has expended far more than it has received. It is proud of its boast that money is not hoarded, but this does mean that more than £250,000 has to be raised annually, a result which each year becomes more difficult to achieve.

DIARY OF THE WAR IN KOREA[1]

22nd January.—The U.S. 7th Division repelled an attack by North Koreans East of Yongwol. Strong Allied patrols once more drove the enemy out of Wonju and re-captured a hill overlooking the airstrip. Other patrols ranged over a 50-mile stretch of the Western front around Osan and Kumyangjang. Superfortresses bombed targets on the West and East coasts. Enemy fighters were unusually aggressive during the day, without result.

23rd January.—Wonju was re-occupied by Allied forces, who also retook the airstrip. U.S. pilots claimed to have destroyed four Russian-built jet fighters in an air battle involving 50 jet aircraft.

24th January.—United Nations patrols penetrating deeply into no-man's land made only limited contact with the enemy. One Russian-type jet fighter was probably destroyed and two others damaged in an encounter with Allied Thunderjets.

25th January.—An Allied patrol from Wonju reached a point 10 miles North of that town without encountering the enemy. There was little activity elsewhere apart from patrolling.

26th January.—Suwon and Kumyangjang were recaptured by the Eighth Army. Allied warships shelled Inchon.

27th January.—South Korean sailors landed at the port of Inchon and inflicted several casualties on the enemy during a 4-hour raid.

28th January.—Elements of five under-strength North Korean Divisions which had been infiltrating through the Allied lines were cut off, mostly in the Yongwol and Tanyang area.

29th January.—United Nations troops, continuing their advance on a 40-mile front in Western Korea, repelled many counter-attacks, and armoured patrols advanced to within 11 miles of Seoul. The area North of Suwon was heavily bombed by Allied aircraft, and Inchon was bombarded by British and U.S. warships.

30th January.—United Nations troops on the West front made a further limited advance, the enemy's resistance being greatly strengthened, especially North-West of Suwon—though on the left flank the Allies advanced as much as 6 miles. On the East coast Allied warships bombarded Kansong, and in the West Inchon was again shelled from the sea.

31st January.—The Eighth Army, including Greek, Puerto Rican and Turkish troops continued to advance, gains of up to 3 miles being made; the severest fighting occurring North-East of Suwon and near Kumyangjang.

A joint battalion of Belgian and Luxembourg soldiers landed at Pusan.

1st February.—A U.S. and French force 18 miles North-West of Wonju was attacked on three sides by Chinese. Elsewhere in the West United Nations troops advanced up to 3 miles, the greatest advance being made by Turkish troops who reached a point 11 miles South of Seoul.

2nd February.—The U.S. and French force fought their way out of the encircling Chinese movement, with the aid of reinforcements and aircraft.

3rd February.—U.S. troops advanced to within 7 miles of Seoul.

4th February.—On the East coast South Korean troops were engaged with the enemy 17 miles South of the 38th parallel. Chinese counter-attacked in the central sector, but the Allied advance continued slowly. Aircraft made many attacks on enemy positions near Seoul. Warships shelled Inchon. The U.S. minesweeper "Partridge" struck a mine and sank off the East coast.

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[1] A sketch-map of Korea faces page 304.

5th February.—Five armoured columns carried out deep raids into enemy positions in the Wonju and Kumyangjang–Suwon areas. Heavy casualties were inflicted. Warships bombarded the Kangnung and Inchon areas on the East and West coasts.

6th February.—In central Korea South Koreans advanced North of Hoengsong to a point 25 miles South of the 38th parallel, while other South Koreans on their right gained 8 miles. In the West, further advances were made North-East and West of Ansang.

7th February.—On the East coast South Koreans captured high ground East and West of Kangnung. In the centre the X Corps cleared hills North of the old Wonju salient and pushed patrols forward to enemy positions along the Hongchon–Hoengsong road. On the West front Allied troops advanced to within 5 miles of Seoul, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.

8th February.—An enemy counter-attack slowed down a further advance by X Corps in the central sector. On the West front U.S. tanks shelled Seoul and artillery shelled Chinese positions North of the Han river. Enemy convoys moving South from Manchuria were heavily attacked by Allied aircraft.

9th February.—In the central sector, on the X Corps front, resistance stiffened 7 miles North of Hoengsong. In the West Allied forces were within 3 miles of Seoul and 6 miles of Inchon, and had cut the road between these places. Warships shelled Inchon.

10th February.—A United Nations patrol entered Seoul and withdrew later. Kimpo airfield was occupied and Inchon was recaptured after bombardment from the sea.

11th February.—A South Korean patrol on the East coast advanced to the vicinity of the border. Enemy resistance increased in the centre North of Hoengsong. Allied patrols met resistance when endeavouring to re-enter Seoul.

12th February.—The enemy launched a heavy counter-attack in the Hoengsong area, capturing the town and making substantial gains on a 30-mile front. In the Seoul area enemy resistance stiffened, and they counter-attacked unsuccessfully across the Han river into the suburb of Yongdungpo held by the U.S. 25th Division.

13th February.—The Chinese counter-attack continued and their troops were reported to be advancing West of Hoengsong towards Yoju under heavy attacks from the air. A South Korean regiment surrounded by the enemy fought its way out with the assistance of U.S. troops. Further West fighting continued along the Han river.

14th and 15th February.—South Korean Marines raided Wonsan, under cover of a naval bombardment. Enemy pressure increased South-East of Wonju and South Koreans repelled attacks North of Chechon. An Allied tank column forced its way through to Chipyong which was encircled and subsequently withdrew through infantry advancing in support. The U.S. and French garrison remained in Chipyong and were supplied from the air.

16th and 17th February.—During continued fighting in central Korea U.S. infantry drove back the enemy North of Chechon. Chinese troops in the Wonju–Chipyong area were reported to be moving East and North-East. Allied aircraft made a record number of attacks on enemy troop concentrations.

18th February.—Chinese and North Korean forces advanced to within a few miles of Yongwol and Chechon before being stopped by counter-attacks. An Allied patrol pushed forward 5 miles North of Wonju without making contact with the enemy. A U.S. tank and infantry column advanced 6 miles in the area West of Chipyong, cutting the enemy's supply route from the West to the central front and obtaining command over a road to the North-East.

19th February.—In the central sector the enemy was forced back several miles North of Yongwol and Chechon. U.S. troops which advanced North-West of Chipyong to the Han river made no serious contact. Allied troops crossed the Han river 5 miles East of Seoul but withdrew under machine gun and mortar fire. The South bank of the river

West of Seoul was also reached by our troops. Allied aircraft flew 728 sorties, concentrating on enemy transport.

20th February.—United Nations troops advanced several miles North of Chechon in pursuit of the withdrawing enemy.

British and Australian warships joined in the bombardment of Wonsan which had been going on for several days, while in the West a U.S. cruiser kept up a round-the-clock shelling of targets North of the Han river.

21st February.—U.S. patrols advanced as much as 10 miles North of the Allied line in central Korea, and thereby regained nearly all the ground recently taken by the enemy. In the West the enemy offered determined resistance along the Han river and attempts by Allied patrols to cross the river were unsuccessful. Superfortresses bombed the port of Tangchon on the East coast, 170 miles North of the 38th parallel, where the U.S. battleship " Missouri " destroyed railway installations and bridges.

Warships continued the bombardment of Wonsan and military targets in the Seoul area.

22nd February.—In an operation on a 60-mile front, in which the U.S. IX and X Corps with British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South Korean units took part, gains were made of 4 to 10 miles. Advances took place from South-East and North of Wonju to points within 5 miles South of Hoengsong, and from South-East, North-East and North of Chipyong. Allied aircraft made more than 400 sorties, striking at vehicles, gun emplacements, supply dumps and troop concentrations ; medium bombers dropped 140 tons of bombs on targets at Hamhung.

Allied warships bombarded Wonsan.

23rd February.—United Nations troops captured Pyongchang, 25 miles East of Wonju, and advanced another 4 miles. U.S. troops were checked during an advance North-West of Chechon and they were also engaged 6 miles North of Chipyong. British Commonwealth troops encountered a small enemy force 12 miles West of Hoengsong. In the extreme West there was an artillery duel over the Han river.

The bombardment of Wonsan by warships continued and the U.S. battleship " Missouri " shelled Songjin on the East coast.

24th and 25th February.—United Nations forces continued to make progress in central Korea, but their advance was slowed up by stiffening resistance, particularly at the western end of this front. Hoengsong was entered by Allied patrols but enemy fire caused their withdrawal.

26th February.—At the eastern end of their line the Allies captured Chongson. South Korean troops drove Chinese rearguards from a ridge overlooking Hoengsong. Superfortresses bombed targets at Wonsan, Hamhung and Pyongyang.

Warships shelled Wonsan and enemy positions in the Seoul area.

27th February.—Troops of the U.S. 7th Division broke through the North Korean main line on the road East of Hoengsong, and on their left the U.S. 2nd Division repelled numerous counter-attacks South-East of that village. Elsewhere in the central sector a steady but cautious advance continued.

Warships maintained their bombardment along the East coast and against enemy positions around Seoul.

28th February.—The South Korean Capital Division advanced along the East coast North of Kangnung. Troops of the U.S. 7th Division made a further advance to the North-East and to the West where they linked up with their 2nd Division on the road to Hoengsong. Heavy fighting, in which Australian troops were involved, took place in the

Yongdu area North-East of Chipyong. Allied aircraft bombed Chongjin, Hamhung and Pyongyang.

Wonsan and Seoul areas were again shelled from the sea.

1st March.—The South Korean Capital Division reached a point on the East coast within 18 miles of the 38th parallel. The U.S. 7th and 2nd Divisions advanced to within 31 miles of the parallel and U.S. Marines captured two hills near Hoengsong in central Korea. British Commonwealth troops and the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division took two hills near Yongdu and pushed on a further mile.

2nd March.—On the East coast road the South Korean Capital Division was engaged by the enemy 10 miles South of the 38th parallel. U.S. Marines captured Hoengsong and advanced North towards Hongchon. British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand troops and the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division pushed forward in the Yongdu area against stubborn resistance.

3rd March.—The enemy counter-attacked the U.S. 7th Division East of Hoengsong but were checked at close quarters. The U.S. Marines were held up North of Hoengsong by enemy reinforcements.

4th March.—U.S. Marines advanced to within 9 miles of Hongchon. The British Commonwealth 27th Brigade with the South Korean 6th Division gained ground West of Hoengsong, and Greek troops after entering Yongdu withdrew under fire from the North. There was Allied patrol activity over the Han river and in the southern outskirts of Seoul.

5th March.—U.S. 7th Division troops advanced 2 miles astride the lateral road leading to Kangnung on the East coast and, in conjunction with their 2nd Division, captured an enemy position. Allied aircraft flew 670 sorties, 236 being in close support of ground troops.

6th *March.*—Slight gains were made by the U.S. 7th and 2nd Divisions. Greek troops attached to the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division captured Yongdu. Enemy resistance stiffened and reports indicated the likelihood of a counter-offensive.

7th March.—In the Eastern sector the enemy launched an attack compelling the South Korean 7th Division to withdraw near the coast. In central and Western Korea United Nations forces opened a general offensive on a 55-mile front. Five U.S. divisions took part in the central sector and Marines advanced to a point 5 miles North of Hoengsong. In the Western sector, after heavy artillery preparation, troops of the U.S. 25th Division crossed the Han river 15 miles East of Seoul and formed a bridgehead.

8th March.—In the Eastern sector the South Korean 7th and the U.S. 7th Divisions gained hills commanding approaches on the right flank. In the centre the U.S. 2nd Division advanced slightly while their Marines moved forward to within 10 miles of Hongchon, and the British Commonwealth 27th Brigade with the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division gained ground North of the Yongdu–Hongchon road. In the West the U.S. 25th Division advanced a further 3 miles. Allied bombers and fighters flew more than 700 sorties.

9th March.—The South Korean 7th Division stopped an enemy attempt to penetrate the right flank, and the U.S. 7th Division made further progress in mountainous country. The U.S. 25th Division extended its bridgehead East of Seoul and linked up with the U.S. 24th Division on the right. Allied aircraft flew more than 1,000 sorties.

10th March.—Steady progress was made by United Nations divisions in the centre, and North of the Han river.

11th March.—In central Korea further ground was gained by the U.S. 2nd, Marine and 1st Cavalry Divisions. Progress was also made by the British Commonwealth 27th and British 29th Brigades South-East and North of Yongdu. The U.S. 25th Division extended its bridgehead East of Seoul.

12th March.—The enemy was reputed to be withdrawing along the whole front.

13th March.—United Nations troops advanced slowly along the East-central and central front without serious contact with the retreating North Koreans and Chinese. In the Western sector troops of the U.S. 25th Division reached the Seoul–Chunchon road 20 miles West of Seoul. Allied aircraft flew 774 sorties and attacked enemy convoys moving South.

14th March.—The enemy continued to withdraw. South Korean patrols entered Seoul. Allied aircraft attacked enemy troops, vehicles, supply dumps and bridges.

15th March.—U.S. troops entered Hongchon, until recently the enemy's main supply base for central Korea. Seoul was occupied in strength by United Nations forces. Allied aircraft flew more than 1,000 sorties. The naval bombardment of targets along the East coast continued.

16th March.—In the East Allied troops captured an important mountain pass, while in the centre a U.S. division occupied high ground North of Hongchon. In the Western sector South Koreans took up positions North of Seoul.

17th March.—U.S. troops captured three hill positions East of Hongchon. Allied patrols were active in the West probing North of the Han river. United Nations aircraft flew 1,123 sorties.

18th March.—United Nations troops continued their advance North of Hongchon towards Chunchon, with the enemy withdrawing more rapidly. West of Hongchon U.S. troops encountered some resistance and Greek troops repelled counter-attacks. Patrol clashes occurred North-East and North-West of Seoul.

19th March.—Allied forces were reported to have established holding positions at five points across the Korean Peninsula, 17 miles from the 38th parallel, from which patrols had advanced some distance further North. A U.S. patrol encountered an enemy rearguard South of Uijongbu.

20th March.—Further advances were made by United Nations forces and the number of holding positions across the peninsula within 17 miles of the 38th parallel was increased to ten. In the West a column approached Kapyong on the Seoul–Chunchon road, having previously captured the hydro-electric plant 24 miles North-East of Seoul.

21st March.—South Korean troops on the East coast were reported to be within 9 miles of the 38th parallel. Chunchon was occupied by a U.S. force without opposition. Enemy resistance continued near Uijongbu North-East of Seoul.

22nd and 23rd March.—North of Chunchon advanced elements of United Nations forces reached positions three or four miles from the 38th parallel. In the West several thousand U.S. parachute troops were dropped on 22nd into the Imjin river valley, 20 miles North-West of Seoul, where they seized the railway and highway at Munsan and cut the main Chinese escape route to the North. Three United Nations columns advanced simultaneously, and one of them captured Uijongbu. Allied aircraft attacked the area North of the captured positions in the Imjin valley.

24th March.—In central Korea Allied spearheads advanced to within two miles of the 38th parallel and dug in on hills overlooking the boundary. Enemy resistance stiffened North-East and North-West of Seoul. A South Korean raiding party landed on the peninsula just South of the estuary leading to Chinnampo and, having inflicted casualties on the enemy, withdrew with a number of prisoners.

25th March.—South Korean troops were reported as having operated across the 38th parallel in Eastern Korea. In the West counter-attacks by the enemy slowed down the Allied advance.

United Nations warships continued their bombardment of Wonsan and also shelled the Songjin area and enemy positions on the West coast.

26th March.—South Korean troops claimed the capture of a village on the East coast 3 miles North of the 38th parallel. Two United Nations forces linked up at a point North

of Uijongbu but a large number of the enemy appeared to have withdrawn to positions North of the boundary. West of Munsan Allied patrols advanced North without making contact.

27th March.—U.S. troops continued to advance slowly North of Seoul and North-East of Uijongbu where they trapped three Chinese battalions, while on their left South Koreans pushed on in force to within 5 miles of the 38th parallel. Allied aircraft concentrated on gun positions, tanks and vehicles in this area and also on vehicles and rolling stock moving South from the Manchurian border.

United Nations warships shelled the Wonsan area for the thirty-eighth consecutive day and bombarded Songjin for the nineteenth day.

28th March.—On the extreme right of the Allied line South Koreans advanced up to 6 miles North of the 38th parallel. East of Chunchon U.S. forces pushed on to within 7 miles of the border. Elsewhere weather conditions hindered progress.

Allied warships continued to bombard areas on the East coast.

29th March.—Enemy resistance stiffened in the central and Western sectors, but Canadian and Australian troops gained some ground in the centre.

Bombardment of Wonsan and Songjin areas from the sea continued.

30th March.—In the East the South Korean Capital Division widened the occupied area across the 38th parallel to more than 8 miles. Chinese troops counter-attacked North of Seoul and U.S. troops gave ground at some points. U.S. fighters, covering Superfortresses bombing bridges over the Yalu river, were attacked by thirty-eight MIG-15 jet fighters of which one was reported as destroyed and two damaged. Allied aircraft destroyed seven enemy tanks and attacked others North of the parallel; vehicles moving South were also attacked.

31st March.—A U.S. armoured column advancing North of Uijongbu penetrated a short distance into North Korea and withdrew after drawing fire. Later, a second column which crossed the parallel farther East, also withdrew after encountering snipers and two bodies of infantry.

1st April.—A second South Korean division crossed the border in Eastern Korea. Superfortresses again bombed bridges over the Yalu river, and enemy troops, vehicles and gun positions were attacked by carrier aircraft.

2nd April.—In the East the South Koreans advanced 12 miles North of the parallel from a 21-mile wide bridgehead. In the centre there were minor clashes in the mountains North of Chunchon. U.S. patrols again crossed the parallel North-East of Seoul, and penetrated two miles before withdrawing.

3rd April.—The South Korean Capital Division, North of Yangyang, reached a point 13 miles beyond the border. In the centre U.S., Greek and Siamese troops took a high ridge North of Chunchon. U.S. troops in the West crossed the 38th parallel on a 10-mile front. U.S. fighters shot down three enemy MIG-15s and damaged three others near the Manchurian boundary. Superfortresses bombed the Wonsan and Pyongyang areas.

4th April.—On the East coast South Koreans made further gains with two divisions on a front of about 15 miles. In the centre United Nations troops North of Chunchon moved to within a mile of the frontier. In the West South Koreans who crossed the Imjin river were forced to withdraw.

5th April.—United Nations troops made further advances North of the 38th parallel on the Uijongbu–Kumhwa road and South of Chorwon.

6th April.—Elements of eight United Nations divisions were reported to have crossed the border into North Korea. North-West of Chunchon British Commonwealth units made substantial gains with no loss. Five MIG-15 fighters were damaged by U.S. Sabre jets. Superfortresses bombed enemy concentrations and supply centres. It was reported

that 275 enemy aircraft had been destroyed or damaged in the air and on the ground, since the beginning of the War.

7th April.—A British Marine Commando unit landed at Songjin on the East coast of North Korea and destroyed a section of the main railway to the South before withdrawing. Elsewhere the advance into North Korea continued.

8th April.—In the East-central sector a counter-attack slowed down the Allied advance towards Hwachon. Elements of six U.S. divisions, with associated British, Greek and Siamese troops, and four South Korean divisions were reported to have crossed the 38th parallel. Superfortresses bombed Yalu river bridges.

9th April.—The enemy opened the floodgates of a big reservoir at Hwachon, but the water receded quickly and United Nations troops resumed their advance towards the reservoir.

The War Office announced that H.Q. 28th Infantry Brigade will relieve H.Q. 27th Infantry Brigade in Korea; that the 1st Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers and the 1st Battalion, The King's Shropshire Light Infantry will relieve the 1st Battalion, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 1st Battalion, The Middlesex Regiment, and that the 27th Infantry Brigade will then return to Hong Kong.

10th April.—Allied tank and infantry advanced to the southern shore of Hwachon reservoir but were halted short of the dam. At the western end of the front Allied patrols encountered stubborn resistance.

Warships bombarded enemy supply dumps and roads on the East coast.

11th April.—East of Hwachon the enemy was forced back to four miles North of the boundary, and to the West and North of the town towards Chorwon, to 17 miles North of the parallel. Elsewhere in the West only slight gains were made against strong resistance.

General MacArthur was relieved of his Commands in the Far East and was succeeded by Lieut.-General Ridgway. Lieut.-General Van Fleet was appointed Commander Eighth Army.

12th April.—On the East coast South Koreans entered Kansong 16 miles North of the parallel. Heavy fighting took place in the Hwachon area. U.S. troops made progress South of Chorwon. Five MIG-15s were destroyed, two more were probably destroyed and 15 damaged in actions with U.S. fighters and Superfortresses. Allied aircraft attacked a large column of enemy troops and other targets with considerable effect.

13th April.—Enemy forces continued to withdraw on the East-central front. Allied troops captured an important ridge South of Hwachon. On the West-central front a United Nations patrol found Yonchon deserted. Further to the West some enemy resistance was encountered. Five Superfortresses were shot down, but four enemy MIG-15s were destroyed and eleven were damaged. Enemy air activity was reported to have increased considerably.

14th April.—Lieut.-General Van Fleet took over command of the U.S. Eighth Army.


15th April.—United Nations forces continued to make limited advances, meeting little enemy resistance except in the Hwachon reservoir area and East of Yonchon.

Warships again bombarded targets in the Wonsan area.

Film and Commentary

A Film and Commentary on "Campaigning in Korea" was given by Mr. William Courtney, O.B.E., M.M., in the Lecture Theatre, Royal United Service Institution, on Wednesday, 31st January, 1951. This covered the fighting up to the end of October, 1950, and two interesting points emerged from the discussion that followed.

(1) The U.S. 5th Air Force was equipped with the Lockheed Shooting Star, the first American jet aircraft to go into combat, and also with the Mustang. First reports of




CHINA
MANCHURIA
CHONGJIN
HYESANJIN
SONGJIN
TANGCHON
IWON
CHOSAN
KANGGYE
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HAGARU
HAKALWOO
KOTORI
YALU R.
SINUIJU
UNSAN
HUICHON
Chongchon R.
HAMHUNG
SINPO
HUNGNAM
TOKCHON
TAEDONG R.
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CHONGJU
ANJU
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YONGHUNG
WONSAN
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SUAN
KOKSAN
IMJIN R.
KOSONG
SARIWON
YESONG R.
KUMHWA
KANSONG
GHANGYON
NANCHONJON
CHOKWON
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YONCHON
HWAGHON
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KAESONG
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MUNSAN
KAPYONG
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UIJONGBU
KANGHUNG
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INCHON
YONGDUNGPO
HOENGSONG
PYONGCHANG
ANYANG
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NAKDONG R.
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NONSAN
SONSAN
UINUNG
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KOREA



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MIG-1

early July, 1950, indicated that the jet could stay over the target about 10 minutes whereas the Mustang could do so for 45 minutes. A young American pilot designed a couple of bulbous wing tanks and found that by using these he could extend the range of the jet. He took off with these wing tip tanks filled with fuel and flew over the target for 45 minutes; he then jettisoned the tanks before returning. Within a few days the Americans had a factory going in Japan turning out 500 auxiliary tanks a week. This brought the jet up to the Mustang in the time spent over the target area, although it could not carry the same armament. Experience proved that on balance the jet was preferred every time, because its extra speed gave the fighter pilot greater immunity from attack over the target.

(2) Mr. Courtney said that he had not seen the Sabre in action against the MIG-15, but all the evidence seems to prove that the MIG-15 is a little under-armoured and not as well armed as the Sabre. The Sabre also has 30 to 40 miles an hour greater speed. In all combat reports during the period under review the Sabre had held its own over the MIG-15.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION[1]

By A. K. Chesterton, M.C.

GENERAL MacARTHUR AND THE FAR EAST

THERE is a curious belief in Britain that General MacArthur was relieved of his several commands because he had challenged the principle that the military must be subordinated to the civil authority. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the controversy in which he was involved, fairness demands that he should be exonerated from the charge of ever having entertained so fantastic a thought. As the Supreme Commander of the United States Forces in the Far East, it was his duty to examine all problems affecting Far Eastern defence, and, having reached clear-cut conclusions on what should be done, to press Washington unremittingly for approval of his ideas and for permission to carry them out. The difficulty arose when, having failed to carry the Government with him, General MacArthur sought, or gave the impression of seeking, publicity which he hoped would range American opinion on his side. Although undertaken with no sinister motive, this was an incursion into the political field which the Government could not ignore. That the American Chiefs of Staff agreed with some of his major military premises, as the General declares they did, was no reason why they should countenance his action in making his views the subject of popular debate.

The most immediate question which General MacArthur raised was the bombing of the Chinese bases in Manchuria. Regarded as a military problem in a given theatre of war, not to use available means to smash the enemy's bases, assembly areas and rear communications may be to forgo the most effective means of crippling his organization and demoralizing his armies in the field. Regarded as a political problem, however, the use of the Western air-arm in Manchuria would involve many considerations beyond those which must occupy the minds of commanders dealing with a single military task. General MacArthur himself rightly scorned the idea of committing Western land forces to battle in the Chinese mainland. To do so, in the present world situation, would be to court disaster. There is nothing, however, to prevent the Chinese from carrying on war beyond their own frontiers, and if their Manchurian bases were to be attacked they might decide that the best means of dispersing concentrations of Western air-power would be to create military problems for the West on as many fronts as there are common frontiers. They have not done so yet, and there can be little wonder that Washington, London and Paris display no eagerness to encourage them to begin.

Containing Chinese Communism

This particular MacArthur controversy, if my thesis be accepted, was thus not primarily a conflict between the defence claims of Europe and Asia, although such a conflict exists and might become decisive. It was first and foremost a profound difference of opinion as to whether the extension of the Korean War by air action across the Yalu river would help to confine the area of hostilities within that country by hampering Chinese intervention, or whether it would set Chinese armies on the march to Hong Kong, to Saigon, to Singapore, to Rangoon, and to the frontiers of India and Pakistan.

Which school of thought is correct, fortunately for the political commentator, is a question upon which he is not required to express an opinion. If the course recommended by General MacArthur were to succeed, the very grave liability

[1]As deduced from reports up to 30th April.

incurred in Korea would be liquidated. Were it to fail, and set in motion the chain of consequences I have depicted, then the World's affairs, presumably, would be placed in the keeping of the atom-bombers. The assessment of risks is a combined military and political task, but the decision, where the issues are so momentous, is the inescapable responsibility of Governments alone. One thing, however, is certain. The removal from his post of General MacArthur does nothing to remove the Korean incubus. Neither General Ridgway nor his successor in command of the Eighth Army can be expected indefinitely to maintain a war of manoeuvre which by its nature precludes a military decision.

INDO-CHINA

Some months will probably elapse before the Franco-Viet Namese forces seek spectacular results in a full-scale offensive against the Viet-Minh rebels. Despite the action now being taken in the region South of Haiphong, it is obviously General de Lattre de Tassigny's intention to remain on the defensive while loyalist troops are being trained in Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos, and while equipment, long withheld, is being shipped to Indo-China ports. The General has made no attempt to restore the Northern frontier line, which would entail the maintenance of supply routes through wild, mountainous and wooded country, and dissipate the strength at his disposal in the kind of struggle most favourable to the enemy. His policy has been the precise opposite—to repel every attack on his established positions in the Red River Delta area guarding Hanoi and its surrounding paddy-fields, and elsewhere to withdraw such advanced posts as offer the enemy an opportunity for harassing action against lines of communication.

An example of standing-fast was the recent defensive action fought in the Viet-Tri area in the North-West. Examples of withdrawal were the evacuation of Uong-Bi and Lam-Xa, both lying to the East of Hanoi, to re-group at Mao-Khe and create a strong line of defence for Haiphong. The Viet-Minh rebels, in attempting to probe these positions, found them so compact, so well organized and so sturdily manned that they have ceased to be an investing force and have broken up into guerilla bands. Artillery played a large part in achieving this result, as did the French Air Force, whose jellied petrol bombs have markedly discouraged enemy troops from leaving the cover of the wooded mountains to debouch upon the plains. Their three main bases on the Tonking front—at Tam-Dao, Ba-Vi and Drong-Trien—are being kept under constant attack from the air.

An interesting political development has been the abandonment of the Viet-Minh claim to be considered a purely nationalist movement of " agrarian reformers." Its organization has always been unmistakably Communist, and Communist commissars have long held watch-dog appointments in the rebel army, but only now has the title of Communist been openly avowed. It would be to ignore the truth not to discover in that avowal the prestige which Mao Tse-tung has won for Communism in the Far East. If, however, the transformation of morale which General de Lattre de Tassigny has effected throughout his command is maintained, and if Viet-Minh morale has to withstand a prolonged period of guerilla activity, more often than not a disintegrating experience, the revolution may dwindle until it becomes only a minor nuisance. One thing counts above all else in East Asia and that is palpable success.

PERSIA

General MacArthur told Congress that, by its system of island bases in the Pacific, the United States was able to " dominate every port from Vladivostock to

Singapore." The pact being made between the United States, Australia and New Zealand—from which Great Britain, mysteriously, is excluded—extends the system to the South. Between Singapore and Aden, however, there is something very much like a power-vacuum, as the recent trouble in the Persian Gulf has revealed. British influence in the area, exerted during the last hundred years and more, has not only kept the waters of the Gulf free from lawlessness, but has saved Persia from being swallowed by the perpetually expanding Russian Empire. India served as a base for the maintenance of this sphere of influence. As recently as 1946, when there were riots in Abadan, an Indian contingent, sent to Basra, had an immediate and salutary effect on the situation, but during the recent disturbances at Abadan and the Anglo-Iranian oilfields, neither India nor Pakistan took any interest in the restoration of law and order. Both were—and are—unhappily still engaged in the Kashmir dispute, while Pakistan has the added responsibility of coping with the Pathan separatist movement, which has become a factor of some importance in a part of the World where the struggle for power is no less intense because its real nature is so often disguised.

There is no suggestion, however, that the Soviet Union's part in the Persian crisis went further than encouraging its fifth-column Tudeh Party to exploit discontent among workers in the oilfields. Its hand was not apparent in the assassination of General Razmara, who had succeeded in greatly improving Russo-Persian relations and who, although no Communist, was not looked upon by the Kremlin with unfriendly eyes. General Razmara was an opponent of the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian property, and it may be significant that no sooner was he dead than the Persian Majlis unanimously passed a resolution approving in principle the State's acquisition of the industry. This was only a short time after it had refused to ratify an agreement giving Russia extensive concessions in North Persia. Some commentators have expressed surprise that the Persian Parliament should not hesitate to alienate both Russian and British sympathies, and, indeed, there is almost certainly more behind its decision to rob Britain of the fruits of her enterprise and labour than has been revealed.

London lodged a protest with Teheran but took up the matter in earnest with Washington. This may be a sign of the happy accord existing between the two great Capitals, or it may be simply an indication that the Persian Gulf is yet another sphere of influence in which Britain has been losing ground. Her position there, if it is to be restored, would seem to suggest the necessity of reaching a clear-cut and mutually advantageous agreement with India and Pakistan.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

Britain's interests in the Eastern Mediterranean are also threatened. It seems that London has proposed the gradual withdrawal of British troops from the Canal zone, subject to right of re-entry in war-time, but that the Egyptian Government has rejected the offer and decided to press for their immediate evacuation. Representatives of the International Bank and of the Point Four programme have agreed to furnish substantial aid to Egypt, as they have arranged to provide a third of the finances required for Persia's seven-years' development programme, so that both countries may feel themselves sufficiently buttressed to be independent of British good-will. The British Government has been criticized for not using the Egyptian sterling balances as a bargaining counter in the negotiations. Such criticism neglects the possibility that the meeting of these debts may serve much the same purpose

as American Aid—if not to prize open markets, at least to preserve those already enjoyed, and so maintain full employment at home.

It is difficult to see how the general trend can be averted as long as Britain's increasing defensive (and therefore protective) strength is integrated in larger political entities. Were this Country to regard itself as a partner in an alliance, instead of as merely one of several contributors to a common pool, there might be a chance of regaining some of the ground lost in the post-war years.

Anglo-Egyptian relations also seem to be moving towards a crisis in the Sudan, where much tentative constitution-making has recently been taking place under British auspices. The right of the Sudanese to determine their own destiny has been recognized, in theory, by both the British and Egyptian Governments, but the assumption in Cairo is invariably that freedom will take the form of self-government under the Egyptian Crown. There are in the Sudan a pro-Egyptian Party, which demands the "Unity of the Nile Valley," and an independence movement, led by the son of the Mahdi, which wishes the Sudan to be nominally free. It is one of the ironies of history that this movement and the British should tend to make common cause, although it is not unnatural. Britain has done, and is doing, a magnificent job in the Sudan, and if the externals of independence were suitably furnished it is certain that few thoughtful and patriotic Sudanese would desire that job to be abandoned. In the Southern part of the territory, indeed, the population would be unlikely to welcome any change even in the externals of power. Africa would infinitely rather deal with Europe than with Asia, and in everything except geography the lower waters of the Nile flow through Asia. Critics of "Imperialism," incidentally, could do worse than make a thorough investigation of Britain's paternal regime in the Sudan.

MILITARY INTEGRATION OF THE AMERICAS

The power-systems sponsored, and to a large extent supported, by the United States, are now fairly clearly defined. As we have seen, one such system consists of the island defences of the Far East. Another, as yet only adumbrated, is to cover Australasia. Then there is the Mediterranean area, in which Greece and Turkey are special American interests, and where, in North Africa, there are strong American air bases. Western Europe, under General Eisenhower, is the most important of the defensive systems, and, allied to it, is the oceanic command of the Atlantic. One hiatus, as I have mentioned, is Southern Asia. Another, until quite recently, was the American continent itself. There has been, for several years, a co-ordination of military measures between the United States and Canada, but it did not extend to Latin America. It was with a view to making good this deficiency that the 21-Powers conference was held recently to discuss the United States' proposal that the other Central and South American Republics should be asked to set aside forces to be "integrated" in a hemispherical command, as well as to provide military contingents for overseas services on behalf of the United Nations. Washington was supported on both issues by Brazil and Colombia, but a strong attack on the second was led by Mexico, Argentina and Guatemala. The grounds of opposition were nominally that the organization of the Americas, when formed, should not be committed as a body to adventures such as the Korean War, or be called upon to defend European possessions and dependencies in the hemisphere.

While there is this strong feeling in several South American Republics that they should resist becoming satellites of the United States, whether or not the United

Nations be invoked, the industrial dynamism of their great Northern neighbour is so powerful that all the States are anxious to come to terms with Washington on the first issue—an integrated defence system roughly corresponding to the Atlantic Pact Organization, but not reaching beyond the Americas. If this limitation be accepted by the United States Government, economic and military aid will be forthcoming for all the Latin American States prepared to standardize their equipment and shape their own defence contribution in conformity with the general plan, which requires each country to specialize in certain kinds of production and in certain kinds of forces, mostly tactical. The United States seems to be anxious to reserve for her own use and control all forms of strategical striking power. At the time of writing, these matters are still being considered by committees and sub-committees, but that an organization parallel to the Atlantic Pact Organization will be created for the Americas is certain.

The Republics, like other nations which have felt obliged to become a part of the global plan, may not relish the inroads made upon their sovereignty, but as long as the threat of the Communist Empire exists they are unlikely to contemplate any other course. It is interesting to speculate upon how long these interrelated power-systems would survive were the Russian menace suddenly to disappear.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL *or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the* JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)

COMMUNISM AND ITS COUNTERACTION

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

SIR,—Wing Commander Slater in his article last quarter* on "Communism and its Counteraction" rightly stressed the importance of ideological weapons in the struggle against Communism. Military preparation sufficient to act as an absolute deterrent against aggression is obviously essential. But to carry the battle to the enemy, and to undermine his hold on the minds of millions of men, both within his own territories and beyond his borders, it will be necessary to take up quite different weapons. The very nature of democracy with its proneness to recognize and respect other points of view makes it difficult to wage a psychological warfare. But without a burning conviction of the validity of the Western way of life and a belief in our civilizing mission we shall not deserve to prevail.

In this connection Wing Commander Slater wrote of the contribution which can be made by the schools. No doubt much can be done, especially in the public and grammar schools where boys and girls remain until a more mature age. But the bulk of our children leave school at 15, and between that age and the time of their call-up for National Service are exposed to few influences other than the popular press and the cinema. Surely our great opportunity for political education comes during the National Service period? Unless the young man can be made to feel that he is not only being trained to fight efficiently, but also to fight for something worth while, our efforts will have been largely wasted.

I am unable to speak with experience of the other two Services where no doubt similar schemes exist. But in the Royal Air Force a syllabus has been drawn up by the Air Ministry which deals with the role of the Royal Air Force, Britain's duties and responsibilities as a great Power and the main features of the British way of life. Instruction along the lines of this syllabus is obligatory for all airmen in the first two years of service. The purpose of this letter is to enter a plea for more general recognition that instruction of this kind, if well carried out, is vital for the building up of a psychological base against Communism

Three hundred years ago Cromwell was fully alive to the importance of this kind of spiritual strength when he said he wished his soldiers "to know what they were fighting for, and to love what they knew." To inculcate such knowledge and to inspire a genuine love for it should be one of the main aims of our defence preparations.

J. L. ARCHER,
Flight Lieutenant.

26th September, 1950.

TERRITORIAL ARMY TRAINING

SIR,—Plenty of ex-officers and men would join voluntarily certain T.A. units but for the fact that such units are located too far from their homes for them to perform the obligatory out of camp training. For example, there are many ex-officers living in the West of England, etc., who would eagerly enlist or re-enlist in the Honourable Artillery Company or the Artists Rifles in London but for the question of distance. To enable patriotic enthusiasts to enrol in the regiment of their choice it is suggested that, in their special case, pre-camp training should be carried out within 15 consecutive days and followed, without a break, by the fortnight's annual camp. Over 30 pre-camp drills

* August, 1950.

could be performed easily by putting in 2 hours six evenings a week plus a couple of Saturday afternoons or week-end camps. Moreover, provided this training was carried out in Summer, immediately prior to annual camp, the personnel concerned could probably be placed under canvas at, or near, the unit's Drill Hall and thereby avoiding the personal expense of hotel accommodation. The issue of one free return railway warrant annually for 30 days continuous training would probably cost no more to the Treasury than the weekly travelling allowances now granted to personnel residing within some 15 miles of the unit H.Q. It is submitted that by the adoption of this suggestion units could be kept at full volunteer establishment with about two-thirds of the personnel resident near the unit and training throughout the year and the remainder, living at a distance, completing their training within one month. Both categories would come together at annual camp, bringing the unit to its full strength. There seems no objection to a proportion of the unit completing the whole of its training within a month, at any rate it proved satisfactory in the old Militia and the Special Reserve.

C. J. H. MEAD,
Lieut.-Colonel.

20th March, 1951.

REGIMENTAL TRADITION

SIR,—As an officer of the Corps which, within the U.S. Armed Forces, embraces most if not all our "regimental tradition" (to use the British phrase), I cannot resist applauding the admirable papers published in your February edition by Major Jarvis and Lieutenant-Colonel Fergusson. One of the bitterly contested issues implicit in the unification controversies which have wracked the American Services has been the matter raised by these two articles.

The forces favouring faceless homogeneity, mechanistic sameness, and *claimed* administrative efficiency, originally launched and still maintain the attack against the U.S. Marine Corps. Every argument, pro or con, which your two authors treated has been invoked in our own, so-far successful, struggle for survival.

If it affords comfort to those in your Services who are fighting comparable battles, the U.S. Marine Corps is corporately convinced of the crucial, however intangible, value of tradition. It is a force which must be supported by every possible device; it is a force to which the routine of administrative convenience should habitually stand subordinate. As General A. A. Vandegrift, 18th Commandant of the Marine Corps, once said: "It is not fifty dollars a month which made Marines storm Suribachi or fight their way over the barricades at Tarawa."

Put in other terms, it is the much-felt conviction of most U.S. Marines that "the Spirit giveth life." Without that spirit and without the tradition which alone can support it, an army degenerates into a mere military machine, and not much of one at that.

R. D. HEINL, Jr.,
Lieutenant-Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps.

4th April, 1951.

GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY GENERAL EISENHOWER.—General Eisenhower announced at a Press conference on 2nd April that he had that day assumed effective command of all Allied Armies in Europe, including the Occupation Forces in Germany and troops stationed in the Western Mediterranean area. The official order issued by General Eisenhower stated that :—

> " Allied Command Europe, consisting of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and such additional operational headquarters, organizations and military forces as may from time to time be subordinated to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is activated at 0001 hours this date pursuant to authority vested in me by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (S.H.A.P.E.) is activated as the headquarters of Allied Command Europe as at 0001 hours this date, with temporary station at Paris, France, pursuant to the authority cited above."

CHAIN OF COMMAND.—The broad command structure on which General Eisenhower will base the defence of Western Europe was announced on 20th March.

To assist General Eisenhower at Supreme Headquarters the posts of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, a Naval Deputy and an Air Deputy have been created, and have been filled respectively by Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Admiral André Lemonnier and Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders.

The defence of Western Europe has been organized around three geographical areas—Northern, Central and Southern.

Admiral Sir Patrick Brind has been appointed Commander-in-Chief, Northern Area, and his principal subordinate Commanders are : Lieut.-General Tangen-Hansteen (Norway) ; Lieut.-General Görtz (Denmark) ; and Major-General Robert K. Taylor, United States Air Force (Air). Admiral Sir Patrick Brind will also act as Commander of the Allied Naval Forces.

In the Central Area, the principal Commands and Commanders are : Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, Général d'Armée Alphonse Juin ; Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Air Forces, Lieut.-General Lauris Norstad, United States Air Force ; and Naval Flag Officer, Vice-Admiral Robert Jaujard, of the French Navy. Général Juin will take over as soon as his duties connected with his present mission in North Africa are completed; meanwhile Lieut.-General Augustine Guillaume, Commander of the French Forces in Germany, will temporarily assume Général Juin's responsibilities.

In the Southern Area the Commanders have not yet been appointed, but an Italian will command the land forces.

GREAT BRITAIN

DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1951–52

The Government's Defence Estimates for 1951–52, providing for a total expenditure of £1,032,262,100, were published on 16th February. The Estimates related to the 3-year programme announced on 12th September, 1950, an accompanying note explaining that the balance of about £300,000,000 involved in the recent revision of the programme to include expenditure of about £1,300,000,000 in 1951–52 would be covered by Supplementary Estimates.

The respective allocations of the three Services and the Ministry of Defence (with original 1950–51 figures for comparison), and the intended strengths of the Services in 1951–52, were shown as follows :—

	Allocation		*Strength*
	1951–52	1950–51	1951–52
Royal Navy	£278,500,000	£193,000,000*	143,000
Army	£418,800,100	£299,000,000*	527,000
R.A.F.	£328,750,000	£223,000,000*	270,000
Ministry of Defence ...	£6,212,000	£820,000†	—

* Increased by Supplementary Estimates to £203,000,000 (Navy), £319,000,000 (Army), and £233,000,000 (R.A.F.).

† Increased by Supplementary Estimates (July, 1950) to £4,069,779.

It was explained that it had been decided to centralize on the Ministry Vote certain expenditure arising out of U.K. participation in the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties (e.g., in connection with the command organization in Western Europe) which had previously been borne by the Votes of the departments concerned; an amount of about £580,000 had therefore been transferred from Service and other Votes to the Ministry of Defence.

COMMANDANT OF THE IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

It was announced by the Ministry of Defence on 12th April that General Sir Frank E. W. Simpson, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., has been appointed to succeed Admiral Sir Charles Daniel, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., as Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, with effect from 1st January, 1952.

STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Ministry of Defence announced on 27th February that the total strength of the Armed Forces on 1st January, 1951, was 751,700 including National Service men, Women's Services, Nurses and V.A.D.s. The male strengths of the three Services were :—

	Regulars	*National Service*	*Total*
Royal Navy	124,600	6,700	131,300
Army	197,600	197,800	395,400
Royal Air Force	125,700	77,400	203,100

In addition, the Territorial, Reserve and Auxiliary Forces totalled 144,400, and 230,800 civilians were directly employed on defence work.

CIVIL DEFENCE

RECRUITING.—The Home Office announced on 15th February that since the opening of recruitment on 15th November, 1949, 110,000 men and women have joined the Civil Defence Corps, 8,700 have joined the Auxiliary Fire Service, 11,800 have joined the National Hospital Service Reserve and 17,000 have been recruited by the Special Constabulary.

PORTSMOUTH EXERCISE.—Exercise "Macedonia," Portsmouth's first big Civil Defence exercise, was held on 25th February. Wing Commander Sir John Hodsoll, Director-General, Civil Defence Training, was among those at the control centre at Fort Widley. Taking part in the exercise were a radio-active monitoring team from H.M.S. "Phoenix," Naval Damage Control School, 1,500 officers and men of the Army from Aldershot and Bordon with 200 Army vehicles, including bulldozers, and about 100 members of the Portsmouth Civil Defence Corps. Rescue work and bomb detection were practised.

DESPATCHES

A Despatch submitted to the Secretary of State for Air on 23rd November, 1944, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard E. C. Peirse, K.C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C., Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, South-East Asia, in connection with Air Operations in South-East Asia from 16th November, 1943, to 31st May, 1944, was published on 19th March as a Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 13th March, 1951.

A Despatch submitted to the Secretary of State for War on 19th June, 1945, by General Sir George J. Giffard, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Commander-in-Chief, 11 Army Group, South-East Asia Command, in connection with operations in Burma and North-East India from 16th November, 1943, to 22nd June, 1944, was published on 19th March as a Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 13th March, 1951.

A Despatch submitted to the Secretary of State for War on 14th August, 1945, by General Sir George J. Giffard, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Commander-in-Chief, 11 Army Group, South-East Asia Command, in connection with operations in Assam and Burma from 23rd June, 1944, to 12th November, 1944, was published on 2nd April as a Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 30th March, 1951.

A Despatch submitted to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on 14th March, 1945, by Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power, K.C.B., C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, in connection with the Carrier-borne Aircraft attacks on oil refineries in the Palembang (Sumatra) area in January, 1945, was published on 5th April as a Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 3rd April, 1951.

A Despatch submitted to the Secretary of State for War on 4th February, 1947, by Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese, Bart., K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia, in connection with the Operations in Burma from 12th November, 1944 to 15th August, 1945, was published on 12th April, 1951, as a Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 6th April, 1951.

A Despatch submitted to the Secretary of State for Air on 16th November, 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, K.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, Air Command, South-East Asia, in connection with Air Operations in South-East Asia, from 1st June, 1944, to the occupation of Rangoon, 2nd May, 1945, was published on 12th April, 1951, as a Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 6th April, 1951.

A Despatch submitted to the Secretary of State for Air in August, 1946, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, G.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, South-East Asia, in connection with Air Operations in South-East Asia from 3rd May, 1945, to 12th September, 1945, was published on 19th April, 1951, as a Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 13th April, 1951.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

CANADA

NEW THREE-YEAR PROGRAMME.—The Defence Minister—Mr. Brooke Claxton, announced on 5th February a new three-year defence programme involving a total expenditure of $5,000,000,000, a large scale expansion of the Royal Canadian Air Force, the setting up of an integrated Canadian–United States radar screen, considerable increases in the strength of the Navy and Army, the despatch of an army formation to Europe, and the supply of large quantities of equipment to European member Countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

DEFENCE ESTIMATES.—It was reported from Ottawa on 11th April that the defence estimates for 1951–52, amounting to $1,664,000,000, represent 46 per cent. of the estimated total expenditure of $3,700,000,000.

EQUIPMENT FOR BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG.—It was announced in Ottawa on 8th March that sufficient military stores, equipment and vehicles to equip a division would be shipped to Belgium during March, and that arrangements were being completed for the delivery of twenty-four 25 pdr. guns to Luxembourg.

ENDING OF STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY.—The Department of External Affairs in Ottawa announced on 27th October, 1950, that the Canadian Government had decided to terminate the state of war with Germany as soon as this would be possible, adding, however, that such action would be quite distinct from any final settlement that may be concluded with Germany and would in no way affect Germany's obligations in respect of such matters as debts and claims.

EXERCISE "SUN DOG TWO."—This Exercise was held in an area North of Fort Churchill between mid-February and the first week in March to test the effects of arctic conditions on men and equipment, and to provide Army and Royal Canadian Air Force staffs with training to meet problems of airborne, air-transported Winter operations.

MEETING OF CIVIL DEFENCE REPRESENTATIVES.—The second meeting of Civil Defence representatives of Canada and the United States was held in the Parliament Buildings at Ottawa on 21st February.

AUSTRALIA

GUIDED MISSILES.—Air Chief Marshal Sir Alec Coryton and Sir Harry Garner, chief of guided missile development and chief scientist respectively of the British Ministry of Supply, visited Australia recently for consultations on the co-ordination of British and Australian Defence research and supply.

Expansion of the Australian programme for development of guided missiles may follow as a result of the visit. The Australian Minister of Supply—Mr. H. Beale, stated that the British Government had recently accorded the highest priority to guided missile research and that this decision added greatly to the significance of the work being carried out in Australia.

TRAINING OF CADETS AS ENGINEERS.—As part of the Australian defence programme, the Department of Supply is conducting a campaign to obtain engineering cadets for training as production and design engineers. It is offering successful applicants four years' training at an Australian university.

Those eligible are boys of 16 and upward who matriculated for engineering in the 1950 examinations. Commencing salaries range from £A.232 a year for a boy of 16 to £A.524 at 21 years, rising to £A.908 within a few years of completion of cadetship.

PAKISTAN

ENDING OF STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY

It was officially announced in Karachi on 5th January that Pakistan had terminated the state of war with Germany, with immediate effect.

MALAYA

NEW MEASURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM.—New and far reaching measures to combat terrorism were announced by Mr. Foster Sutton—Chief Justice of the Malayan Federation and officer administering the Government, in the Federal Legislative Council at Kuala Lumpur on 21st November, 1950, and by Sir Henry Gurney—High Commissioner of the Malayan Federation, on 15th December, 1950.

The announcements were made shortly after the return of Sir Henry Gurney and Lieut.-General Sir Harold Briggs—Director of Operations in Malaya, from a visit to London during which they had conversations with Mr. James Griffiths—the Colonial Secretary, and other Ministers, Lieut.-General Briggs also seeing Mr. Attlee.

Mr. Sutton announced

(1) that the Government planned to enact regulations giving it power to conscribe and direct manpower;

(2) that the Federation security forces, particularly the Special Branch and the C.I.D., would be brought to full strength and the highest degree of efficiency, in which connection Sir William Jenkin—technical adviser to the C.I.D., had been appointed Director of Intelligence for a two-year period;

(3) that the Government was determined to ensure that the progress of the "squatter" resettlement scheme was not retarded by lack of materials and manpower; and

(4) that the War Council, formed by Lieut.-General Briggs in 1950, to co-ordinate all Malaya's resources in prosecuting the anti-terrorist campaign, would be strengthened by the inclusion of Dato Onn Bin Jaafar—President of the United Malays' National Association, Mr. Leong Yew Koh—a Federal Councillor, Tungku Yaacob—Keeper of the Rulers' Seal, and Mr. G. D. Treble—Chairman of the Pahang Planters' Association.

Sir Henry Gurney, who declared in his statement that the emergency must be brought to an end in 1951, announced at a Press Conference in Kuala Lumpur on 15th December

(1) that Mr. Foster Sutton had been appointed Director of Manpower;

(2) that all Government officers on leave in Britain would be recalled to their posts;

(3) that two new battalions of the Malay Regiment would be raised, for which purpose the British Government would make a gift of 10,000,000 Malayan dollars;

(4) that regulations would be issued for the collective punishment of the inhabitants of areas which wilfully refused to co-operate with the authorities in the anti-terrorist operations.

Simultaneously with Sir Henry Gurney's statement, the Federation Government offered new rewards for the capture, dead or alive, of members of the Malayan Communist Party, ranging from 60,000 Malayan dollars for the Secretary-General to 2,000 for ordinary party members.

The Federation Government announced on 18th December, 1950, that three methods of collective punishment would be employed in areas where the inhabitants culpably failed to prevent terrorist crimes or refused to give information about terrorist activities:

(1) the levy of a collective fine on all men over the age of 18 years living in the area;

(2) the closing of shops in the area, either temporarily or permanently; and

(3) the imposition of a levy on the area to cover the cost of additional troop reinforcements.

It was explained that collective punishments would be imposed only in well defined and comparatively small areas whose inhabitants had clearly failed in their duty; that, where fines were not paid, the authorities would have power to seize movable property which would be held for one week, during which the owner could redeem it, before being put up for sale; and that moneys collected from the fines would be used to pay compensation to victims of terrorist activities in the areas concerned.

The first collective punishments under the above-mentioned regulations were imposed on 20th January, 1951, on the small town of Pusing near Ipoh, where a European resettlement officer had been killed three days earlier. After a local inquiry, under a magistrate, a collective fine of 40,000 Malayan dollars was imposed on the town and all shops therein were ordered to close.

Bandit Losses and Civilian Casualties.—Official figures issued in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore on 18th November, 1950, stated that 1,487 bandits had been killed from the commencement of the emergency in 1948 to the end of October, 1950; that 530 suspects had been arrested, of whom 181 were acquitted and proceedings against 52 others withdrawn; that 130 death sentences and 136 prison sentences had been imposed; that the number of civilians killed during that period was 1,180 (including 53 Europeans and 788 Chinese) and 343 were missing; that casualties among the regular police were 270 killed and 293 wounded; and that casualties among auxiliary police and special constables were 224 killed and 258 wounded.

Detainees.—A further announcement on 4th March, 1951, stated that the total number of detainees under the emergency regulations was 11,530, this figure including the wives, children and other dependants of persons under detention; and that the majority of the detainees were in camps at Ipoh and Kluang.

INDIA

Reduction in Army Strength.—Mr. Nehru—the Indian Prime Minister, announced in the Indian Parliament on 21st December that the Government of India had decided to carry out a reduction in the size of the Indian Army without, however, impairing its fighting strength.

What was contemplated was to reduce those elements of the Army which were not properly equipped, which might therefore be considered more as police forces than as

armed forces, and which were not so well trained as the others, so that their reduction would not really affect the Country's fighting strength.

Explaining that the Government did not contemplate any reduction in the Navy or Air Force, Mr. Nehru said that for the last two or three years they had been thinking of how to reduce defence expenditure which was " swallowing up a very large part of the revenue " and impeding the Country's development. Defence, he stated, did not consist in the number of soldiers alone but included, among other things, the Country's manufacturing potential, and it was essential that the latest types of machines and weapons needed for defence should, as far as possible, be produced within the Country. Considering all factors, the main economy could come only from the Army and the Government had decided that they must go ahead with the reduction with due caution.

ENDING OF STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY.—The Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi announced on 31st December that the Government of India had decided to terminate the state of war with Germany, with effect from 1st January, 1951.

FOREIGN

BELGIUM

REORGANIZATION OF HIGH COMMAND.—A Decree issued in Brussels on 18th January announced important changes in the High Command of the Belgian Armed Forces and the creation of the new post of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Lieut.-General E. Baele, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, was appointed to the new post, whilst Lieut.-General Piron, hitherto Commander of the Belgian Forces in Germany, became the new Chief of Staff of the Army. Lieut.-General Tromme took over the command of the Belgian Forces in Germany, and Major-General Gierts, hitherto Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, was appointed Belgian representative at General Eisenhower's Headquarters.

EXTENSION OF PERIOD OF MILITARY SERVICE.—A Bill extending the period of military service from one to two years was passed by the House of Representatives on 6th March.

ENDING OF STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY.—M. van Zeeland—the Belgian Foreign Minister, announced in the Chamber of Deputies on 9th November, 1950, that the Belgian Government had decided to terminate the state of war with Germany in accordance with the decisions of the New York Conference and in agreement with the other two Benelux Countries, and would take the necessary legislative measures.

GREECE

EFFECTS OF CIVIL WAR

The weekly, *Stratiotika*, issued by the Greek General Staff, published on 15th January a summary of the losses suffered by Grecee during the recent Civil War. It was stated that 1,032 officers and 11,745 other ranks had been killed and 2,313 officers and 35, 419 other ranks wounded; that 4,527 officers and men were missing; that 4,124 civilians and 165 priests had been executed by the Communist rebels; and that 931 civilians had been killed by land mines.

Material losses, it was also stated, had included the loss of 114,754 cattle and 1,365,315 sheep, pigs and poultry; the destruction of 476 road and 439 railway bridges; the burning of 80 railway stations; the complete destruction of 24,626 residential buildings, 15,139 farms and barns, 50 churches and 139 schools; and the partial destruction of 22,000 residential dwellings.

ISRAEL

ISRAEL–JORDAN FRONTIER INCIDENTS.—The Deputy Chiefs of Staff of Israel and Jordan reached agreement in Jerusalem on 15th February on measures to prevent further border incidents between the two countries, agreeing that contacts should be established between local Israeli and Jordanian border commissions and that prisoners should be exchanged. Recent border incidents had resulted in the deaths of 15 Jewish and 10 Arab

civilians, whilst, during 1950, the United Nations Commission in Palestine had received over 200 complaints from both sides alleging violations of the armistice agreement.

ISRAEL–SYRIA BORDER CLASHES.—It was reported from Tel Aviv on 4th April that seven Israeli policemen were killed, three wounded and one captured in an incident in northern Israel that day when Syrian troops occupied part of a demilitarized zone. Reports from Amman stated that Israeli soldiers had penetrated the demilitarized zone and had been fired on by Arab legionnaires in consequence.

On 5th April it was reported from Tel Aviv that the Israel Air Force had attacked Syrian fortified positions in the demilitarized zone near the village of El Hamma, South of Lake Tiberias, in retaliation for the action taken by Syrian troops. Simultaneously, the Israel Government decided to submit their complaints against Syria to the United Nations Security Council.

KOREA

CIVILIAN LOSSES AND DAMAGE TO HOUSES.—The South Korean Ministry of Social Affairs announced on 2nd February that South Korea had suffered over 400,000 civilian casualties during the first seven months of the Korean War. The total of civilian casualties comprised 163,461 men, women and children killed, 104,722 wounded and 163,483 reported missing, and excluded deaths among refugees or military casualties. During the same period the Ministry estimated that 31,503 houses had been completely destroyed or burned and 90,308 damaged. These figures, it was stated, were based on returns up to 15th December, 1950.

DIARY.—For a diary on the War in Korea, see page 298.

NETHERLANDS

INCREASED CONTRIBUTION TO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

Dr. Drees—the Prime Minister, announced in the *States-General* on 17th March that the Netherlands would increase its contribution to the collective defence of the West within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by extending the period of military training from 12 to 18 months, by making five Dutch divisions available instead of three, and by additional defence expenditure over the next four years of 2,000,000,000 guilders, to be met partly by taxation and partly by borrowing.

PERU

ENDING OF STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY

Both Houses of the Peruvian Congress, meeting in joint session on 25th January, adopted a resolution ending the state of war between Peru and Germany. Peru and Western Germany had recently signed a trade agreement.

SIAM

WAR COMPENSATION

The Siamese Government announced on 5th January that final agreement had been reached with the United Kingdom, Australian and Indian Governments on the payment of £5,224,000 war compensation in settlement of Commonwealth claims against Siam. The amount will be paid *in toto* to London, and apportioned by the three Governments to individual claimants.

SWEDEN

C.-IN-C. OF THE ARMED FORCES

It was announced in Stockholm on 26th January that Major-General Nils Swedlund had been appointed C.-in-C. of the Swedish Armed Forces and promoted to the rank of General as from 1st April, 1951, in succession to General Helge Jung.

TRIESTE

Allied Force Commander

The Ministry of Defence in London announced on 14th March that Major-General Sir John Winterton, lately British High Commissioner in Austria, had been appointed Allied Force Commander in Trieste in succession to Major-General Sir Terence Airey, consequent upon the latter's appointment as Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence) to General Eisenhower.

UNITED STATES

Defence Production Administration and Mobilization Board.—A Defence Production Administration, centralizing the various emergency production agencies hitherto scattered among a number of Departments, was established by President Truman on 3rd January under Mr. William H. Harrison, head of the National Production Authority.

Simultaneously with the creation of the Defence Production Administration the President announced the establishment, at Cabinet level, of a Defence Mobilization Board to advise Mr. Charles Wilson, the Director of Defence Mobilization, who would act as its chairman. The other members comprise the Secretaries of Defence (General George Marshall), the Treasury (Mr. John Snyder), Commerce (Mr. Charles Sawyer), Labour (Mr. Maurice Tobin), and Agriculture (Mr. Charles Brannan), the chairman of the National Security Resources Board (Mr. Stuart Symington), and the chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal Reserve System.

Forces in Britain.—In reply to a question in the House of Commons on 31st January, the Secretary for Air—Mr. Arthur Henderson, stated that the strength of the United States Forces then stationed in Britain was about 15,000 Air Force, 1,500 Naval and 25 Army personnel.

Military Training Mission for Liberia.—An agreement was signed in Washington on 11th January between the United States and Liberia under which the United States will send a military training mission to Liberia. The Liberian military forces number about 2,000.

YUGOSLAVIA

Ending of State of War with Austria

It was announced in Belgrade on 19th January that the Presidium of the Yugoslav National Assembly, on the proposal of the Yugoslav Government, had issued a Decree terminating the state of war between Yugoslavia and Austria. The Decree made it clear, however, that the decision represented a unilateral internal measure and would not prejudice Yugoslavia's claims for reparations and other issues which could be settled only by an eventual Peace Treaty with Austria, and would not affect any questions arising out of existing international agreements on post-war Germany.

Yugoslavia's decision was warmly welcomed in Vienna as an expression of goodwill towards Austria, though it was pointed out by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that there had, in fact, never been a state of war between the two countries, since there had neither been an Austrian declaration of war on Yugoslavia nor a Yugoslav declaration of war on Austria.

Postal Orders for Forces Overseas

The War Office has announced that the ban on the sending of British Postal Orders to members of H.M. Forces serving in certain countries has been removed. Postal Orders, not exceeding £2 (two pounds) in value at any one time, may now be sent to British sailors, soldiers and airmen serving in Korea, Japan, Egypt, Germany, Austria, Trieste and certain other countries.

British Postal Orders could previously be sent without restriction to men serving in most British Commonwealth countries, but relatives and friends can now send small

money gifts to members of H.M. Forces, within and without the British Commonwealth, wherever they are serving.

Further particulars are available from any Post Office.

Country Home for Elderly Retired Officers

The Officers' Association has opened a Home for elderly retired officers at "Huntly," Bishopsteignton, South Devon.

The house, which stands in its own grounds of 4½ acres containing fruit and vegetable gardens, a hard tennis court and a putting course, has a South aspect overlooking the River Teign. Sailing and sea fishing can be obtained from Teignmouth (2½ miles) and there is an 18-hole golf course at Haldon (1½ miles). Encouragement and help is given in connection with hobbies such as gardening, poultry and bee keeping.

Accommodation for 30 is already available, and it is hoped eventually to accommodate 35. Each resident has a separate bedroom with hot and cold water and an electric stove.

Married couples, or ex-officers of the Women's Services cannot be accepted, and no accommodation is available for cases of chronic infirmity.

All residents whose incomes permit, are required to contribute towards maintenance whilst in residence.

The claims of all applicants are considered on their merits by a Selection Committee, due regard being given to necessitous circumstances and Service record.

Application should, in the first instance, be made to the General Secretary, The Officers' Association, 28, Belgrave Square, London, S.W.1.

NAVY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. The King

The King and Queen will travel in H.M.S. " Sheffield " to Northern Ireland for their visit at the beginning of June, embarking at Liverpool on 31st May and arriving at Belfast the next morning. The destroyers " Battleaxe " and " Broadsword " will act as escorting ships. It is expected that the return journey will be by air.

The Prime Minister of Australia announces that the King and Queen, with Princess Margaret, will arrive in Fremantle to begin their tour of Australia on 1st March, 1952, and the tour will end in Queensland on 1st May.

The conversion of the Shaw Savill liner " Ceramic " or " Gothic," one of which is to carry the Royal party to Australia and New Zealand, is to be undertaken by Cammell Laird & Co., Birkenhead.

The following officers have been appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to the King from 8th January, 1951, in place of the officers stated :—

Captain (Commodore 2nd Class) R. S. Warne, C.B.E., vice Captain C. John, promoted to Flag Rank.

Captain A. J. Baker-Cresswell, D.S.O., vice Captain F. J. Butler, placed on the Retired List.

Captain C. S. B. Swinley, D.S.O., D.S.C., vice Captain W. W. P. Shirley-Rollison, placed on the Retired List.

Captain S. Boucher, C.B.E., vice Captain J. W. Boutwood, D.S.O., placed on the Retired List.

Captain G. P. Claridge, vice Captain C. A. G. Nichols, D.S.O., M.V.O., placed on the Retired List.

Captain L. M. Shadwell, vice Captain J. P. Gornall, D.S.O., placed on the Retired List.

Captain S. B. de Courcy-Ireland, vice Captain R. J. R. Dendy, placed on the Retired List.

The following have been appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to the King from 21st February, 1951 :—

Captain (E) P. D. Oliver, vice Captain (E) R. W. V. Reeves, placed on the Retired List.

Captain (E) G. A. D. Cooper, vice Captain (E) W. F. Baily, placed on the Retired List.

Captain (S) J. H. B. Benwell-Lejeune, C.B.E., has been appointed a Naval Aide-de-Camp to the King from 15th January, 1951, vice Captain (S) R. H. Johnson, C.B.E., placed on the Retired List.

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) B. W. Leicester, D.S.O., R.M. (seconded to the Sudan Defence Force), has been appointed a Royal Marine Aide-de-Camp to the King from 28th February, 1951, vice Colonel J. H. G. Wills, O.B.E., R.M.

Board of Admiralty

The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser of North Cape, G.C.B., K.B.E., visited the Home and Mediterranean Fleets when they were together at Gibraltar early in March. On his return he visited Seville and Madrid, and on 8th March called privately on the Spanish Minister of Marine and the Chief of the Naval Staff.

Honours and Awards

The King has approved the promotion of Vice-Admiral W. G. Andrewes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., to be Knight Commander of the Military Division of the Order of the British

Empire, and the appointment of Captain U. H. R. James, R.N., to be Commander of the same Order, both for distinguished service in Korean waters since 9th July, 1950.

Also announced for similar service is the award of a Bar to the D.S.O. to Captain J. S. C. Salter, D.S.O., O.B.E., R.N.; a second Bar to the D.S.O. to Lieutenant-Commander H. J. Lee, D.S.O., R.N., and the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant P. M. Lamb, R.N.

Flag Appointments

Northern Europe.—On 20th March, General Eisenhower announced the appointments of nine of his principal deputies and commanders in Paris. They included the name of Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, G.B.E., K.C.B., late Commander-in-Chief, British Far East Station, to be Commander-in-Chief, Northern Europe. He will also act as Commander of the Allied naval forces.

Rosyth.—Rear-Admiral J. H. F. Crombie, D.S.O., has been appointed Flag Officer, Scotland, and Admiral-Superintendent, Rosyth, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir Angus E. M. B. Cunninghame-Graham, K.B.E., C.B., the appointment to take effect in August, 1951.

Ground Training.—Rear-Admiral C. R. L. Parry, D.S.O., has been appointed to be Flag Officer, Ground Training, in succession to Rear-Admiral D. H. Everett, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in May, 1951.

Portsmouth.—Rear-Admiral J. P. L. Reid, C.B., has been appointed Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, in succession to Rear-Admiral D. M. Lees, C.B., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in May, 1951.

D.N.I.—The date of the appointment of Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony W. Buzzard, Bt., D.S.O., O.B.E., as Director of Naval Intelligence (announced in the February issue of the Journal) was altered from January to May, 1951.

Additional A.C.N.S.—Rear-Admiral E. G. A. Clifford has been appointed to be an Additional Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, from 1st February, 1951.

Indian Navy.—Rear-Admiral C. T. M. Pizey, C.B., D.S.O., has been appointed to be Commander-in-Chief, Indian Navy, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Edward Parry, K.C.B., the appointment to take effect in October, 1951.

First Cruiser Squadron.—Rear-Admiral R. A. B. Edwards, C.B., C.B.E., has been appointed to be Flag Officer Commanding First Cruiser Squadron, and Flag Officer (Air), Mediterranean, in succession to Vice-Admiral Guy Grantham, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in August, 1951.

Deputy Controller.—Rear-Admiral J. W. Cuthbert, C.B.E., has been appointed to be Deputy Controller, with effect from March, 1951.

Supply Branch.—Captain (S) (Acting Rear-Admiral (S)) William McBride, C.B., C.B.E., is to be promoted Rear-Admiral (S) and appointed Director-General, Supply and Secretariat Branch, with the acting rank of Vice-Admiral (S), in succession to Vice-Admiral (S) Sir G. Harold Bankart, K.C.B., C.B.E., the appointment to take effect on 4th August, 1951.

Civil Appointments

The following have been approved by the First Lord of the Admiralty:—

Mr. J. D. Morris, C.B., O.B.E., to be Principal Under Secretary, to date 1st February, 1951, in succession to Mr. C. B. Coxwell, C.B., O.B.E., who retired on 31st January, 1951.

Mr. P. N. N. Synnott to be Under Secretary, Finance, to date 1st February, 1951, in succession to Mr. Morris.

Mr. J. F. Mountain to be a second Under Secretary (Acting) in the Establishments Division, to date 8th January, 1951.

Mr. W. Marshall to be Principal Private Secretary to the First Lord, in succession to Mr. J. H. Taylor, who assumes other duties on promotion.

Mr. C. B. Coxwell, C.B., O.B.E., to be Director of Greenwich Hospital, in succession to Mr. H. N. Morrison, C.B., who retired on 2nd April, 1951.

Mr. John H. Babington, G.C., O.B.E., M.A., B.Sc., Headmaster of the Grammar School, Diss, Norfolk, has been selected for the appointment of Headmaster of the Royal Hospital School, Holbrook, Suffolk, to date 1st September, 1951, on the retirement of Mr. Norman E. Lee, O.B.E., M.A., B.Sc.

Promotions

Vice-Admiral (Retired) Sir R. S. Gresham Nicholson, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., has been promoted Admiral on the Retired List, to date 15th January, 1951.

Captain (E) Robert Cobb, O.B.E., has been promoted to Rear-Admiral (E), to date 21st February, 1951.

Exercises and Cruises

Home Fleet.—Ships of the Home Fleet returned to their home ports on 14th and 15th March from the spring cruise to the Mediterranean and to give Easter leave. In the second week of February exercises were held with the Mediterranean Fleet and the United States Sixth Fleet, and afterwards ships visited ports in Italy and on the French Riviera. Before leaving Gibraltar for home the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Philip Vian, transferred his flag from the battleship "Vanguard" to the aircraft carrier "Indomitable."

North-Western Approaches.—Routine sea and air exercises were held in the North-Western Approaches between Northern Ireland and the West Coast of Scotland in mid-February. The exercises were conducted from the Joint Anti-Submarine School, Londonderry, and the forces taking part were two destroyers, three frigates, three submarines, the submarine depot-ship "Montclare," and aircraft from the R.N. air stations at Eglinton and Ballykelly, Northern Ireland.

Mediterranean.—The exercises between the Mediterranean, Home, and United States Sixth Fleets, mentioned above, brought together the largest concentration of warships assembled in the Mediterranean since the 1939–45 War. Vice Admiral John J. Ballentine, U.S.N., commanded the U.S. Naval Forces in the exercises, while the British Mediterranean Fleet was commanded by Admiral Sir John Edelsten. On the first day of the exercises a U.S. pilot who was forced to come down in the Tyrrhenian Sea off the south-western coast of Italy was rescued uninjured by the British destroyer "St. Kitts." British destroyers under Vice-Admiral Powlett, in the "Armada," arrived at Marseilles on 15th February. Other ships, including the frigate "Magpie," Lieutenant-Commander the Duke of Edinburgh, visited Monaco, where the Prince of Monaco conferred on His Royal Highness the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Charles. The Mediterranean Fleet anti-aircraft trophy for the best long-range shoot in 1950 has been won by the destroyer "Vigo," the runner-up being the cruiser "Liverpool."

The cruiser "Phoebe" returned from the Mediterranean to Chatham on 14th March. The frigate "St. Austell Bay" returned to Plymouth on the same day from service in the Mediterranean and a period in exchange with the Royal New Zealand Navy.

East Indies.—Following reports of unrest in Persia connected with the nationalization of the oilfields, the cruiser "Gambia" left Malta on 28th March for the Red Sea. An official statement said that for the present she would remain on the Mediterranean Station, but that she would be lent to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, should he require her services. On 24th March, the frigates "Flamingo" and "Wild Goose" arrived at Bahrein, Persian Gulf.

The Admiralty announced on 5th April that ships of the Indian Navy, Royal Pakistan Navy, and Ceylon Navy had been carrying out exercises at sea with H.M. ships of the East Indies Squadron under Vice-Admiral G. N. Oliver, Commander-in-Chief, whose flag flies in the cruiser "Mauritius." This is the first time that ships of all four navies have exercised jointly.

The surveying ship " Dalrymple " returned to Plymouth on 20th March on completing two years' hydrographic service in the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean.

FAR EAST.—Ships on the Far East Station, and in particular the aircraft carrier " Theseus," continued to be actively engaged in the War in Korea. The cruiser " Jamaica " arrived back at her home port of Devonport late in February.

AMERICA AND WEST INDIES.—In the course of the spring cruise, the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir Richard Symonds-Tayler, H.M.S. " Superb," arrived at Buenos Aires on 19th February on a week's visit, during which the Vice-Admiral called on President Peron. The frigate " Bigbury Bay " simultaneously visited ports of southern Argentina. Both ships visited Montivedeo for the installation of the new President of Uruguay on 1st March.

The cruiser " Devonshire " on 23rd February landed parties of seamen and marines to guard the airport and other important points in Grenada, where a state of emergency had been declared following a general strike of agricultural workers. The strike ended on 19th March after 29 days.

The frigate " Sparrow " returned to the United Kingdom in April after having shown the Flag in 25 ports of 12 foreign countries and visited 23 anchorages in nine British Colonies.

PERSONNEL

RECALL OF RESERVISTS.—On 22nd February notices of recall were sent out to men of the Royal Fleet Reserve from the Registrars of the R.F.R. at Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth. This was the first step taken by the Navy to recall more reserves since the announcement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 29th January that about 6,000 men would be recalled from the R.F.R. for 18 months' service. The first of these reservists arrived at their port divisions on 10th April.

OFFICER VOLUNTEERS.—The Prime Minister also announced on 29th January that the Navy would need for 18 months about 600 officers from the emergency list of the Royal Navy, the R.N.V.R. or the R.N.V.S.R. It was hoped that a good proportion of this number would be obtained by calling for volunteers. On 5th March it was announced that a personal enquiry had been sent, or would be sent, to some officers whose qualifications or experience are particularly required for the present expansion of the Fleets. But any officer is asked to volunteer if he can. The requirement is mainly for junior officers. Officers who undertake to serve for eighteen months should address their undertaking to the Secretary of the Admiralty (C.W. 511), or to the Admiral Commanding Reserves if they are members of the Permanent R.N.V.R. or R.N.R.

SURVIVAL AT SEA.—A further series of trials in connection with survival at sea began in the Portsmouth area on 7th March. Some 60 soldiers had volunteered to assist in these trials, which are connected with precautions to be taken against sea-sickness. In previous trials a naval party carried out nutritional tests while remaining in a rubber float for three days, first in the Arctic and then in the tropics.

ENGINEER OFFICERS' MEMORIAL.—A Book of Remembrance containing the names of the engineer officers who gave their lives in the two World Wars was dedicated in the chapel of H.M.S. " Thunderer," the Royal Naval Engineering College, Manadon, Plymouth, on Sunday, 14th January, in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth, the Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet, and a congregation of serving and retired engineer officers. Relations and friends of the fallen officers are invited to write to the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. " Thunderer," for a copy of the Order of Service, which also contains the names inscribed in the book.

PAYMASTER PRIZE.—The late Captain George Norman Ballard, O.B.E., R.N., retired, of Crowthorne, Berkshire, has bequeathed £1,000 to the Admiralty to provide the " Charles Dargaville Ballard Prize " in memory of his son, a Paymaster Sub-Lieutenant, R.N., killed in action on board H.M.S. " Manchester " in 1941. The prize

will be awarded annually to the best all-round Acting Paymaster Sub-Lieutenant, R.N., promoted from the lower deck on the conclusion of his period under training.

Royal Naval Reserves

Distinguishing Lace.—On 30th March the Admiralty announced that the King had given his consent to a fundamental change in the distinguishing lace worn by officers of the Naval Reserves as marks of rank. The Admiralty have decided that it is no longer expedient or in keeping with the times to have any considerable distinction between the marks of rank of the Regular and Reserve officers. The distinctive lace hitherto worn by the R.N.R. will disappear completely, and the R.N.V.R. wavy lace will be retained only for officers of the Sea Cadet Corps and Combined Cadet Force. Except for this, all officers of the Reserves will in future wear lace similar to that worn by Regular officers of the Royal Navy, but with variations in the curl where officers are not qualified in every respect to accept the responsibilities of their professional colleagues in the Royal Navy. Regulations to be announced in a message to the Fleet broadly provide for the following :—

(*a*) " Qualified officers " of both the R.N.R. and R.N.V.R. to wear straight stripes and curl according to rank, similar to that worn by R.N. officers. Qualified status is normally only attainable in war.

(*b*) Other officers of the permanent R.N.R. and R.N.V.R. to wear straight stripes and curl according to rank, similar to that worn by R.N. officers, but with a letter " R " inside the curl. Officers of the R.N.V.R. Air Branch to wear the letter " A " instead of the letter " R " inside the curl.

(*c*) Temporary officers of all categories to wear straight stripes according to rank, similar to that worn by R.N., but with a " wavy " curl instead of a normal R.N. curl. If these officers become fully " qualified " they will exchange their " wavy " curl for a normal curl. Temporary Air officers will wear an " A " in the curl.

The traditional R.N.R. and R.N.V.R. buttons will be reintroduced at the same time. They differ only very slightly from R.N. buttons but it is hoped that they will help to maintain the *esprit de corps* of the Reserves.

Small changes are being made in the distinction cloth worn by certain naval officers to denote their particular branch. The distinction cloth of the Wardmaster Branch will in future be salmon pink (a shade midway between the colours of distinction cloth worn by the surgeons and the dental surgeons) instead of maroon. Changes in shades of green are being made in the distinction cloth of the Electrical Branch and the R.N.V.R. Special Branch.

Commodore, R.N.R.—Captain R. G. Thelwell, O.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., has been promoted to the rank of Commodore 2nd Class, R.N.R., to date from 1st February. Altogether there are six R.N.R. Commodores, of whom five have passed the retiring age of 55. Thus Captain Thelwell is the only R.N.R. Commodore at present on the Active List. He entered the R.N.R. as a Probationary Midshipman on 23rd December, 1913, and served in both World Wars. He was awarded the O.B.E. in 1941 for his work in the organisation of convoys, and is now in command of the Cunard White Star liner " Britannic."

Home Trade Entries to R.N.R.—The General Service Section of the Royal Naval Reserve is now open to Merchant Navy officers holding Home Trade Masters' Certificates of Competency in addition to those holding Foreign-Going Certificates. Officers between 21 and 26 years inclusive and holding Home Trade Masters' Certificates are now eligible for entry as Probationary Sub-Lieutenants, and at the discretion of the Admiral Commanding Reserves older men up to the age of 30 may also be entered. Applications by Home Trade certificated officers for entry into the R.N.R. should be addressed to the Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen, at Cardiff.

Fifth Term R.N.R. Ratings.—It has been decided to reintroduce the pre-war fifth term of enrolment on a modified and restricted basis for suitable R.N.R. ratings who have completed 20 years' service (mobilized time counting double) and have been

discharged from the Reserve. To take advantage of the fifth term of enrolment, during which they will be required to undergo two periods of obligatory training, ratings must be able to complete the five-year engagement before attaining the age of 45 years.

Material

SHIPS FROM RESERVE.—In the House of Commons on 7th March, Mr. Callaghan, Parliamentary Secretary, said it was planned to bring forward 60 ships from reserve for service with the active fleet this year, including two destroyers, two frigates, three submarines, eight ocean and 22 other minesweepers, two fast minelayers, and 21 smaller craft. In addition, one light fleet carrier, one destroyer, one landing ship (headquarters), and three anti-submarine frigates will be brought forward for trials and training.

" DUCHESS " LAUNCHED.—H.M.S. " Duchess," the seventh and last but one of the " Daring " class of destroyers, was launched from the Thornycroft yard at Woolston, Southampton, on 9th April. Lady Mountbatten of Burma performed the naming ceremony. At the luncheon after the ceremony Vice-Admiral Lord Mountbatten, Fourth Sea Lord, mentioned that the cost of the " Duchess " when completed would be almost exactly the same as that of the famous battleship " Dreadnought " when she was completed nearly half a century ago.

NEW SURVEYING SHIP.—The new surveying vessel, H.M.S. " Cook," completed in the autumn of 1950, commissioned at Plymouth in March. She is one of four of her class to be converted from a frigate during building. For her " shake-down " cruise, which began early in April, she proceeded to a working ground about 200 miles South of Ireland where there is believed to be a deep submarine canyon. By the use of echo-sounding this theory will be proved or disproved. The " Cook " will afterwards go to the West coast of Scotland to check charts. Her work here will include a re-survey of Gunna Sound, a famous " short cut " for fishermen.

FUEL COMMITTEE.—The Admiralty has set up a Committee under the chairmanship of the Hon. R. C. Geddes to consider both present and future fuel and other oil quality problems affecting or likely to affect the Royal Navy. Invitations to serve on this Committee have been accepted by representatives of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, together with Professor F. H. Garner, O.B.E., of Birmingham University, Dr. C. M. Cawley, O.B.E., of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and representatives of the oil industry.

BERMUDA DOCKYARD CLOSED.—At noon on 31st March the White Ensign above H.M.S. " Malabar," as the Bermuda shore base is known, was hauled down at a simple ceremony which marked the official closing of H.M. Dockyard at Bermuda. Until a year ago 1,200 men were employed in the dockyard. It has now reverted to the status of a fleet anchorage. The big floating dock is to be towed to Britain.

Naval Aviation

HELICOPTER TRIALS.—The practicability of operating helicopters from merchant ships was investigated by the Royal Navy in a series of trials in the English Channel in January. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary " Fort Duquesne " and " Dragon Fly " helicopters operating from Gosport and the R.N. Air Station at Culdrose, Cornwall, took part, with the destroyer " Savage " in attendance.

The Navy is adopting the helicopter for air-sea rescue and for inter-communication between ships of the Fleet. The first to be included in the equipment of any of H.M. ships was embarked in the fleet carrier " Indomitable," flagship of Admiral Sir Philip Vian, Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, during the spring cruise.

NEW ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT.—The Ministry of Supply, on behalf of the Admiralty, has placed an order with the Fairey Aviation Company for a substantial number of the new twin-engine anti-submarine aircraft at present known as the Fairey 17. This aircraft, the first fitted with an airscrew-turbine engine to land on the deck of a

carrier, is powered by an Armstrong-Siddeley " Double Mamba," which consists of two engines side by side in the same power unit, giving twin-engine safety combined with the aerodynamic cleanliness of a single-engine type.

NEW R.N.V.R. SQUADRON.—A new R.N.V.R. air squadron is being formed at the R.N. Air Station, Culham, and will be based eventually at the R.N. Air Station, Ford, near Arundel. Announcing this on 27th January the Admiralty stated that since the existing squadron will continue at Culham, the pilots for the new squadron will be drawn mainly from Surrey, Sussex, Kent and Hampshire. It is hoped, however, that the observers will come from the whole of South-Eastern England.

PILOTS ASKED TO RE-ENTER.—The Admiralty are inviting former naval pilots and any now serving in the R.N.V.R. who have completed 300 hours' flying in service aircraft to re-enter on a short service Commission. These Commissions will normally be for four years but may extend to six years in some cases. Applications, preferably accompanied by flying log books, should be addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty (C.W. 522), London, S.W.1.

LOSS OF H.M. SUBMARINE " AFFRAY "

H.M. Submarine " Affray " submerged about 30 miles South of the Isle of Wight on the night of Monday, 16th April, and failed to surface as expected at a position about 20 miles South-East of Start Point next morning. On board were the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant J. Blackburn, D.S.C., R.N.; three other ship's officers, 20 officers of the Officers' Submarine Course, 46 naval ratings, and four Royal Marine other ranks on a Royal Marine training course.

When the vessel became overdue the codeword " Subsmash " was sent out for the second time since the end of the War—the first being when the " Truculent " was lost in collision on 12th January, 1950—to set in operation the routine procedure relating to submarine accidents. Ships of four nations joined in the search, 26 in all, including two from the United States, three from the French and one from the Belgian Navies, as well as R.N. and R.A.F. aircraft. Early on the morning of 18th April it was reported that communication had been established by signal with the " Affray ", messages thought to have been from her having been picked up in the submarine " Sea Devil," but no reply was received to signals made from the " Sea Devil." Various contacts were reported on the days immediately following, but all were discounted on investigation and the exact position of the vessel remained unknown and the cause of her loss a mystery.

On 21st April the Admiralty announced that submarines of the " A " class, sister-ships of the " Affray," had been stopped from going to sea pending investigation into the loss.

AMMUNITION SHIP " BEDENHAM " BLOWN UP AT GIBRALTAR

On 27th April, the British ammunition ship " Bedenham " was blown up in the Admiralty Harbour at Gibraltar at the Ordnance Wharf, less than a mile from the town. In the explosion, described as the worst in the history of Gibraltar, eight persons were killed, two were reported missing, and 50 were taken to hospital injured, 18 seriously. Many more were treated for cuts from flying glass and for shock. Hardly a building in the city escaped damage. The crew of the " Bedenham," 26 merchant seamen, were safe, only one being injured, said the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. W. J. Edwards, in reply to a question in the House of Commons. There were only minor injuries to naval personnel, but the extent of damage to the dockyard and city was not then known.

WOMEN'S ROYAL NAVAL SERVICE

By approval of The King, H.R.H. the Duchess of Kent, Commandant of the Women's Royal Naval Service, will in future have the title of Chief Commandant. The Director of the Service, Miss M. K. Lloyd, O.B.E., will in future hold the rank and title of Commandant, W.R.N.S.

The Navy Estimates

The Navy Estimates for 1951–52 were presented to Parliament on 16th February, with an Explanatory Statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Hall (Cmd. 8160, 6d. net). They provide for a net expenditure of £278,500,000. It has not been possible to make detailed provision in these estimates for the further measures to speed up the preparedness of the Royal Navy which were announced by the Prime Minister on 29th January; the House of Commons will be approached in due course for a supplementary grant.

The net provision represents an increase of £85,500,000 on the original net Estimates for 1950–51, or £75,500,000 if allowance is made for the Supplementary Estimate which was presented on 23rd January, 1951. The increase is principally due to the measures already taken to improve the preparedness of the Navy, as announced to Parliament on 26th July and 12th September, 1950; additional provision to cover the improvement in Service emoluments; increased prices; and the continuation of special measures in the Far East.

The vote for numbers provides for a maximum strength of 143,500, which includes 5,085 for the Women's Royal Naval Service and 230 for the Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service. It also includes officers and men who are retained beyond the period of their engagement to meet the Korean emergency, and the reservists who have been recalled for that purpose. The recently decided additional measures, referred to above, are expected during the forthcoming financial year to increase the strength of Vote A to a maximum of 152,000, bringing the total demand on United Kingdom manpower to 149,000. This will be attained by the recall of 6,600 additional reservists and by the retention of men beyond the period of their normal engagements, each of whom will be required for 18 months' service.

A table of the strength of the Fleet, excluding vessels of the Fleet Train, attendant ships and numerous small craft, has the following:—

Active Fleet.—Fleet carrier "Indomitable"; light fleet carriers "Theseus," "Glory," "Vengeance" and "Ocean"; 13 cruisers; 28 destroyers; 36 frigates; 32 submarines; and 13 minesweepers.

Training and Experimental (special complements).—Battleship "Vanguard"; fleet carriers "Indefatigable" and "Illustrious"; light fleet carriers "Triumph" and "Warrior"; 2 cruisers; 18 destroyers; 13 frigates; and 3 minesweepers.

In Reserve or Reducing to Reserve (not including ships for disposal).—Battleships "Anson," "Howe," "Duke of York" and "King George V"; fleet carriers "Victorious," "Implacable" and "Formidable"; escort carrier "Campania" (lent to the Festival of Britain for about two years); 11 cruisers; 65 destroyers; 113 frigates; 2 monitors; 24 submarines; 47 minesweepers; and 3 fast minelayers.

In Course of Construction.—2 fleet carriers; 7 light fleet carriers; 3 cruisers; 8 destroyers; 4 frigates; and 41 minesweepers.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, Mr. L. J. Callaghan, introduced the Navy Estimates in the House of Commons on 12th March. He reviewed the whole field of naval activity, progress, and development. The naval rearmament programme would absorb a considerable part of the labour force of the shipbuilding and repairing industry. In 1948 the Navy's share was about 2 per cent., and this year had increased to 11 per cent. Toward the end of next year the total would probably increase to 30 per cent.

In the work of the year the outstanding event had been the service of the Far Eastern Fleet. The work of H.M.S. "Theseus" was outstanding. Her company was not hand-picked, but had been operating at a higher level of efficiency than was ever known in the Pacific war. Since last October no aircraft had ever been unserviceable for longer than two hours, and they had the remarkable record of more than 1,300 deck landings without a failure and without an accident. That was unprecedented.

Referring to the technical needs of the Navy, he said that the major problem confronting them was the increased speed of attack. That dominated the whole of the research and development of the work of Admiralty scientists at the present time.

The programme of vessels to be laid down during the next three years totalled 232 ships, including six aircraft carriers, eig t destroyers, 24 frigates (17 of which had already been ordered), together with 28 patrol boats of various descriptions. When the programme was completed the Navy would have 18 fleet and light fleet carriers, plus three in the Commonwealth, making a total of 21, compared with the war-time peak number of 11.

More ships needed more men, and later it would be necessary to ask for a supplementary vote for men. Meantime the gap in strength was being filled by reservists called up for a period of 18 months and by the retention of men who were concluding their term of service. The reserves numbered in all 50,000. Asked " Can we mobilize the Navy ? " he answered " Yes, sir, we can."

Dealing with Britain's position in the world in relation to sea power, Mr. Callaghan said that when we started the last war the American Fleet and our own were roughly equal in manpower and in ships. When the U.S.A. came into the war they embarked on the biggest shipbuilding programme the world had ever seen. We finished with 17 aircraft carriers, they finished with 98, having started with five. Both nations started about level in destroyers and frigates but the U.S. finished with a fleet of destroyers and frigates twice as large as ours. By 1945 the Royal Navy had a personnel of about 850,000 including W.R.N.S. The American Navy numbered over four million. To-day we had 140,000 to 150,000 men in the Royal Navy. The Americans would this year have 850,000.

In conclusion Mr. Callaghan said : " So far from being overwhelmed by what is happening, or feeling that the Royal Navy is taking a second place, I am confident that in our men, ships, history, tradition and fighting qualities, our Navy, which has stood for many hundreds of years, will go on, will continue in the paths it has set itself, and that we ourselves, in this House of Commons, have a most formidable task still to preserve it as a safeguard and a shield for our country."

ROYAL MARINES

COMMANDANT GENERAL.—Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Hollis, K.B.E., C.B., Commandant General, Royal Marines, visited the Home Fleet at Gibraltar between 5th and 8th March for the purpose of inspecting Royal Marine detachments.

DINING HALL AT DEAL.—The Second Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral A. C. G. Madden, opened a new dining hall and canteen block at the Royal Marine Barracks, Deal, on 12th January. The ceremony marked the conclusion of the first phase of a reconstruction and modernization at the Depot and is, in fact, the first major construction of its type to be completed by the Admiralty since the War.

NEW PAY CODE.—A new pay code for the Royal Marines has been approved with effect from 1st September, 1950. Announcing this in the House of Commons on 21st February, the Parliamentary Secretary, Mr. Callaghan, said that, as in the new pay code for the Royal Navy, extra pay is given for higher qualifications. The new rates are in substitution for those announced in Appendix III of the White Paper (Cmd. 8027).

RETIREMENTS.—Major-General G. E. Wildman-Lushington, C.B., C.B.E., and Major-General R. A. R. Neville, C.B.E., are placed on the Retired List (29th November, 1950).

DOMINION AND COMMONWEALTH NAVIES

CANADA

DEFENCE PLANS.—Outlining a three-year defence programme for Canada on 6th February, Mr. Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, said the programme will put into commission 100 ships for the Navy, and the expanded Navy will be in a

position to aid in North Atlantic defence should an acute crisis arise. Plans include new building, besides the re-arming, refitting, and reconditioning of ships in reserve. These will be fully manned and ready to operate with the British and United States Navies in anti-submarine and escort work in the North Atlantic.

AUSTRALIAN CRUISE.—The Canadian cruiser "Ontario" left Esquimalt in mid-February on a 15-week training cruise to Australia and to take part in April in combined exercises with units of the Royal Australian Navy. This is the first training cruise ever made to Australia by a ship of the Royal Canadian Navy.

REPORTED SABOTAGE.—An attempt was made to delay the sailing on 5th February of the aircraft carrier "Magnificent" from Halifax, Nova Scotia. Sand and brass filings were found in an oil compartment of an engine bearing, but this was discovered before the engine was turned over. The carrier sailed as scheduled for manoeuvres with two destroyers in Bermuda waters.

AUSTRALIA

COMMONWEALTH EXERCISES

In the last week of February a British Commonwealth Task Force was engaged off the South-East coast of Victoria in the largest manoeuvres in Australian naval history. Twelve ships from Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the British Navy went into "action" off Sydney on 24th February. Next day "Sea Fury" fighters from Sydney took off to maintain an air patrol over the force.

SOUTH AFRICA

BUDGET CRITICISM

The Capetown Correspondent of *The Times* reported that during the Budget debate on 4th April Mr. L. C. Gay, the Member for Simonstown, criticised the state of the South African Air Force and Navy. Of the latter, the Member said that six out of nine warships in Durban harbour were "rotting"; if they were needed quickly for service they would be useless.

INDIA

NEW COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.—(See under Flag Appointments).

EXERCISES.—The cruiser "Mauritius," flagship of the British East Indies Squadron, and "Lancaster" aircraft of the R.A.F. Coastal Command, operating from Ceylon, took part in the Indian Naval Squadron's annual exercises off the West coast of India in February.

CEYLON

NAVY ESTABLISHED

The Royal Ceylon Navy came into being on 9th December, 1950, the date on which the Navy Act was proclaimed in the Ceylon Government Gazette Extraordinary. Captain W. E. Banks, C.B.E., D.S.C., R.N., formerly Naval Adviser to the Ceylon Government, has been appointed to command the Royal Ceylon Navy with the title of Captain of the Navy.

FOREIGN NAVIES

ARGENTINA AND CHILE

ANTARCTIC BASES

In reply to a question on 4th April in the House of Commons on new Argentine and Chilean bases, Mr. Morrison, the Foreign Secretary, said that as regards the general policy of the Government he had nothing to add to the statement made on 6th November, 1950. Since then the Chileans have established another post on British Antarctic territory in

Referring to the technical needs of the Navy, he said that the major problem confronting them was the increased speed of attack. That dominated the whole of the research and development of the work of Admiralty scientists at the present time.

The programme of vessels to be laid down during the next three years totalled 232 ships, including six aircraft carriers, eig t destroyers, 24 frigates (17 of which had already been ordered), together with 28 patrol boats of various descriptions. When the programme was completed the Navy would have 18 fleet and light fleet carriers, plus three in the Commonwealth, making a total of 21, compared with the war-time peak number of 11.

More ships needed more men, and later it would be necessary to ask for a supplementary vote for men. Meantime the gap in strength was being filled by reservists called up for a period of 18 months and by the retention of men who were concluding their term of service. The reserves numbered in all 50,000. Asked "Can we mobilize the Navy?" he answered "Yes, sir, we can."

Dealing with Britain's position in the world in relation to sea power, Mr. Callaghan said that when we started the last war the American Fleet and our own were roughly equal in manpower and in ships. When the U.S.A. came into the war they embarked on the biggest shipbuilding programme the world had ever seen. We finished with 17 aircraft carriers, they finished with 98, having started with five. Both nations started about level in destroyers and frigates but the U.S. finished with a fleet of destroyers and frigates twice as large as ours. By 1945 the Royal Navy had a personnel of about 850,000 including W.R.N.S. The American Navy numbered over four million. To-day we had 140,000 to 150,000 men in the Royal Navy. The Americans would this year have 850,000.

In conclusion Mr. Callaghan said: "So far from being overwhelmed by what is happening, or feeling that the Royal Navy is taking a second place, I am confident that in our men, ships, history, tradition and fighting qualities, our Navy, which has stood for many hundreds of years, will go on, will continue in the paths it has set itself, and that we ourselves, in this House of Commons, have a most formidable task still to preserve it as a safeguard and a shield for our country."

ROYAL MARINES

COMMANDANT GENERAL.—Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Hollis, K.B.E., C.B., Commandant General, Royal Marines, visited the Home Fleet at Gibraltar between 5th and 8th March for the purpose of inspecting Royal Marine detachments.

DINING HALL AT DEAL.—The Second Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral A. C. G. Madden, opened a new dining hall and canteen block at the Royal Marine Barracks, Deal, on 12th January. The ceremony marked the conclusion of the first phase of a reconstruction and modernization at the Depot and is, in fact, the first major construction of its type to be completed by the Admiralty since the War.

NEW PAY CODE.—A new pay code for the Royal Marines has been approved with effect from 1st September, 1950. Announcing this in the House of Commons on 21st February, the Parliamentary Secretary, Mr. Callaghan, said that, as in the new pay code for the Royal Navy, extra pay is given for higher qualifications. The new rates are in substitution for those announced in Appendix III of the White Paper (Cmd. 8027).

RETIREMENTS.—Major-General G. E. Wildman-Lushington, C.B., C.B.E., and Major-General R. A. R. Neville, C.B.E., are placed on the Retired List (29th November, 1950).

DOMINION AND COMMONWEALTH NAVIES

CANADA

DEFENCE PLANS.—Outlining a three-year defence programme for Canada on 6th February, Mr. Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, said the programme will put into commission 100 ships for the Navy, and the expanded Navy will be in a

position to aid in North Atlantic defence should an acute crisis arise. Plans include new building, besides the re-arming, refitting, and reconditioning of ships in reserve. These will be fully manned and ready to operate with the British and United States Navies in anti-submarine and escort work in the North Atlantic.

AUSTRALIAN CRUISE.—The Canadian cruiser "Ontario" left Esquimalt in mid-February on a 15-week training cruise to Australia and to take part in April in combined exercises with units of the Royal Australian Navy. This is the first training cruise ever made to Australia by a ship of the Royal Canadian Navy.

REPORTED SABOTAGE.—An attempt was made to delay the sailing on 5th February of the aircraft carrier "Magnificent" from Halifax, Nova Scotia. Sand and brass filings were found in an oil compartment of an engine bearing, but this was discovered before the engine was turned over. The carrier sailed as scheduled for manoeuvres with two destroyers in Bermuda waters.

AUSTRALIA

COMMONWEALTH EXERCISES

In the last week of February a British Commonwealth Task Force was engaged off the South-East coast of Victoria in the largest manoeuvres in Australian naval history. Twelve ships from Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the British Navy went into "action" off Sydney on 24th February. Next day "Sea Fury" fighters from Sydney took off to maintain an air patrol over the force.

SOUTH AFRICA

BUDGET CRITICISM

The Capetown Correspondent of *The Times* reported that during the Budget debate on 4th April Mr. L. C. Gay, the Member for Simonstown, criticised the state of the South African Air Force and Navy. Of the latter, the Member said that six out of nine warships in Durban harbour were "rotting"; if they were needed quickly for service they would be useless.

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the Falkland Islands Dependencies. During the last few days the Argentine Press had reported the establishment of another Argentine base also in the Falkland Islands Dependencies. If this is confirmed, the Government will protest to the Argentine Government.

DENMARK

Coastal Force Exercise

Danish Naval Forces co-operated with the Royal Navy in February in a tactical exercise for fast patrol boats operating from a coastal forces mobile unit base set up on the East coast of England. The exercise was under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A similar exercise took place in June last from the Netherlands Naval Base at Den Helder. The mobile base was set up at the R.A.F. Station, Felixstowe, with the assistance of the Army, who provided transport and drivers from H.Q., Southern Command.

FRANCE

N.A.T.O. Appointment.—At a Press conference in Paris on 2nd April, General Eisenhower announced the appointment as his Naval Deputy of Admiral André Georges Lemonnier of the French Navy. The Admiral's duties " will include advising General Eisenhower on measures to exploit the potentialities of naval power for the defence of Europe, representing him with adjacent and subordinate commands and national naval authorities, and furthering the combined training of naval forces with land and air forces."

Malta Exercises.—On 31st March the French corvettes " Kabyle " and " Hova " and the submarine " Bouan " arrived at Malta to take part in anti-submarine exercises with the British Mediterranean Fleet. More French warships were expected there in April.

ITALY

Destroyer Escorts from U.S.A.

The three 1,800-ton destroyer escort vessels given to Italy under the North Atlantic Treaty military aid plans arrived at Messina on 25th March after a 15-day crossing from New York, and were formally handed over at Taranto in the first week of April.

NETHERLANDS

Aircraft in Ulster

The British " Firefly " aircraft of a Royal Netherlands Navy squadron which, as stated in the February Journal, is being based in the United Kingdom until at least the autumn, arrived at Eglinton, near Londonderry, on 22nd and 23rd January.

NORWAY

Appointment.—Commodore H. P. Henriksen, Naval Attaché to the Norwegian Embassy, left London on 10th March to take up his new appointment as Commander of Naval Command in South Norway.

New Ships.—Hr. Hauge, the Minister of Defence, stated on 21st February that during the five years 1950–55 the additions to the Navy would be two minelayers, three submarines, and 13 motor torpedo boats, to replace the former British " D "-class torpedo boats. The Minister said it was possible that three destroyers of the " Sleipner " class would be modernized and that Norway would take over a number of British escort destroyers of the " Hunt " class. The building programme included five minelayers with American engines and equipment.

Lack of Sea Forces.—Commodore Gunnar Hovdenak, Chief of the Norwegian Naval Staff, has written a memorandum to King Haakon in which he says that Norway's defence leaders have little understanding of the sea problem and in consequence have no confidence among the officers of the Navy. Vice-Admiral Edvard Danielsen, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, has passed on the memorandum with the remark that he agrees

with the Chief of Staff. The background of the memorandum, states *The Times* Correspondent at Oslo, is the fact that the Army and Air Force get the lion's share of the defence budgets.

PERU

Gunboat Launched

The gunboat " Ucayali " was launched on 7th March from the Woolston shipyard of Messrs. Thornycroft and Co. by Señora Teresa de Rivera Schreiber, wife of the Peruvian Ambassador, acting as proxy for Señora Maria de Odria, wife of the President of the Republic of Peru. A sister ship, the " Mañanon," was due for launching in April, and both will sail in July for Para, Brazil, and then steam 2,200 miles up the Amazon to Iquitos, Peru. They are to be employed on police duties on the Amazon and tributaries. A floating dock which is also being built by Messrs. Thornycroft for the Peruvian Government is to be towed to Iquitos, leaving Southampton in June.

POLAND

Memorial

Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, Commander-in-Chief at Plymouth, unveiled at Devonport, on 11th March, a plaque in memory of Polish naval officers and men who fell in the 1939–45 War. The ceremony, which was held at the principal Polish wartime base, was attended by senior officers of the Polish Navy, including its war-time Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Swirski.

SPAIN

New Destroyers

The new destroyer " Liniers," built at Cartagena, was delivered to the Spanish Navy on 27th January. Another new destroyer, the " Audaz," was launched at El Ferrol in the same week. The " Liniers," of 1,635 tons, is armed with nine guns and six torpedo tubes and has a speed of 36 knots.

UNITED STATES

Chief of Naval Operations.—Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, arrived in Paris on 2nd March from Washington for talks with General Eisenhower. On 4th March he proceeded to London with Admiral R. B. Carney, Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, for further discussions connected with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On 6th March, Admiral Sherman flew to Rome and conferred with Admiral Ferreri, Chief of the Italian Naval Staff, and on the 8th arrived at Gibraltar, where he and Mrs. Sherman were guests of the Governor and Lady Anderson before returning to Washington.

Appointments.—Vice-Admiral Matthias B. Gardner in March relieved Vice-Admiral John J. Ballentine as Commander of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Rear-Admiral Carl F. Holden, Commander of the Naval Base at New York City, was in March ordered to Germany as Commander, Naval Forces, Germany.

New Escort Carrier.—The 11,000-ton escort carrier " Kula Gulf," launched in 1944 but put into reserve after the War, was recommissioned on 15th February at Boston as a unit of the Atlantic Fleet. The 27,000-ton aircraft carrier " Hornet," states a U.S. Navy announcement, is also being taken out of reserve.

Building Programme.—President Truman on 13th March signed the Bill authorising a $2,000,000,000 naval construction and conversion programme under which 173 new ships will be built and over 200 will be modernized. The bulk of the programme is to be completed within two years.

ARMY NOTES

H.M. The King

The King presented Colours to the 1st and 2nd Battalions, Coldstream Guards, at Windsor Castle on 3rd April. The Queen and the Duke of Gloucester (Colonel, Scots Guards) were present.

The Duke of Gloucester, as Colonel-in-Chief, inspected the 1st Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders, at Liverpool on 6th March, prior to their embarkation for duty overseas.

The King has approved the following appointments :—

To be Aides-de-Camp to the King.—Brigadier E. R. Ash, C.B., M.I.Mech.E., R.E.M.E. (1st December, 1951), vice Major-General C. Bullard, C.B.E., B.Eng., M.I.Mech.E., M.I.E.E., promoted; Colonel H. E. Fernyhough, D.S.O., late R.A. (31st January, 1951), vice Brigadier F. S. Siggers, C.B.E., M.C., retired.

To be Honorary Aide-de-Camp to the King.—Brigadier Mary F. Coulshed, C.B.E., Director, Women's Royal Army Corps (29th January, 1951), vice Brigadier Dame Mary J. C. Tyrwhitt, D.B.E., retired.

To be Honorary Physician to the King.—Brigadier W. R. D. Hamilton, O.B.E., M.B., late R.A.M.C. (1st February, 1951), vice Major-General J. Bennet, M.D., F.R.C.P., retired.

To be Honorary Surgeon to the King.—Major-General R. D. Cameron, C.B.E., M.C., M.B., late R.A.M.C. (26th January, 1951), vice Major-General W. E. Tyndall, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., M.B., K.H.S., retired.

To be Colonels Commandant.—Of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, General Sir Brian H. Robertson, Bart., G.B.E., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., late R.E. (4th February, 1951), vice Major-General A. R. Valon, C.B., O.B.E., M.C., M.I.Mech.E., retired; of The Royal Horse Artillery, Lieut.-General Sir Otto M. Lund, K.C.B., D.S.O., late R.A. (retired), (9th February, 1951), vice Major-General (Honorary Lieut.-General) E. F. Norton, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., resigned; of The Royal Artillery, Major-General W. J. Elridge, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (9th February, 1951), vice Lieut.-General Sir Otto M. Lund; of The Royal Engineers, Major-General (Honorary Lieut.-General) Sir Ronald MacK. Scobie, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., late R.E. (retired), (19th March, 1951), vice Major-General F. S. G. Piggott, C.B., D.S.O., tenure expired.

To be Colonels of Regiments.—Of The Royal Norfolk Regiment, Colonel (Honorary Major-General) E. C. Hayes, C.B., late Infantry (retired), (9th February, 1951), vice Brigadier W. J. O'B. Daunt, C.B.E., tenure expired; of The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) General Sir Richard N. O'Connor, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., late Infantry (retired), (12th February, 1951), vice General Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster, G.C.B., D.S.O., D.L., resigned; of the Special Air Service Regiment, General Sir Miles C. Dempsey, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., D.L. (21st February, 1951).

Appointments

Ministry of Defence.—Lieut.-General Sir Kenneth G. McLean, K.B.E., C.B., appointed Chief Staff Officer, Ministry of Defence (1st April, 1951).

War Office.—Colonel (temporary Brigadier) R. W. McLeod, C.B.E., appointed Director of Military Operations, with the temporary rank of Major-General (3rd March, 1951).

Major-General J. Wren, F.D.S., appointed Director, Army Dental Services (5th March, 1951).

Lieut.-General E. A. B. Miller, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., appointed Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War (15th March, 1951).

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY.—Major-General H. E. Pyman, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Director General Fighting Vehicles (Summer, 1951).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Colonel (temporary Brigadier) H. R. B. Foote, V.C., D.S.O., appointed Commander, 11th Armoured Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General (1st December, 1950). (Substituted for the notification in the November, 1950, Journal.)

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) R. W. Goodbody, D.S.O., appointed Commander, 56th Armoured Division (T.A.), with the temporary rank of Major-General (May, 1951).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) C. P. Jones, C.B.E., M.C., appointed Commander, 7th Armoured Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General (May, 1951).

Major-General L. Wansbrough-Jones, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff, Western Command (June, 1951).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) B. A. Coad, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Commander, 2nd Infantry Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General (June, 1951).

Lieut.-General Sir Cameron Nicholson, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., Western Command (September, 1951).

Major-General W. J. Eldridge, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., appointed Commander, Aldershot District (September, 1951).

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS IN EUROPE.—Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O., has been appointed Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.

Major-General Sir Terence Airey, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.B.E., appointed Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), (1st April, 1951).

Major-General F. W. Festing, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Assistant Chief of Staff (Organization and Training), (1st April, 1951).

WESTERN EUROPE.—Major-General H. Redman, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff to the Chairman, Western Europe Commanders-in-Chief Committee (28th March, 1951).

GERMANY.—Major-General C. B. Callender, C.B., M.C., appointed temporary Commander-in-Chief, B.A.O.R., with the local rank of Lieut.-General (26th April, 1951), pending assumption of Command by General Sir John Harding, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) C. J. G. Dalton, C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff, Control Commission, Germany (June, 1951).

General Sir John Harding, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., appointed Commander-in-Chief, B.A.O.R. (September, 1951).

TRIESTE.—Major-General Sir T. John W. Winterton, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.B.E., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., British Element in Trieste Force (18th March, 1951).

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—Major-General C. D. Packard, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Chief of Staff (26th March, 1951).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) G. C. Humphreys, C.B.E., appointed Major-General Administration, with the temporary rank of Major-General (July, 1951).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) J. C. Walkey, C.B.E., appointed Chief Engineer, with the temporary rank of Major-General (July, 1951).

EAST AFRICA.—Major-General A. M. Cameron, C.B., M.C., appointed G.O.C., with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (October, 1951).

FAR EAST LAND FORCES.—Lieut.-General Sir Charles Keightley, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Commander-in-Chief (May, 1951).

Major-General A. G. O'C. Scott, C.B.E., appointed Commander, Singapore District (14th April, 1951).

SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT.—Colonel (temporary Brigadier) W. F. H. Kempster, D.S.O., O.B.E., with the temporary rank of Major-General (6th January, 1951); Major-General J. C. F. Holland, C.B., D.F.C. (2nd April, 1951).

Promotions

Lieut.-General.—Major-General to be Lieut.-General :—E. A. B. Miller, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (15th March, 1951).

Major-Generals.—Temporary Major-Generals, Brigadiers or Colonels to be Major-Generals :—R. D. Cameron, C.B.E., M.C., M.B. (28th January, 1951) ; J. M. S. Pasley, C.B.E., M.V.O. (7th February, 1951) ; M. B. Dowse, C.B.E. (9th February, 1951) ; J. E. Witt, C.B.E., M.C., A.D.C. (22nd February, 1951) ; R. L. Scoones, D.S.O., O.B.E. (1st March, 1951) ; J. Wren, F.D.S. (5th March, 1951) ; C. H. Norton, C.B.E. (15th March, 1951) ; G. H. Inglis, C.B.E. (5th April, 1951).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals :—H. R. B. Foote, V.C., D.S.O. (1st December, 1950) ; W. F. H. Kempster, D.S.O., O.B.E. (6th January, 1951) ; G. E. Prior-Palmer, D.S.O. (10th January, 1951) ; R. W. McLeod, C.B.E. (3rd March, 1951) ; M. Lea-Cox, C.B.E. (16th April, 1951).

From Retired Pay to Active List

Major-General V. Eveleigh, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., for special employment (2nd April, 1951) ; Major-General J. Y. Whitfield, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., for special employment (2nd April, 1951).

Retirements

The following General Officers have retired :—Major-General W. E. Tyndall, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., M.B., K.H.S. (28th January, 1951) ; Major-General J. Bennet, M.D., F.R.C.P., K.H.P. (1st February, 1951) ; Major-General E. B. de Fonblanque, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (7th February, 1951) ; Major-General J. C. Haydon, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. (9th February, 1951) ; Major-General J. Y. Whitfield, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. (22nd February, 1951) ; Major-General V. J. E. Westropp, C.B., C.B.E. (1st March, 1951) ; Major-General Sir Charles H. Boucher K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (14th March, 1951) ; Major-General C. M. Smith, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., A.M.I.Mech.E. (5th April, 1951).

Army Estimates, 1951–52

The gross expenditure provided for in the Estimates was £466,520,100, reduced by appropriations in aid to the net figure of £418,800,100. Estimates for the main branches of expenditure were : Army Pay, £110,170,000 (compared with £84,630,000 in 1950–51) ; Stores, etc., £147,340,000 gross, reduced by appropriations in aid to £134,340,000 net (against £57,820,000 in 1950–51) ; Supplies, £51,940,000 ; Civilians, £46,644,000 ; Works, Buildings, and Lands, £32,030,000 ; Movements, £23,120,000 ; Non-effective Service, £18,098,000 ; Reserve, Territorial, and Cadet Forces, £13,750,000.

An accompanying memorandum by the Secretary for War stated that a large construction programme was being undertaken in respect of A.A. defences, storage, and other works, made necessary by the deterioration in the international situation. About two-thirds of the estimated expenditure on armaments and stores was for tanks, A.A. guns, etc., whilst steps had already been taken to ensure a further acceleration of deliveries in 1952–53. Meanwhile the Ministry of Supply programme for building wheeled vehicles had been supplemented during 1950–51 by the rebuilding of large numbers in Army workshops in the United Kingdom and Germany, the total number of vehicles rebuilt by 31st December, 1950, being 23,000. During 1950–51 the modernization of living accommodation at home and abroad had been continued, and further schemes would be developed during 1951–52.

The memorandum added that the new divisions being raised for the Field Force would be exercised during 1951 at autumn manoeuvres in the United Kingdom and Germany, and that an important feature of these exercises would be co-operation between ground and air forces. The measures taken in 1950–51 to arrange for the interchange of personnel for training with the Armies of other Western Powers would be continued during 1951.

Changes in Army Conditions of Service

Two changes in the conditions of service of officers and other ranks have been announced by the War Office as a result of the general review undertaken last year. The first is the provision of employment for regular officers (Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors) and other ranks in a wide range of staff and administrative duties up to a maximum age of 55, subject to fitness and efficiency. In many cases the further employment of Lieutenant-Colonels up to this age will have to be as retired officers as sufficient active appointments in their rank will not be available. This policy can only be introduced gradually and only a small proportion can be so employed during the next year or two.

The other change relates to the group system of Army trades for other ranks. The present three groups are being reduced to two, which should give an added incentive for men to qualify for higher rates of pay by improving their skill. It was hoped to introduce this change as from 1st May.

Class "Z" Reservists

The Secretary of State for War—Mr. John Strachey, stated in a Parliamentary written answer on 5th February that the present strength of the Class "Z" Reservists was 2,856,384 other ranks, the strengths by age groups on 31st August, 1950, being as follows :—

Over 50 years of age	29,788
41–50 ,, ,, ,, ...	560,024
31–40 ,, ,, ,, ...	1,259,344
30 years of age and under	1,007,228

Army Cadet Force National Conference

A very representative gathering of the Regular Army, the Territorial Army, and the Army Cadet Force took place recently at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, under the direction of General Sir Montagu Stopford, Chairman of the Army Cadet Force Association, and Major-General E. O. Herbert, Director, Territorial Army and Cadets. About 160 attended, including Chiefs of Staff from the Army Commands, Chairmen of County Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations, County Commandants of the Army Cadet Force, Commanders of Territorial Army Brigades and Battalions, and of Army Cadet Force Battalions.

The following representatives also attended :—Admiral Sir Wilfred Patterson (Sea Cadets and Navy League), Group Captain Gardner (Home Command R.A.F.), Mr. N. S. Goodridge (National Association of Boys' Clubs), Mr. R. E. Williams (Youth Service, Ministry of Education) and Mr. H. L. Bullock (T.U.C.).

The Conference was addressed by General Sir Gerald Templer, G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Command, General Sir Montagu Stopford, Major-General Herbert, the Rev. F. P. W. Alexander, Deputy Chaplain General, and other speakers. The value of the Army Cadet Force to the Regular Army as a source of supply of potential leaders was brought out ; the importance of close affiliation between the Territorial Army and the Army Cadet Force was stressed ; and the vital importance of the work of the Army Cadet Force in training youths to be good, responsible, Christian British citizens was fully confirmed.

Decoration for Women's Services

First awards of the Territorial Efficiency Decoration to members of the Women's Services were announced in *The London Gazette Supplement* of 16th March, 1951.

The decoration is awarded for 12 years' "voluntary, efficient and continuous" service in the A.T.S., A.T.S. (T.A.) and the W.R.A.C. (T.A.). The award is not automatic and must be claimed. Forms of application (A.F. E.643—Revised) may be obtained from the War Office, M.S.3.

Women who held appointments of officer status on 2nd September, 1939, may count full-time, fully paid service in the 1939–45 War as double. Extended service after the War is counted at the "single" rate.

The service of those who were appointed to officer status after 2nd September, 1939, is counted at the rate of half for service before their appointment and at single rate for subsequent service. To qualify, however, they must have joined the A.T.S. (T.A.) or the W.R.A.C. (T.A.) by 1st November, 1947, or within six months of the end of their release leave, whichever is the later.

Service on Regular or Short Service Regular commissions is not a qualification for this award.

Clasps are awarded to holders of the Decoration for every subsequent six years of similar service. Officers who have been awarded the Efficiency Medal (Territorial) and who subsequently qualify for the Decoration, may be awarded the Decoration in lieu of the Medal.

War Memorials

Eighth Army

On 4th March, in All Saints' Cathedral, Cairo, Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery unveiled and Bishop Gwynne, formerly Bishop in Egypt and Cairo for nearly forty years, dedicated the window in memory of men of the Eighth Army who fell in the fighting in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Italy.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

CANADA

H.M. The King

The King has been graciously pleased to consent to become Colonel-in-Chief of The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, with effect from 2nd February, 1951.

Appointments.—Lieut.-General C. Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., has relinquished command of the Canadian Army to become Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff.

Major-General S. F. Clark, C.B.E., C.D., appointed Quartermaster-General of the Canadian Army (August, 1951).

Major-General J. D. B. Smith, C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., appointed Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff in London and Canadian Military Representative on the Atlantic Pact Organization in the United Kingdom (August, 1951).

Brigadier G. Kitching, C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., appointed Commandant Canadian Army Staff College, Kingston.

Colonel A. E. Wrinch, C.B.E., C.D., appointed Deputy Quartermaster-General with the rank of Brigadier, vice Brigadier G. P. Morrison, C.B.E., C.D., who will retire in June, 1951.

Colonel R. L. Purves, D.S.O., appointed Chief of Staff, Canadian Army Staff, Washington, vice Colonel A. E. Wrinch.

Colonel A. G. Chubb, D.S.O., appointed Director of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps.

25th Canadian Infantry Brigade.—The Governor-General Field-Marshal Viscount Alexander, with Mr. Brooke Claxton, Minister of Defence, left Ottawa by Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft on 14th April for Fort Lewis, Washington State, to visit the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade before it sailed for Korea, where it will join its component, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

Officer Cadets.—Nearly 1,500 undergraduates from 28 Canadian Universities, including the Royal Military College and Royal Roads, will undergo practical training as officer cadets with the Canadian Officers Training Corps at Canadian Army Active Force Camps and Corps schools this summer. Another 400, in their third year as officer cadets, will act as instructors at Corps schools and cadet trades training camps.

ARMY CADETS.—The strength ceiling, which has been set at 50,000 since 1946, has been raised to 65,000. Latest figures available at Army Headquarters show an actual strength of 49,341 boys in 496 Cadet Corps in the Country.

AUSTRALIA

APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS.—Lieut.-General F. H. Berryman, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Director-General of the Royal Visit in addition to his duties as Director-General of the Australian Commonwealth Jubilee celebrations.

Major-General W. Bridgeford, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., appointed G.O.C. Eastern Command, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General.

Major-General H. Wells, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C. Southern Command and District Commandant of the Third Military District, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General.

Major-General J. A. Chapman, D.S.O., appointed Quartermaster-General and Third Military Member of the Military Board.

Major-General R. N. L. Hopkins, C.B.E., appointed Commandant of the Royal Military College.

Brigadier R. Kendall, C.B.E., appointed G.O.C. Central Command and District Commandant Fourth Military District, with the temporary rank of Major-General.

Brigadier E. W. Woodward, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff, with the temporary rank of Major-General.

RETIREMENT.—Lieut.-General A. J. Boase, C.B.E. (20th February, 1951).

ENLISTMENT CONDITIONS, AUSTRALIAN WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS.—Enlistment conditions for other ranks in the Australian Women's Army Corps have been announced by Mr. J. Francis, the Minister for the Army, who said that enlistment would be open to single women or widows without dependent children.

The minimum age is 18 years, and the maximum age for applicants without previous military experience is 30 years. For those with previous military experience the maximum is 35 years. Recruits must be "A1" medically and British subjects domiciled in Australia.

Normal enlistment will be for the rank of private, and the initial engagement period will be for four years. Enlisted women will be required to live out and will be responsible for arranging their own accommodation unless otherwise required by the Service.

SOUTH AFRICA

H.M. THE KING

The King has approved the following appointment:—

TO BE AIDE-DE-CAMP (ADDITIONAL) TO THE KING.—Brigadier W. H. Hingeston, C.B.E., South African Staff Corps, vice General J. Mitchell Baker, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., retired.

PAKISTAN

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS TRAINING TEAM.—Major-General W. F. H. Kempster, D.S.O., O.B.E., has been appointed Commander of the new General Headquarters Training Team.

TURKISH MILITARY MISSION.—A Turkish Military Goodwill Mission headed by Lieut.-General Zakai Okan (Army representative) arrived in Pakistan on 24th March. The Mission consisted of seven members, including Admiral Sadiq Altinjan and Major-General Suphi Goker (Air Division Commander).

INDIA

APPOINTMENTS.—Lieut.-General D. R. Thapar, C.I.E., O.B.E., appointed Director-General, Armed Forces Medical Services (1st October, 1950).

Brigadier C. F. C. Spedding appointed Adviser Technical Development (1st February, 1951).

NATIONAL DEFENCE ACADEMY.—Since 1946, six regular courses and three Technical Graduates courses have passed out of the Military Wing. The first course at the Joint Services Wing ended in December, 1950.

INFANTRY SCHOOL.—It is proposed to commence a Senior Officers course at the Infantry School in the near future.

GUARDS BRIGADE.— A Guards Brigade of four infantry battalions is now being formed. The battalions selected were :—2nd Punjab Regiment, 1st Grenadiers, 1st Rajputana Rifles and 1st Rajput Regiment, as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions of the Guards respectively.

FOREIGN

NETHERLANDS

NEW CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF

It was announced on 25th January that Colonel B. R. Hasselman had been appointed to succeed General Kruls as Chief of General Staff with effect from 1st February, and had been promoted to the rank of Lieut.-General.

UNITED STATES

FOUR DIVISIONS FOR EUROPE

It was reported from Washington on 4th April that the Senate had that day finally adopted the resolution approving the dispatch of four divisions to Europe, to join the Atlantic Pact Army under General Eisenhower. With the two United States divisions already in Europe this will complete the total of six divisions contemplated under the present plans. Movement was expected to begin early in May.

AIR NOTES

Appointments

Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C., appointed Inspector-General of the Royal Air Force (8th February, 1951).

Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., D.F.C., M.M., has been appointed Deputy (Air), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe.

Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot, K.B.E., C.B., D.F.C., A.D.C., has been appointed Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in succession to Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, G.C.B., D.C.L., LL.D.

Air Ministry.—Air Vice-Marshal C. N. H. Bilney, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Director General of Technical Services (I) (26th March, 1951).

Air Vice-Marshal R. G. Hart, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., appointed Director General of Technical Services (II) (1st April, 1951).

Air Commodore N. S. Allinson, C.B., appointed Director General of Manning, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (May, 1951).

Maintenance Command.—Air Vice-Marshal G. Combe, C.B., appointed Air Officer in charge of Administration (19th March, 1951).

Flying Training Command.—Air Commodore R. B. Jordan, C.B., D.F.C., A.F.C., A.D.C., appointed A.O.C. No. 25 Group, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (20th March, 1951).

Bomber Command.—Air Vice-Marshal D. A. Boyle, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C., appointed A.O.C. No. 1 Group (5th April, 1951).

Fighter Command.—Air Vice-Marshal R. L. R. Atcherley, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C., appointed A.O.C. No. 12 Group (May, 1951).

Coastal Command.—Air Vice-Marshal G. E. Nicholetts, C.B., A.F.C., appointed Senior Air Staff Officer (May, 1951).

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe.—Air Commodore (acting Air Vice-Marshal) E. C. Hudleston, C.B., C.B.E., has been appointed Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans).

Promotions

Air Marshal to be Air Chief Marshal.—Sir William Elliot, K.B.E., C.B., D.F.C., A.D.C. (1st April, 1951).

Air Vice-Marshal to be Air Marshal.—C. W. Weedon, C.B., C.B.E. (1st February, 1951).

Retirements

Air Vice-Marshal Sir Alexander P. Davidson, K.B.E., C.B., is placed on the Retired List (26th January, 1951).

Air Vice-Marshal T. G. Bowler, C.B.E., is placed on the Retired List (6th April, 1951).

Air Marshal Sir R. Victor Goddard, K.C.B., C.B.E., is placed on the Retired List at his own request (8th April, 1951).

Air Estimates

The net expenditure provided for the Royal Air Force for 1951–52 amounts to £328,750,000. This shows a net increase of £105,750,000 on the corresponding figure for the 1950–51 Estimates. It provides for a maximum number of officers, airmen, and airwomen of 270,000 compared with 215,000 (recently increased by 28,000) for the previous year. In presenting the Estimates, the Secretary of State for Air, Mr. Arthur Henderson, said that the front line strength of the R.A.F. had increased considerably during 1950–51, notably in Fighter Command and the British Forces of Occupation. These were, however, only first steps towards substantial increases to be achieved during the next two years.

In Fighter Command the doubling of the regular day-fighter squadrons had been completed, and there would be a further large increase in day-fighter strength; the night-fighter force would be greatly increased and equipped with jet fighters; and good progress was being made with the radar chain. In Bomber Command the Canberra would come into service during 1951, and the tactical bomber forces would in due course be greatly strengthened by a large number of squadrons to be formed of this type; meanwhile, the medium bomber force would be maintained on Washingtons and Lincolns until later types of long range jet bombers came into service. There would also be a substantial increase in Coastal Command where the Shackleton was now coming into squadrons; the rundown of Transport Command had been halted; and jet fighters had been flown out to Singapore for the re-equipment of squadrons in the Far East Air Force. In all Commands there had been an increase in the scale and intensity of operational training in which the Allied Forces had frequently participated, and co-operation with other Commonwealth Air Forces and with Allied Air Forces had been closer than ever.

Mr. Henderson also made the following points: medium range reconnaissance squadrons to be formed would be equipped initially with Lockheed P.2V Neptunes supplied by America under the military aid programme; entries to Cranwell were satisfactory, but the number of University graduates accepting permanent commissions fell short of needs; airmen of all trades would be eligible for selection for aircrew duties and could continue their duties on the ground up to the age of 55; recruiting for the Royal Observer Corps had increased by 1,200 during the past year.

Flights

Flight of Canberra Across Atlantic.—On 21st February a standard Canberra jet aircraft flew across the Atlantic from Aldergrove, Northern Ireland, to Gander, Newfoundland, a distance of 2,100 statute miles in 4 hrs. 40 mins., at an average ground speed of 450 m.p.h. The previous fastest crossing of 5 hrs. 10 mins. was made during the War by a Mosquito flying the Atlantic from West to East. This is the first time that the Atlantic has been flown by a jet aircraft without refuelling. The crew of the Canberra were: Squadron Leader A. E. Callard, D.F.C., pilot; Flight Lieut. E. A. J. Haskett, navigator; and Flight Lieut. A. J. R. Robson, signaller. They were stationed at Boscombe Down. On 24th February the Canberra flew on to Andrews Field, near Washington, a distance of 1,317 miles, in 2 hrs. 59 mins.

Reinforcement of Far East Air Force.—Fighter squadrons of the Far East Air Force were recently re-equipped by the delivery from England of 44 Vampire jet fighters. They were ferried out by aircrews of Transport Command, and were staged through airfields in eleven different countries between R.A.F. Station, Chivenor, and R.A.F. Station, Changi, Singapore. The first six Vampires logged a flying time of just over 27 hours.

Casualty Evacuation by Helicopters in Malaya.—During the first six months in which the Far East Casualty Flight operated in Malaya, 21 casualties were evacuated from the depths of the jungle and transported to hospital. The sick and wounded included British, Gurkha and Malay members of the Security Forces.

R.A.F. Navigation Specialists to Visit Commonwealth Air Forces.—A team of six navigation and air control specialists from the Royal Air Force Central Navigation and Control School, Shawbury, is to make a six weeks' tour in a Hastings of Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Air Force stations. Group Captain B. J. R. Roberts, Commandant of the School, will command the mission.

Training

Aircrew Training in Canada.—A number of National Service airmen are now under training in Canada as pilots and navigators.

Use of Heligoland as a Bombing Range.—The use of Heligoland as a bombing range will be discontinued as soon as some sandbanks off North-West Germany have been prepared as alternative targets.

Personnel

Passing-out Parade at Cranwell.—The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser, reviewed the passing-out parade at Cranwell on 11th April and presented the sword of honour to Flight Cadet Under-Officer J. A. Fryer.

National Service Officers.—All National Service pilots and navigators are now granted commissions in the General Duties (flying) branch on completion of their initial training, while the majority of ground branches are now open to National Service officers.

Commissions for Civilian Technicians.—Selected technicians from leading industries—particularly aeronautical—will be given an opportunity of serving as commissioned officers in the Royal Air Force for an optional number of years.

More Trades Recognized by Trade Unions.—Agreement has now been reached with the National Society of Painters whereby regular airmen who have attained the rank of senior aircraftman in the trades of painter and doper, surface worker, or safety and surface worker, will be recognized as eligible for direct admission to the Society as tradesmen on completion of their R.A.F. engagements. A similar agreement has also been reached with the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers. About 90 per cent. of the R.A.F. skilled trades are now recognized by trade unions.

Battle of Britain Week.—The Battle of Britain week this year will be observed from 10th–16th September. On Battle of Britain Day, Saturday, 15th September, a number of R.A.F. stations will be open to the public.

Reserve Forces

Call-up of Auxiliary Fighter Squadrons.—Twenty Auxiliary fighter squadrons are being called up for three months' training with Fighter Command between the middle of April and the middle of October.

Auxiliary Transport Squadrons.—Three more Auxiliary transport squadrons are to be formed shortly.

Royal Auxiliary Air Force Squadron Commanders' Conference.—A conference of officers commanding flying squadrons of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force was held at the Air Ministry under the chairmanship of the Under-Secretary of State for Air, Mr. Aidan M. Crawley. The Secretary of State for Air, Mr. Arthur Henderson, and the Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, also addressed the meeting. Problems likely to arise from the three months' call-up of the 20 fighter squadrons, as well as a variety of general policy matters were discussed. Seventeen squadron commanders were present.

Appointment of Air Commodore.—Air Marshal Sir John Baldwin, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., D.L., J.P., has been appointed Air Commodore of No. 3506 (County of Northampton) Fighter Control Unit (13th January, 1951).

Esher Trophy.—No. 603 (City of Edinburgh) Squadron won the Esher Efficiency Challenge Trophy for 1950. No. 604 (County of Middlesex) Squadron were second, and No. 616 (South Yorkshire) Squadron were third.

Lloyds Trophy for Anti-Aircraft Gunnery.—The trophy was won again this year by No. 2502 (Ulster) L.A.A. Squadron, Aldergrove, Northern Ireland.

Call-up of R.A.F. Reservists.—First warning notices to the 10,000 airmen in G Class Reserve, who are to be recalled for 15 days' training, were sent out at the beginning of February. The training will be given in seven fortnightly periods between June and September.

Air Training Corps

Message from the King.—The King, as Air Commodore-in-Chief, sent the following message to the Secretary of State for Air on the 1st February, the tenth anniversary of the Corps :—

" Please thank all members of the Air Training Corps for their loyal message. The Corps has worthily acquitted itself as the younger brother of the Royal Air Force and I send my sincere wishes for its continued prosperity."

Celebration of the Tenth Anniversary.—A parade of 1,000 cadets was held on the Horse Guards Parade, after which a service was held in St. Martin-in-the-Fields. Similar parades and services were held in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Cardiff and in towns all over the Country.

Size of the Corps.—There are now 74 A.T.C. squadrons in London, and more than 670 squadrons in the British Isles.

Air Cadet Council.—The Air Council has established an Air Cadet Council and a Scottish Air Cadet Council in place of the two existing Air Training Corps Consultative Committees. They will be advisory bodies.

A.T.C. Flying Scholarships.—Fifty-four cadets have recently been awarded £150 flying scholarships and will begin their training at civil flying clubs shortly.

Royal Observer Corps

New Commandant

Air Commodore G. H. Vasse, C.B.E., has been appointed Commandant of the Royal Observer Corps (20th March, 1951).

DOMINIONS

CANADA

Expansion of the R.C.A.F.—In the House of Commons, on 21st March, Mr. Brooke Claxton, the Defence Minister, said : " In the statement I made on February 5th I said that the Government had offered to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to train additional aircrew. The number proposed was 1,100 per annum which would bring the total to be trained for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Kingdom to something over 1,300 per annum. We have now received the recommendation of the Standing Group that all the places available in respect of this additional number up to 31st December this year should be allocated to the United Kingdom. After that the allocation will be reconsidered. At present our plans provide for a build-up to an annual output of aircrew of over 3,000. That represents an increase of six times the figure for 1950, and fifteen times the figure of the previous year. This will be accompanied by a fivefold increase in ground crew training facilities. Administrative establishments will also be increased. This will require the reopening of a number of airfields. With hardly an exception all the other establishments will be increased in accordance with the expansion programme. To operate this plan will require a large number of additional aircraft for training. My colleague, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, announced in the House on March 5th that we would be manufacturing Harvards of the most modern type, as well as engines. We shall also be acquiring from the United States some two-seater jet training aircraft to be used until our own production enables us to meet all our own needs for this type of aircraft."

R.C.A.F. Squadron Welcomed.—On 8th February, at the R.A.F. Station, Odiham, the Secretary of State for Air, Mr. Arthur Henderson, welcomed No. 421 (Red Indian) Squadron, R.C.A.F.—the first squadron of any Commonwealth Air Force to be stationed in this country in peace-time. The squadron is commanded by Squadron Leader R. T. P. Davidson, and it has been re-equipped by the R.A.F. with Vampire jet fighters of a more advanced type.

Observer Corps.—A civilian Observer Corps of over 150,000 volunteers will be organized as part of the Canadian defensive system. The Corps will be similar in operation to organizations in this Country and in the United States.

AUSTRALIA

NEW TYPES OF AIRCRAFT FOR R.A.A.F.—Mr. J. W. White, the Minister for Air, has announced that the R.A.A.F. will be flying more than 100 jet fighters, including the latest Gloster Meteor 8 from the United Kingdom by the end of this year. Fighter squadrons of the R.A.A.F. are also being rearmed with De Havilland Vampires built in Australia, and the Government is considering the production in Australia of a third type of fighter. The production of the Canberra jet bomber is getting under way in Melbourne.

METEORS IN KOREA.—Mr. White also announced that 36 Meteor 8 fighters bought from the United Kingdom had been delivered to No. 77 Squadron, R.A.A.F., in Korea by the Aircraft Carrier H.M.S. "Warrior." These Meteors were the first British built jet aircraft to go into action in the Korean campaign.

R.A.A.F. CHIEF OF STAFF IN MALAYA.—Air Marshal George Jones, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., Chief of the Air Staff, recently inspected the R.A.A.F. squadrons operating in Malaya. He was the guest of the A.O.C.-in-C., Far East Air Force, Air Marshal Sir Francis J. Fogarty, K.B.E., C.B., D.F.C., A.F.C.

R.A.A.F. AIR COMMODORE FOR LONDON.—Air Commodore A. L. Walters, C.B.E., A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding Southern Area, has been posted to England. He will have the appointment of Air Officer Commanding Overseas Headquarters, R.A.A.F., in London.

FIRST W.R.A.A.F. TRAINING COURSES.—The first trainees for the Women's Royal Australian Air Force have arrived at Laverton, Victoria and Richmond, New South Wales, for a four weeks' training course.

NEW ZEALAND

RE-EQUIPMENT OF R.N.Z.A.F.

It has been announced that a number of Handley Page Hastings C.Mk.3s have been ordered for the re-equipment of the R.N.Z.A.F., and the first deliveries are expected at the end of this year. It was also reported that the first De Havilland Vampire had arrived in New Zealand at the beginning of February, and that seventeen other Vampires were to follow.

FOREIGN

CHILE

CHILEAN AIR BASES IN ANTARCTIC

Sir Bertram Jerram, the British Ambassador in Santiago, has protested to the Chilean Foreign Ministry against the recent establishment of a third Chilean base in the British Antarctic, situated at Paradise Bay, and garrisoned by the Chilean Air Force.

IRAQ

TRAINING WITH THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

Two R.A.F. squadrons, one of Vampire jet fighters and one of Brigand light bombers, based in the Middle East, recently completed a four weeks' training programme at the R.A.F. Station, Habbaniya, in which a fighter squadron of the Royal Iraqi Air Force also took part. During the training period the three squadrons worked in close co-operation.

ITALY

RE-EQUIPMENT OF SQUADRONS

Air Marshal Urbani, Chief of Air Staff, recently stated that a large part of Italy's military equipment had now been replaced thanks to Allied aid, and that the first squadrons using jet aircraft were already in training.

SWITZERLAND

Manufacture of Venom Jets

The Swiss Parliament has voted a credit for 150 De Havilland Venom jet fighters for the Swiss Air Force. They are to be built under licence in Switzerland.

TURKEY

Evacuation of Wounded

The Air Ministry has received a message of appreciation from the Turkish Government for the assistance rendered by the R.A.F. in evacuating wounded Turkish soldiers from Korea.

UNITED STATES

U.S. Air Bases in Morocco

Under an agreement signed between France and the United States, the United States Air Force is to share five air bases in the French Protectorate of Morocco with the French Air Force. The bases are due to be completed in July.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL

Empire of the North Atlantic. By Gerald S. Graham. (Toronto University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege.) 35s.

In his book *Empire of the North Atlantic*, Professor Graham, who is Rhodes Professor of Imperial History in the University of London, is primarily concerned with the struggle between Spain, France, Holland and England for colonial empire in North America and the part played in it by sea power.

It is a remarkable book which should be of the greatest interest to those who study Imperial affairs and should be added to every reference library.

The main part of the work is devoted to the three hundred years which ended in 1812. In this the author is not so concerned with the influence of sea power in its wider or global aspect as with the effects resulting from the constantly changing command of the sea in the North Atlantic. Many of the original colonial settlements were founded by private venture, but all were dependent on sea communications which not only linked them to the countries from which they sprang but with each other. Professor Graham does not always connect the impact of world affairs with the failure of the mother countries to send aid to their struggling colonists in their hour of need.

But the interrelation of sea fighting, seaborne expeditions and land warfare on and along the coast line under review is graphically told, and herein lies the great value of his work. In effect and in this part of his book, he attempts to expand in detail some of the ground covered by Mahan in his classic work.

The last two chapters deal with "The Age of Iron and Steam" and with the "End of Pax Britannica" and bring the story up to date. International warfare in this sphere has ceased. Canada has emerged as one of the great Dominions. The United States has completed its internal expansion and has become engrossed in world affairs. The stage is set for the consideration of sea power in its widest sense in relation to the future of Canada. If more controversial, these chapters are of absorbing interest and hold lessons for us all.

In such a scholarly work it would appear strange that the author should start with the misconception that "Contrary to the general belief the Englishman has no deep rooted tradition of the sea." In his opinion the best seamen came from Scandinavia and Brittany, and such ultimate success as the English won at sea was due to the policy followed by their Government. In this he expresses a contrary view to Mahan who wisely points out that the actions of statesmen might modify but not create the impulses which originated and maintained the maritime activity of the British people.

A full list of sources is given, but like so many of the modern transatlantic histories the additional referencing in the text is rather overdone. This may well benefit the student but tends to madden the lay reader. It is a pity that no general map is included showing the relative positions of the various harbours and colonies referred to in this very long coast line.

The Road to Pearl Harbor. By Herbert Feis. (Princeton University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege.) 32s. 6d.

Mr. Feis has made an exhaustive study of all available sources in this description of the Japanese path to war. They include the published State documents of the United States, captured German, Italian, and Japanese archives, memoirs, private diaries both American and Japanese, intercepted and decoded signals—the "Magic" series—and oral and written testimony produced at the various post-war trials of war criminals. It is an imposing array, and the author of this intriguing book has plotted a course through the mass of evidence that brings him to what must be a reasoned and dispassionate view of one aspect of current international history.

Inevitably, as in all history, there must be some surmise. One cannot know all the intimate thoughts of all the people concerned, even when the main outline is as well-documented as it is here. One wonders, for instance, exactly what lay beyond Cordell Hull's long resistance over the question of the Japanese trade embargoes. Was it purely a fear of goading Japan into a war for which the United States was not yet ready, or was it a belief, always attributed to Mr. Hull, that fair and honest trade was the only real basis of peace? Or was it a hope that the Japanese people would tire of the endless war in China and that calmer ideas, fostered by this dangerous trade, would ultimately prevail? We shall never know. Perhaps Mr. Feis has come nearest to finding the answer through his long study of the documentary side. Yet, whatever the real answer, it must remain for ever as an unhappy enigma of the United States foreign policy at this period. One cannot easily forget the feelings of frustration and wonderment at the continued export to Japan from American ports of the vast quantities of aviation spirit and scrap steel during the Japanese attack on China and the subsequent threat to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.

The picture which the author draws of Japanese diplomacy is a fascinating one. It was so childish and cunning, a policy of promising one thing to allies (Germany and Italy), of proposing something entirely different to potential enemies (United States and Great Britain), and of planning and carrying out a course of action totally opposed to both, with a wild wriggling at the end to escape from the nets of their own weaving. Here, in the cold light of print, is laid bare the tortuous Oriental mind.

So the story unfolds to its dramatic climax. We see the two Japanese envoys in the United States, Nomura and Kurusu, struggling to keep the secret as the sands were running out. We see them trying to make something palatable for American ears out of the incredible plots and plans being hatched in Tokyo. We see, even, one Japanese fleet steering South and East to a secret rendezvous within bombing range of Pearl Harbour, another steering South and West to Kota Bharu, in Malaya, while Nomura and Kurusu talk peace to Cordell Hull. They were talking it still as Japanese troops poured ashore in British Malaya and as American battleships turned over after being hit by Japanese bombs and began to settle in the sands of Pearl Harbour.

Here is a book that makes a notable contribution to the history of the Japanese War. It is so well documented throughout that it must take its place as one of the recognized source books for any student of the diplomatic scene of the period. But it is more than that. It is worth reading for itself alone, for it contains all the elements that make a book of absorbing interest—a brilliant analysis of the course of events, a deft handling of the vast canvas on which the overall picture is painted, and a mounting sense of tension and drama as the grim story plays itself out to its inevitable end.

Greek Resistance Army. By General Stefanos Sarafis. (Birch Books, Ltd.) 5s.

This is not the whole story of the Greek guerilla forces during the Axis occupation, but of what was known as ELAS, "The Greek People's Liberation Army," organized by the Left Wing resistance movement called EAM. The author was Commander-in-Chief of ELAS, and the translation, abridged from the original in that it does not reproduce certain documents and communiqués, is by Marion Pascoe.

General Sarafis (or Saraphis) is a soldier, not a politician; but he is anti-monarchist and republican, "an obstinate republican idealist," who suffered for his faith both before and after the 1939–45 War, as is recorded here by Compton Mackenzie in a preliminary note. The book is described as a "coldly factual account," but it is written by one who always distrusted British and Allied policy and believed that the Greek people could only regain their liberty by the triumph of his party which was really Communist in character. Naturally he has nothing good to say of Metaxas the dictator, and blames him for allowing Greece to enter upon the War with Italy in a state of unpreparedness. Even the conduct of the Albanian campaign is severely criticized. Before this time, of course, the author and other officers of the same political faith had been expelled from the Army.

ELAS was something more than a horde of loosely organized guerilla bands subject to local command and control. Here it is presented as a well-disciplined army with communications and supply services maintained over a large area, a Commander-in-Chief and a G.H.Q. planning and directing operations. During the resistance it is claimed that the conduct of ELAS was invariably " correct " whether in warring against rival Greek factions—principally EDES, the national guerilla movement of the Right Wing which enjoyed British confidence and support—fighting the occupation forces, or treating with the officers of the British Military Mission who were striving to carry out the policy of G.H.Q., Middle East. The Greek people, not only in EAM's sphere of influence but also in other parts of the country, are mostly portrayed as devoted to the cause and ready to sacrifice everything for it.

We are given quite a fresh and very plausible view of the manner in which the Italian Pinerolo Division surrendered, and of the " clashes " in December, 1944, after the liberation, when British troops were opposed to ELAS. At this time it appears that General Sarafis expressed to General Scobie, commanding the British forces, his resentment at British policy which sought to impose upon the Greek people " a government which did not enjoy their confidence, a government appointed by a conniving king."

The military achievements of ELAS are presented throughout in a better light than that in which they appeared to British observers at the time. Figures show that ELAS was by far the biggest guerilla force in Greece ; casualties are contrasted with the far heavier losses inflicted upon Germans, Italians and Bulgarians ; the chief destructive and sabotage operations that were carried out are specified ; and a list is given of the principal items of booty which accrued from encounters with the Axis forces.

The Endless Years. By John T. Barnard. (Chantry Publications.) 8s. 6d.

Captain Barnard, captured at the surrender of Singapore, in February, 1942, kept a diary of his experiences as a prisoner-of-war of the Japanese until about six months before the Japanese collapse in 1945. During these last six months the penalties for being caught in possession of a diary were so brutal that Captain Barnard gave up the practice and buried in a tin what he had already written. The story of the last few months were written after liberation, although while still in a prisoner-of-war camp in Thailand.

It is this diary which now forms his book. As a result it is an authentic record, written at the time, of nearly three and a half years as a prisoner-of-war. Memory plays little part in this recital of an unhappy experience, a fact which makes it a much more valuable document on Japanese behaviour and on their methods of treating their prisoners-of-war. Memory is a fickle thing at best, and when applied to an emotional and distressing period, no matter how soon after the event, is apt to paint up the highlights in colours that are false.

Captain Barnard was one of those who were employed on the building of the Bangkok-Moulmein Railway, sometimes known as the Railway of Death. The full toll in human life of that single track line through the jungle has never yet been fully determined, but it ran into tens of thousands. This stark book does something to explain the causes of that terrible death roll. It has much to tell, too, of the brutality with which prisoners-of-war were treated, of the savage punishments meted out for minor offences, of the wanton inhumanity of Japanese and Korean guards towards anyone against whom they had fostered a grudge. There are descriptions of the appalling conditions under which men lived, of the paltry and unhealthy camps, of the lack of medical stores and facilities, of the incidence of dysentery, cholera, and malaria.

But there is another side to the story and, although Captain Barnard's book does not bring it out in any way, it is easy enough to discover it between the lines of this bare narrative. Although prisoners-of-war, and subject to every conceivable indignity and barbarity, the men yet remained soldiers and kept their courage and discipline high throughout. The strain was terrific, yet the qualities of good humour and native dignity never once faltered or deteriorated into any lack of morale. All was accepted with that typical fortitude so characteristic of the British and Dominion soldier.

This is a book that makes, by its very modesty, a great impression on the reader. Though it tells in the main of captivity, of ill health, of hardship, of barbarity, it yet shines with an inner light that, while not mitigating the horrors, shows that courage and discipline can still rise superior to every adversity. It is a plain tale, unvarnished and laconic. Therein lies its true value as a human document and as a contemporary piece of history of one aspect of the War which is often forgotten in the clash and action of other theatres.

Letters from America, 1773-1780. Edited by Eric Robson, M.A. (Manchester University Press.) 12s. 6d.

Personal letters from a young soldier to his sister, written nearly two hundred years ago, have a possible interest for at least four types of reader today—i.e., soldiers, historians, students of ancient social conditions, and those who are intrigued by the gradual evolution of the English language and its spelling.

The soldier will find in these letters of Captain Sir James Murray clear examples of certain unchanging principles of war—e.g., the worthlessness of a fighting force that loses its " morale " and the factors which can bring about such a loss. From those of the twenty-four letters which cover the American War of Independence he can read, as in a Greek tragedy, the fatal descent of the originally proud British forces, who landed in America with a preconceived contempt for the " rebels," until they became a querulous crowd of individualists, doubting the justice of their own cause, bitterly (and justly) critical of their own military administration, lacking any confidence in their own commanders, and burning under the humiliation of unnecessary defeats. He will read also of the disgust felt by the hide-bound regular soldier for the " unsporting " guerrilla, who would persist in sniping from the unfair cover of hedges, ditches, and well-dug entrenchments. He will find, particularly in the account of the disastrous attack on Charleston, examples of the danger of faulty topographical intelligence and the pitfalls of combined operations without adequate previous combined training and reconnaissance. He will find also proof of the cheerful cynicism of the British front-line soldier, which long survived the ineptitude of the commanders and staff, but eventually succumbed.

The historian will find here something from the British side of the struggle to corroborate or correct the wealth of information already published in the form of letters from American combatants.

Interesting insight into such matters as purchase of commissions or the peace-time Continental touring of 1773, and many other items of social life of that day, are to be found throughout the letters. It is intriguing to read how, in the midst of this war, a young officer had time to write abstruse mathematical calculations on the pros and cons of buying his promotion in this or that regiment!

For grammarians and spelling reformers there is much food for study. It is hard to guess whether " G.B.S." would have been strengthened in his zeal to reform English spelling, if he had read these letters, or would he have given up the whole idea in despair? Incidentally, in letter (5) is the earliest reference (1773) to the " British Empire " that I have ever come across.

Altogether a well-edited collection of most readable letters, profusely annotated, and provided with an interesting and informative introduction, a complete list of authorities consulted, and a useful index. Well worth reading.

The History of the Royal Cornwall Yacht Club, 1871-1949. By Lieut.-Colonel C. J. H. Mead. (Underhill (Plymouth), Ltd., Regent Street, Plymouth.) 15s. 6d.

This book is the story of a Yacht Club which came to life at Falmouth in 1871, when Mr. W. H. Lean, the Mayor, addressed a memorial to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales begging him to become patron of a proposed club. The Prince consented, and a meeting was held at which it was decided that the club should be called the Royal Cornwall Yacht Club, ranking in precedence with the Royal Cinque Ports and Royal Corinthian as the fifteenth " Royal " club in England.

To yachtsmen as a whole, and to Cornishmen and people of Falmouth in particular, the author has offered a year to year account of the progress, development, temporary decline, and subsequent renaissance of this club in great detail and with meticulous care for his facts. With plans to aid his descriptions of the club premises, which were frequently being altered and improved, the author holds the attention of his reader throughout the story. By 1873, it had become advisable to move out of accommodation in the Falmouth Hotel into two rooms in the Green Bank Hotel, overlooking the harbour, and thence, in 1883, to Green Bank House, where the largely rebuilt premises stand to-day.

A book of this nature must necessarily repeat from year to year lists of competing yachts with their owners' names, as well as give references to the state of finances which allow for development in this type of club. The author has been aware of the boredom that such repetition is liable to induce, yet he has managed nevertheless to entertain the reader with amusing and attractive references and facts as he goes along.

From earliest days the R.C.Y.C. maintained a warm liaison with the Royal Navy at Falmouth, conforming with the ceremony of Colours and Sunset until, several years on, the club preferred its own calculations as regards the time of Sunset!

The period between the Wars makes excellent reading and describes flourishing days for the club. By 1926 the big yachts of the " J " class were competing at the annual regattas, and this was to continue until they made their last appearance at Falmouth in 1936.

This account of the R.C.Y.C. is a most engaging one, though it will appeal mainly to a restricted section of the community interested in yachting matters, both past and present. It also contains a wealth of experience which will serve as a useful guide to those administering yacht clubs to-day. It is a pity that records do not exist of what took place during the actual races of days gone by, but with the data available Lieut-Colonel Mead has made a useful contribution to sailing history as a whole. It is an attractive book full of good stuff.

NAVAL

History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. VI : Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July, 1942—1 May, 1944. By Samuel Eliot Morison. (Oxford University Press.) 42s.

The Breaking of the Bismarcks Barrier is both the title and theme of this volume of Captain Morison's History of the United States Naval Operations in the 1939–45 War. The book, which is dedicated to the memory of Admiral Theodore Stark Wilkinson, U.S.N., opens with three quotations of which the first *Fas est et ab hoste doceri*—It is right to be taught even by an enemy—is perhaps the most apt.

The new volume carries forward the story of the War in the Pacific from July, 1942, to the annexing of the Admiralties in May, 1944, and is divided into four parts and twenty-six chapters. Part One deals with the Papuan Campaign but opens with the strategic planning that went on in Washington in 1943. The Allies had won their first success in the West, the invasion of North Africa, in November, 1942. In the East the Japanese spear-head had been blunted at Midway and broken at Guadalcanal, and the time had come for long range plans for victory, though the fundamental Allied strategic concept, that of beating the European Axis first, remained the paramount consideration. At the Casablanca Conference, in January, 1943, King and Marshall agreed that Germany was Enemy Number One, but said bluntly that, unless the United States could retain the initiative against Japan, a situation might arise which would necessitate American withdrawal from Europe. With this view the British Chiefs of Staff agreed in principle.

After the Conference the problem of detailed strategic planning in the Pacific was thrown back to Washington and in May, 1943, while Halsey was preparing to move into the Central Solomons and MacArthur into the Trobriand Islands, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were charting roads to Tokyo which proved impossible to follow. A long, bitter

struggle to breach and break the Bismarcks Barrier lay ahead. The author deals briefly with the holding of the Papuan peninsula from May to September, 1942; and with the naval aspects of the Buna-Gona Campaign, "the toughest fighting in the world," which lasted from September, 1942, to January, 1943. The loss of Buna-Gona occurred almost simultaneously with the loss of Guadalcanal and warned the Japanese that the War had entered a new and, for them, unsatisfactory stage. Except, however, for a decision to step up air bombing they did little and were apparently content to wait for the Allies to take the initiative. The author gives a clear objective account of the battle of the Bismarck Sea during which a Japanese convoy of eight transports and eight destroyers carrying nearly 7,000 troops to Lae, in New Guinea, was annihilated in March, 1943, with the loss of all the transports, four of the destroyers and more than 3,000 men, at a cost of only five of the 335 American aircraft engaged. News of the battle greatly shocked the Japanese, but MacArthur was too wise to regard it as a clue to easy victory by air power alone. An interesting account of the activities of the American South-West Pacific submarines between February, 1943, and May, 1944, brings Part One to an end.

Part Two deals at some length with the preparations for the offensive and turns from MacArthur to Halsey's South Pacific Fleet in the Solomons. During the Guadalcanal Campaign the Japanese had used the Russell Islands as a staging point for barge traffic and in February, 1943, several thousand enemy troops were harboured there. On the 7th, Halsey ordered Admiral Turner to land 9,000 men on the Islands. Turner's first convoy had to beat off a heavy Japanese air attack two weeks later, but the actual landings on the Russells were made unopposed and the 9,000 men had been put ashore within a few days. The enemy, however, ignorant of what had been going on, made no air attack on the Russells till 6th March. The book goes on to describe Fleet Admiral Yamamoto's last offensive in the Solomons and New Guinea, which did little more than delay American plans ten days and ended in the death of the Admiral and several members of his staff, who were shot down in two bombers on 18th April. After covering the invasion of New Georgia, Morison describes the indecisive night battles of Kula Gulf in June and Kolombangara in July, in which each side found consolation for its own losses in imaginary damage inflicted on the other. Part Two also includes details of the last stages of the New Georgia Campaign from July to September, 1943, and of the battle of Vella Lavella, fought on 6th–7th October which, though won by the Japanese, left the Americans with the firm conviction of ultimate victory. The enemy knew the last of Central Solomons was being lost; the Americans that they were winning the war, even if they lost an occasional ship.

Part Three, which covers the Bougainville Campaign, contains a graphic description of the battle of Empress Augusta Bay, which ended in an American victory on 2nd November, 1943, for the superior Japanese force could achieve only five shell hits on the "Denver" one on the "Spence" and a torpedo hit on the "Foote." Omori, the Japanese admiral, reported sinking several non-existent heavy cruisers but failed to attack a single American transport. So the campaign went steadily ahead and by Christmas, 1943, a great day in Bougainville history, the doom of Rabaul was sealed. The conquest of the Bougainville perimeter had been a mighty effort and had given command of the Solomon Sea to the Allies. The time had come to throw a military chain around the entire Bismarck Archipelago.

Part Four describes the final breaking of the Bismarcks Barrier. In the autumn of 1943, the Barrier was still intact and all waters north and west of it were still under Japanese control. After the Bougainville Campaign the next operation, "to throw rings round Rabaul," was the occupation of the Admiralty Islands. It was a brilliant success. On 25th March, 1944, all organized enemy resistance on Manus Island ceased and, by mid-1944, Seeadler Harbour, Lorengau and Moakareng—collectively known to the Allied forces as Manus—had become valuable naval and air bases for staging the landings in Palau and Leyte. "Thus for the neutralized but virtually impregnable Fortress Rabaul," ends Morison, "the Allies substituted a better base behind the Bismarcks Barrier, more

useful to the Allies and dangerous to the enemy. Algernon Sidney's motto, *Manus haec inimica tyrannis*—This hand, enemy to tyrants,—applied to a Manus that he never knew; for Manus in the Admiralties proved to be one of those air and naval bases whose possession by the Allies rendered the defeat of Japan inevitable."

Although the author is inclined to indulge in heroics, his new book may be regarded as one of his best. Like its predecessors, it is well illustrated with charts and photographs and has a good index. In short the standard which readers have been led to expect has been well maintained by the author in this his latest volume.

ARMY

Ball of Fire. By Antony Brett-James. (Gale and Polden, Ltd.) 25s.

Few divisions of the Commonwealth Armies covered more ground or were more continuously engaged in action during the 1939–45 War than the Fifth Indian Division. Its formation sign was a " ball of fire," and this is its story. In the author's own words it is " the story less of a military formation of tactical importance than of some thousands of British and Indian soldiers who fought against three strong and different enemies across the continents of Africa and Asia."

Formed out of the Deccan District on the outbreak of war, the Division first saw action in Eritrea in the autumn of 1940. It fought at Keren and defeated the remnants of the Italian Army at Amba Alagi in Abyssinia.

Transferred to the Western Desert in the spring of 1942, it fought desperately and with heavy losses in the battle of the Knightsbridge ' Cauldron ' and the subsequent withdrawal to the El Alamein Line.

Returning to India in June, 1942, a brief period of reorganization and training was followed by the Arakan, Kohima, Imphal, and the subsequent advance into Burma via the Tiddim Road. It was the first division to land at Singapore after the defeat of Japan, and later saw its final action in Java, whence it returned to India in 1946.

In compiling this History, Antony Brett-James has meticulously drawn information from a mass of official and private sources including some 80 former members of the Division. Much of the narrative is understandably taken up by detailed accounts of the parts played by formations, units, and sub-units in the various battles in which the Division took part.

These accounts will doubtless be read with great interest by those who took part in the events described, but it seems a pity that a wider circle of readers should not be allowed to share that interest for lack of more detailed and conveniently arranged maps.

The author is at his best when describing the characters, idiosyncrasies, and sayings of the various commanders and staff officers, the daily lives and habits of the troops and the varied surroundings in which they fought, trained, and rested. The vivid pictures which he paints of life in the Western Desert and of the scenes and scenery of Cyprus, for example, attain a high literary standard.

This is Brett-James's second war book, and we hope to see more of his work in the future.

In a foreword Admiral Earl Mountbatten of Burma pays tribute to the Division which fought under his command for three years. The book is well illustrated with photographs. It is a useful addition to the series of divisional histories published since the War, and a worthy tribute to a famous Division and to the late Indian Army.

Signal Venture. By Brigadier L. H. Harris. (Gale and Polden, Ltd.) 18s. 0d.

From farm hand to senior executive engineer : from private to brigadier. Such might be the sub-title of this book. In a generation which fought in two World Wars, and in which, not uncommonly, some trivial incident or chance remark has changed an individual's destiny, the author's career is not unique. But how many similarly placed have attempted to chronicle the events which have framed their lives, and produced a satisfactory story ? Few indeed. Brigadier Harris is one of the few.

In the preface he states that his original intention was to tell the story of the planning and execution of the long distance communications for the invasion of North-West Europe. As Chief, Telecommunications Section, S.H.A.E.F., no one was better qualified to carry out this intention. Fortunately he changed his mind and widened the scope of this book to include his experiences as a youthful emigrant who served as a linesman in Australian Signals during the 1914-18 War, and his life as a Post Office telecommunications engineer and an officer of a Territorial R. Signals unit between the two Wars.

The result is a story of intense human interest, flavoured throughout with an admirable spice of wit and humour.

Essentially the book is a tale of the two World Wars as seen through the eyes of a private soldier in the 5th Australian Division in 1914-18, and of a senior R. Signals regimental and staff officer in 1939-45

Inevitably that part which covers the planning and execution of " Overlord " deals with the technical communications problems involved, but the technicalities are reduced to the simplest terms.

To those who are old enough to remember the blood and mud battles of the Somme, Ypres, and Passchendale, the author's description of life in those years will recall vivid memories of death, discomfort and good companions. To the younger generation it will unfold the full tale of sacrifice. " Within four weeks of disembarkation far more than half the men of the Division were dead, wounded, or missing."

Of life in the Territorial Army between the Wars Brigadier Harris records some amusing anecdotes, whilst omitting mention of the sacrifice of leisure and drudgery entailed. He records his opinion that " It was a pretty rag-time army, but I believe the main object was achieved, that is, the availability of a partly trained body of well-spirited men whose names and abilities were known and who were willing to go anywhere and put up with most things as long as they could be together." For this masterpiece of understatement he may, as one of them, be forgiven.

The invasion of France found the author as second-in-command of the 44th Divisional Signals. His description of the retreat and evacuation from Dunkirk provides one of the best individual accounts of that episode yet recorded. On his return to England he was posted to G.H.Q., Home Forces, and of this period and the subsequent planning for " Overlord " he records, albeit modestly, the tremendous part played by the Post Office Engineering staff in providing the necessary communications for defence against invasion and subsequently for D. Day.

The book is well illustrated. It must be read by all Signals officers as part of their education. It will be read by many others with pleasure and profit.

Fortress Tobruk. By Jan Yindrich. (Ernest Benn, Ltd.) 8s. 6d.

Tobruk was not a fortress according to the usual meaning of the word ; neither, perhaps, should its investment by Axis forces in 1941 be called a siege, for the port remained open to the sea ; and it is certainly possible to put too high a value upon the successful defence of the place. But these are little matters which the official historians will doubtless adjust. Major-General Birks, who was ordered into Tobruk by General Wavell to join General Morshead as Senior British Staff Officer, introduces the volume as a story written by one with actual experience of the critical days of the defence. The author, a war correspondent, dedicates his book to the 7th Armoured Division, " The Desert Rats " with whom he was initiated into desert warfare.

This is not a continuous account of the defence of Tobruk regarded as a military operation, and the units of the 9th Australian Division are not identified with any precision; but there is a double-page sketch map showing the field works in considerable detail, supplemented by a general description of the country in the port area. The author presents his personal experiences and adventures in diary form, taking in, on a generous scale, the

plain unvarnished accounts of the fighting gathered from Australian soldiers, often hospital patients, and others. Among the latter is a British medical officer who, during the retreat, had made his way back to Tobruk through the Germans and Italians from a point East of Derna, on foot all the way.

The day by day record covers the period from 7th April, before the enemy arrived to invest the place, until 17th May when the author left by sea for Alexandria. This was more than three months before the relief of the Australians by British and Polish troops. It is easy to understand that, as time went on, it became more and more difficult to provide the United Press with suitable "stories." While in Tobruk Mr. Yindrich's personal experiences were largely concerned with the discomforts of living and the unpleasantness of being bombed and machine-gunned from the air, altogether a monotonous if hazardous mode of existence.

An epilogue presents the German point of view. It is supplied by von Ravenstein, who opens with some general remarks on tank tactics in the desert. He is of opinion that "siege" is not the word and prefers "blockade," but he calls Tobruk a "complete fortress." He points out that the Afrika Korps was an improvisation—not a force specially trained and equipped for desert warfare in Africa. In his Foreword General Birks says that it is a mystery to him why Rommel did not sweep on in April and capture Tobruk before its defences were organized. Here the German explanation is that Rommel was not strong enough to do so.

The photographs of scenes and personalities reproduce but indifferently well.

From Kent to Kohima. By Major E. B. Stanley Clarke and Major A. T. Tillott. (Gale and Polden, Ltd.) 21s.

This book contains the story of the 4th Battalion, The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment (T.A.) in the 1939-45 War.

The Battalion saw service in France and Belgium during the first part of the War and was present at Dunkirk. Subsequently, and still with the 132nd Infantry Brigade, 44th Division, it moved from England to Egypt via the Cape, and took part in operations in the Western Desert, including the opening stages of the Battle of Alamein.

Later in 1942, the Battalion was transferred to the 161st Infantry Brigade, 5th Indian Division, and, in 1943, went to Iraq and thence to India. Moving to the Arakan in the same year it played a notable part in operations in that area.

Flown from the Arakan to Dimapur at the end of March, 1944, the Battalion was prominent in the siege of Kohima and in the subsequent advance into Burma via the Tiddim Road, eventually reaching Rangoon.

The book contains some good illustrations, several useful maps and a number of appendices.

ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

(*Books for Reference in the Library only)

GENERAL

REPORT TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF BY THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER SOUTH-EAST ASIA, 1943–1945. By Vice-Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of Burma. Large post 4to. 280 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1951.) 17s. 6d.

*WORLD RAILWAYS 1950–51. Edited and complied by Henry Sampson. Foolscap folio. (Sampson Low, 1951.) 63s.

A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES. Volume I. The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. By Steven Runciman. Demy 8vo. 377 pages. (Cambridge University Press, 1951.) 25s.

EMPIRE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC. The Maritime Struggle for North America. By Gerald S. Graham. Medium 8vo. 338 pages. (University of Toronto Press, 1950.) 35s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)

*THE ROMANCE OF HERALDRY. By C. Wilfrid Scott-Giles. Crown 4to. 234 pages. (Dent, 1951.) 21s.

THE ANTARCTIC PROBLEM. An Historical and Political Study. By E. W. Hunter Christie. Medium 8vo. 336 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1951.) 25s.

THE BRITISH WEST INDIES. By W. L. Burn. Crown 8vo. 196 pages. (Hutchinson's University Library, 1951.) 7s. 6d.

CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION. A Study of Sino-Soviet Relations. By Aitchen K. Wu. Demy 8vo. 434 pages. (Methuen, 1950.) 25s.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE. By David H. James. Demy 8vo. 409 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1951.) 21s.

TIME OF FALLEN BLOSSOMS. By Allan S. Clifton. Crown 8vo. 204 pages. (Cassell, 1950.) 10s. 6d.

THE TRUTH ABOUT KOREA. By Robert T. Oliver. Large post 8vo. 178 pages. (Putnam, 1951.) 10s. 6d.

THE CURTAIN ISN'T IRON. By Joseph C. Harsch. Crown 8vo. 190 pages. (Putnam, 1950.) 8s. 6d.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE SOVIET UNION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. U.S. Government Committee on Foreign Affairs Report. Medium 8vo. 54 pages. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1950.)

HOW TO DEFEAT RUSSIA. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. Pamphlet. 16 pages. (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1951.) 1s.

THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR. The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan. By Herbert Feis. Medium 8vo. 356 pages. (Princeton University Press, 1950.) 32s. 6d. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)

OUR FOREIGN POLICY. (U.S.A.) Crown 8vo. 100 pages. (Department of State, Washington, 1950.)

LETTERS FROM AMERICA 1773–1780. Edited by Eric Robson. (Manchester University Press.) Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)

RETURN FROM UTOPIA. By Richard Law. Demy 8vo. 206 pages. (Faber, 1950.) 12s. 6d.

GLOBAL MISSION. By General H. H. Arnold. Medium 8vo. 276 pages. (Hutchinson, 1951.) 21s.

GOERING. By Willi Frischauer. Large post 8vo. 303 pages. (Odhams Press, 1951.) 12s. 6d.

THE RIDDLE OF MACARTHUR. Japan, Korea and the Far East. By John Gunther. Demy 8vo. 219 pages. (Hamish Hamilton, 1951.) 12s. 6d.

THE LIFE, WORK AND INFLUENCE OF WILLIAM HENRY GILES KINGSTON. By the Rev. Maurice Rooke Kingsford. Medium 8vo. 220 pages. (Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1947.) Presented by the Author.

HITLER'S INTERPRETER. By Dr. Paul Schmidt. Demy 8vo. 286 pages. (Heinemann, 1951.) 15s.

HITLER DIRECTS HIS WAR. The Secret Records of his Daily Military Conferences. Selected and annotated by Felix Gilbert. Large post 8vo. 187 pages. (Oxford University Press, 1950.) 20s.

GREEK RESISTANCE ARMY. By Stefanos Sarafis. (Birch Books Limited.) 5s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL).

TEN DAYS TO DIE. By Michael A. Musmanno. Large post 8vo. 310 pages. (Peter Davies, 1951.) 12s. 6d.

THE GREAT ESCAPE. By Paul Brickhill. Large post 8vo. 263 pages. (Faber, 1951.) 10s. 6d.

THE TUNNEL. By Eric Williams. Large post 8vo. 255 pages. (Collins, 1951.) 10s. 6d.

THE LONG WALK HOME. An Escape Through Italy. By Peter Medd. Completed by his companion Frank Simms. Large post 8vo. 176 pages. (John Lehmann, 1951.) 10s. 6d.

AND SOME FELL BY THE WAYSIDE. An Account of the North Burma Evacuation. By A. R. Tainsh. Demy 8vo. 175 pages. (Orient Longmans, India, 1948.) 15s.

BY EASTERN WINDOWS. The Story of a Battle of Souls and Minds in the Prison Camps of Sumatra. By William H. McDougall, Jr. Large post 8vo. 343 pages. (Arthur Barker, 1951.) 12s. 6d.

THE ENDLESS YEARS. A personal record of a British officer as a prisoner-of-war in Japanese hands, from the fall of Singapore to his liberation. Written during his captivity. By Captain John T. Barnard. Demy 8vo. 160 pages. (Chantry Publications, 1950.) 8s. 6d. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)

I CAME BACK. By Krystyna Zywulska. Large post 8vo. 246 pages. (Dennis Dobson, 1951.) 12s. 6d.

WARRIOR WITHOUT WEAPONS. By Marcel Junod. Large post 8vo. 318 pages. (Cape, 1951.) 12s. 6d.

TO THE VICTORS THE SPOILS. By Colin MacInnes. Large post 8vo. 350 pages. (MacGibbon and Kee, 1950.) 12s. 6d.

I BELIEVED. The Autobiography of a former British Communist. By Douglas Hyde. Large post 8vo. 303 pages. (Heinemann, 1950.) 10s. 6d.

THE WORLD REBUILT. The True Story of Frank Buchman and the men and women of Moral Re-Armament. By Peter Howard. Crown 8vo. 232 pages. (Blandford Press, 1951.) 2s. 6d.

CRUISING UNDER SAIL. By Eric C. Hiscock. Medium 8vo. 480 pages. (Oxford University Press, 1950.) 42s.

DOWN TOPS'L. The Story of the East Coast Sailing-Barges. By Hervey Benham. Demy 8vo. 192 pages. (Harrap, 1951.) 12s. 6d.

IANTHE CRUISES. Ushant—Gironde. By H. J. Hanson. Demy 8vo. 248 pages. (MacGibbon and Kee, 1950.) 25s.

MASTER IN SAIL. By Captain James S. Learmont. Demy 8vo. 222 pages. (Percival Marshall, 1950.) 12s. 6d.

KON-TIKI AND I. By Erik Hesselberg. Medium 4to. 76 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1950.) 9s. 6d.

THE MARINE SOCIETY. A Catalogue of the Pictures, and other Works of Art, at the Society's Offices. By Lieutenant Henry T. A. Bosanquet, R.N. Medium 4to. 35 pages. (Published privately, 1905.) Presented by the Author.

THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL CORNWALL YACHT CLUB 1871–1949. Including a contemporary account of the Falmouth Sailing Club and items of interest concerning yachting in general. By Lieut.-Colonel C. J. H. Mead. Crown 8vo. 235 pages. (Underhill (Plymouth) Ltd., 1951.) Presented by the Author. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)

CHANTIER ET ATELIERS DE SAINT-NAZAIRE (PENHOËT) 1900–1950. Medium 4to. 78 pages. (Published privately, 1950.) Presented by La Société des Chantier et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire.

THE CONSUL AT SUNSET. By Gerald Hanley. Large post 8vo. 254 pages. (Collins, 1951.) 9s. 6d.

NAVAL

A SAILOR'S ODYSSEY. By Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope. Medium 8vo. 715 pages. (Hutchinson, 1951.) 21s.

NINE VANGUARDS. By Lieutenant-Commander P. K. Kemp, R.N. Medium 8vo. 236 pages. (Hutchinson, 1951.) 18s.

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II. Volume VI. BREAKING THE BISMARCKS BARRIER. 22 July, 1942–1 May, 1944. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Medium 8vo. 463 pages. (Oxford University Press, 1950.) 42s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)

SAIPAN. The Beginning of the End. By Major Carl W. Hoffman, U.S.M.C. Crown 4to. 285 pages. (Historical Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1950.) Presented by the Publishers.

SUBMARINERS. By James Casing. Crown 8vo. 183 pages. (Macmillan, 1951.) 9s. 6d.

ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE. NAVIGATION, MAGNETISM AND DEVIATION OF THE COMPASS. A Manual for the use of Aerial Navigators. By Commander H.T.A. Bosanquet, R.N. and Lieutenant-Commander G. R. C. Campbell, R.N. Medium 8vo. 98 pages. (Air Department, Admiralty, 1917.) Presented by Captain H.T.A. Bosanquet, C.V.O.

THE KEITH PAPERS. Volume II. Edited by Christopher Lloyd. Medium 8vo. 422 pages. (Navy Records Society, 1950.)

ARMY

OUTLINE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY 1716–1950. By Lieut.-Colonel M. E. S. Laws. Pamphlet. 20 pages. (R.A. Institution, 1950.) 6d. Presented by the Author.

*FROM KENT TO KOHIMA. Being the History of The 4th Battalion The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment (T.A.) 1939–1947. By Major E. B. Stanley Clarke and Major A. T. Tillott. Demy 8vo. 259 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1951.) 21s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)

*HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ULSTER RIFLES. Volume III. By Charles Graves. (Royal Ulster Rifles Regimental Committee.) Presented by the Colonel of the Regiment and the Regimental Committee.

*SIGNAL VENTURE. By Brigadier L. H. Harris. (Gale and Polden.) 18s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL).

BALL OF FIRE. The Fifth Indian Division in the Second World War. By Antony Brett-James. Demy 8vo. 481 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1951.) 25s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)

*RECORD OF THE CEYLON MOUNTED RIFLES 1892–1938. Foolscap folio. 22 pages. (Typescript, 1950.) Presented by Mrs. E. Thomas.

GOOD-BYE TO BOOT AND SADDLE, or, The Tragic Passing of British Cavalry. By Lieut.-Colonel The Hon. E. G. French. Medium 8vo. 283 pages. (Hutchinson, 1951.) 21s.

FORTRESS TOBRUK. By Jan Yindrich. Crown 8vo. 214 pages. (Benn, 1951.) 8s. 6d. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL).

SUNBEAMS LIKE SWORDS. By W. F. Jeffrey. Demy 8vo. 176 pages. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1950.) 10s. 6d.

A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY SCIENCE, which comprehends the Grand Operations of War, and General Rules for conducting an Army in the Field, etc. By Thomas Simes. Medium 4to. 328 pages. (H. Reynell, 1780.) Presented by Mrs. H. S. Bowlby.

*HISTORY WRITTEN WITH PICK AND SHOVEL. Military Buttons, Belt-Plates, Badges, and other Relics Excavated from Colonial, Revolutionary, and War of 1812 Camp Sites. By William Louis Claver and Reginald Pelham Bolton. Medium 8vo. 320 pages. (New-York Historical Society, 1950.) 30s.

A MEMOIR OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR R. R. GILLESPIE, K.C.B. Demy 8vo. 256 pages. (T. Egerton, 1816.) Presented by The Royal Norfolk Regiment Association.

COLONEL OF DRAGOONS. By Philip Woodruff. Large post 8vo. 320 pages. (Cape, 1951.) 12s. 6d. Presented by Captain J. C. Ledward.

ONE HUNDRED-AND-TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY MEETING

TUESDAY, 6TH MARCH, 1951, at 3 p.m.

MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE LORD NEWALL, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., C.B.E., A.M., presiding

THE SECRETARY (LIEUT.-COLONEL P. S. M. WILKINSON) read the notice which had appeared in *The Times* of 20th February, 1951, convening the Meeting.

ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1950

COUNCIL

VICE-PRESIDENTS

The Council, with much regret, have to record the death of Field-Marshal The Earl Wavell, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., C.M.G., M.C.

Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., LL.D. was elected a Vice-President in this vacancy.

Admiral Sir Charles J. C. Little, G.C.B., G.B.E., was elected a Vice-President of the Institution in the vacancy caused by the resignation of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, P.C., G.C.B., O.M., K.C.M.G., C.V.O.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward Ellington, G.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., was elected for a further term as a Vice-President.

ELECTED MEMBERS

General The Lord Ismay, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O., M.C., was elected a Member of the Council in the vacancy caused by the resignation of General Sir Evelyn Barker, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O., was elected a Member of the Council in the vacancy caused by the election of Admiral Sir Charles Little as a Vice-President.

Lieut.-General Sir Gerald Templer, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., was elected a Member of the Council in the vacancy caused by the election of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck as a Vice-President.

The following Members, having completed three years service, retire, but have offered themselves for re-election, for which they are eligible :—

Royal Navy—
Admiral Sir Henry Moore, G.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.
Regular Army—
Major-General L. O. Lyne, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.
Territorial Army—
Lieut.-Colonel R. D. Judd, D.S.O., M.C.
Royal Auxiliary Air Force and Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve—
Air Commodore F. Crerar, C.B.E.

REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS

Group Captain D. I. Coote, succeeded Air Commodore L. T. Pankhurst, C.B.E., as Air Ministry Representative on the Council.

The Council have been notified that the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Training) will in future be the Air Ministry Representative on the Council, instead of the Director of Staff Training. Air Vice-Marshal S. D. Macdonald, C.B.E., D.F.C., therefore succeeded Group Captain D. I. Coote in this capacity. Air Vice-Marshal T. N. McEvoy, C.B.E. subsequently succeeded Air Vice-Marshal S. D. Macdonald as Air Ministry Representative.

Ex-Officio Members

Admiral Sir Harold Kinahan, K.B.E., C.B., accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex-officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich.

Honorary Members

The Council noted with much regret the death of Field-Marshal The Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, O.M., C.H., who had been an Honorary Member of the Council since 1920.

STAFF

It is recorded with deep regret that the death occurred on 16th October, 1950 of Captain Edward Altham, C.B., R.N., who had been Secretary and Chief Executive Officer since 1927 and Editor since 1924.

The following appointments were made by the Council :—

Lieut.-Colonel P. S. M. Wilkinson as Secretary, Chief Executive Officer and Curator.

Major-General R. E. Vyvyan, C.B.E., M.C., as Editor and Museum Registrar.

Captain J. H. Laing as Assistant Executive Officer and Deputy Curator.

MEMBERSHIP

The total number of members on the roll at the end of 1950 was 6,263 as compared with 6,156 in 1949. During the year 345 Members joined the Institution as compared with 500 in 1949. The following shows comparative figures for the past five years :—

	Joined			*Re-*	*Deceased*		*Struck*	
Year	*Annual*	*Life*	*Total*	*signed*	*Annual*	*Life*	*off*	*Total*
1950 ...	289	56	345	126	41	50	21	238
1949 ...	397	103	500	185	58	64	57	364
1948 ...	449	128	577	270	44	29	35	378
1947 ...	407	276	683	390	63	31	36	520
1946 ...	433	163	596	135	56	46	24	261

The financial gain in membership for 1950 was 146 as compared with 193 in 1949.

The details of Members joining during the year 1950 are as follows :—

Regular Army	146
Royal Air Force	102
Royal Navy	38
Dominions Forces	24
Indian Forces	13
Royal Marines	5
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve	5
Indian Army (Former officers)	5
W.R.A.C.	2
Territorial Army	2
Royal Naval Reserve	1
Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve	1
Civil Functionary	1
	345

Covenanted Subscriptions

Attention is invited to the Revenue Account from which it will be seen how greatly Members who will covenant to pay their subscriptions for seven years can benefit the Institution.

By the end of 1950 there were 1,528 Annual Covenanted subscriptions as compared with 1,482 at the end of 1949; and 772 Covenanted Life subscriptions as compared with 747 in 1949.

FINANCE

The surplus of income over expenditure is £115 16s. 11d. as compared with the deficit in 1949 of £503 4s. 5d.

Comparisons of the principal items of Receipts and Expenditure are shown below:—

Receipts

	1950			1949		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Annual Subscriptions	5,850	7	6	5,790	16	4
Life Subscriptions (amount brought to credit)	1,961	17	0	1,848	0	0
Museum	2,527	4	0	2,597	17	6
Journal Sales	2,180	2	11	1,745	5	9
Journal Advertisements	399	18	8	395	7	1
Sales of Catalogues and Pamphlets ...	181	9	10	125	15	11

Life Subscriptions (brought to credit) represent £1 10s. 0d. from each Life Member whose payment has not yet been so expended. The balance, in each case, is held in the Life Subscription Fund. A further £1,500 of this Fund has been invested in 2½ per cent. Defence Bonds.

Museum.—When the Banqueting Hall was closed at the end of August, leaving only the Crypt as a source of revenue, it was estimated that the normal takings would drop by an average of £125 a month. After four months the total drop is £70, in spite of the admission fee being reduced to one shilling.

Journal Sales.—These continue to show a satisfactory increase, breaking all previous records.

Expenditure

	1950			1949		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Salaries	4,534	7	1	4,142	14	8
Wages and National Insurance	3,580	19	7	3,754	9	2
Journal Printing	3,583	17	2	3,457	3	2
Library—Purchase of Books	331	17	10	343	10	9
Binding	103	1	6	666	12	6
Fuel	190	17	2	209	7	0
Lighting and Electric Fires	496	1	6	446	10	4
General Repairs and Maintenance ...	1,815	4	7	2,972	4	3
Other Printing and Stationery	367	4	5	398	3	8
Museum Expenses	481	13	5	448	2	6

Salaries and Wages.—The increased salaries figure is accounted for by annual service increments and the transfer of the Assistant Curator from the Wages list to the Salaries list.

GENERAL REMARKS

A bequest of £250 received from the estate of the late Mrs. Evelyn Colquhoun has been devoted towards the purchase of a model of H.M.S. "Victory," the initial cost of which was £300, and for which there is a further estimate of £120 for partial re-rigging.

Two further bequests of £10 each were received from the estates of the late Mr. H. B. Cleghorn and the late Major A. F. Bowker. As the former was specifically left to the Library, it has been expended on the purchase of an illuminated Globe.

As will be seen in the Museum Report, a bust of Charles I has been erected over the entrance to the Banqueting House, with a new tablet. The work was carried out by the Ministry of Works, for a maximum estimate of £250. Ten guineas has been received from the Society of King Charles the Martyr as a donation towards the cost, and a further £25 has been promised by the London County Council.

The Minister of Works accompanied by Sir Eric de Normann and Sir Charles Mole visited the Banqueting House on 4th May 1950 and, as a consequence, a programme was agreed for redecorating the Hall and re-instating the Rubens Ceiling.

The decoration of the Interior of the Hall is the responsibility of the R.U.S.I. and the Council have accepted an estimate which is not to exceed £3,000. £1,500 of this sum has already been met out of this year's income.

JOURNAL

The popularity of the JOURNAL at home and abroad has continued to increase. The 336 new subscribers out-numbered those who failed to renew their subscriptions by 221. New subscribers included 84 from Australia, 63 from Pakistan, 41 from India and 37 from New Zealand.

Thanks are due to officers and others who, by the value of their contributions, have assisted in maintaining the high standard of the contents of the JOURNAL.

The review of World affairs under the title "The International Situation" has continued in each number during the year. Recently, the rapid changes in events have made it increasingly difficult to ensure that the contents of this article are reasonably up-to-date by the time the JOURNAL is published.

There has been a tendency for General Service Notes to lengthen at the expense of individual Service Notes. This has been caused by the inclusion in General Service Notes of items connected with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Western Union, and by the fact that reports regarding Dominions, Colonies and Foreign Nations, under existing emergency conditions, are concerned chiefly with the present and future state of their Forces as a whole.

The dispute in the printing trade occurred at an unfortunate time during the make-up of the November JOURNAL. The resultant delay necessitated a reduction in the size of this number, several contributions having to be held over, in order to avoid a possible overlap with the February issue.

The help given by Service Departments, Commandants of Staff Colleges, and by the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry Representatives on the Council in preparing the lecture programme, and in advising the Editor in many matters, is gratefully acknowledged.

LIBRARY

The Library has maintained its usefulness to Members and qualified Public research workers.

Accessions to the Library amounted to 461 new volumes and the number of books issued on loan during the year was 6,058. Comparative figures for 1949 were 505 and 6,046.

Close liaison continues to exist with the libraries of the Services Staff Colleges, the Joint Services Staff College, and the Imperial Defence College. The number of enquiries from Libraries and Institutions in the Dominions and U.S.A. has considerably increased.

The Regimental Records section of the regular Forces has been completely re-classified. The records of the Auxiliary Forces have been separated from the Regular and re-arranged separately under County headings.

Now that small-boat sailing has become so popular in the Services, a new section " Seamanship and Sailing " has been added. This includes personal accounts of coastal and ocean voyages, as well as books of advice and instruction.

MUSEUM

During 1950, 43,403 people paid for admission to the Museum; this included 11,857 children at half price. The figure for 1949 was 39,580 including 9,628 children. Free admission was given to 3,866 of H.M. Forces and to 2,361 Members' guests, pupils in school parties, Scouts and Cadets. In spite of the Museum being limited to the Crypt for the last four months of the year, the turnstile total exceeded that for 1949 by nearly 6,000.

The Banqueting Hall portion of the Museum has been closed since 1st September, for redecoration and the replacement of the Rubens panels in the ceiling. The painted panels have been restored under the direction of the Ministry of Works; six of them were in position by the end of the year and the remaining three will be replaced in January. The Ministry of Works is also supervising the redecoration of the Hall on behalf of the Institution and the closest co-operation exists between the two authorities. It is the Ministry's intention to replace the Victorian wrought-iron chandeliers by period Dutch candelabra, which will embellish the Hall by harmonizing the lighting fixtures with the architecture, It is anticipated that the Banqueting Hall will be available for its normal use by the end of April, when it will be re-opened to visitors. The portion of the Museum in the Crypt has remained open at a reduced entrance fee. A large new notice of the Museum has replaced the old and rather shabby one at the public entrance.

The Minister of Works, the Right Hon. R. R. Stokes, M.P., visited the Museum during May.

A life-sized lead bust of Charles I. has been set in an oval niche over the Public entrance to the Banqueting House, as being the nearest place to the site of the original window which led to the scaffold. A new bronze tablet has been placed under the bust and the old tablet under the centre window has been removed.

The Council decided not to hold a Special Exhibition during 1950, but to conserve our resources for 1951. Although the proposed Special Exhibition will be held during the Festival of Britain, the theme will be in conformity with the historic objects of the Institution.

During the year the Museum Committee disposed of 300 items which could be better displayed elsewhere; of these, 241 were sent to Service and Regimental Museums.

Certain exhibits were lent to the French Embassy for an exhibition held in August and September at Castres to commemorate the association of Field-Marshal The Earl Ligonier with that town.

Among the valuable and historically interesting gifts received during the year were a coatee, 2 pairs of epaulettes and a cocked hat worn by Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington (Mr. A. E. Collins); the Flag flown by Admiral von Reuter in the "Emden," when in command of the interned German Fleet, scuttled at Scapa Flow on 21st June, 1919 (Admiral Sir Sydney Fremantle); the Royal Standard flown from the Royal Yacht "Victoria and Albert" (Admiralty); a Statuette of a Rifleman of the 44th Gurkha Light Infantry, the Decorations, Medals and Badges of the 44th Gurkha Light Infantry, and two medals awarded to dogs attached to the 1/8th Gurkhas (Mrs. Alban Wilson).

The most important item purchased for the Museum was a model of H.M.S. "Victory," considered to be one of the finest in existence, and now being partially re-rigged.

The Institution's model of the "Wappen von Hamburg," a Hanseatic ship of 1720, is being disposed of by sale to the Museum for Hamburg History.

The honorary services of the following Members have again been generously given to the Museum and Library and grateful acknowledgment is made on behalf of the Institution:—Lieut.-Colonel H. Wyllie, O.B.E., Captain H. T. A. Bosanquet, C.V.O., R.N., Captain W. A. Tinlin, Major A. N. Ingram, Captain C. C. P. Lawson, Commander H. P. Mead, R.N., and Captain Frank C. Bowen; also to Mr. T. Hitch.

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION BALANCE SHEET, 31st DECEMBER, 1950

1949		£ s. d.	£ s. d.
	ACCUMULATED FUND—		
	Excess of Assets over Liabilities as at 31st December, 1949	123,508 15 6	
	Add: Additions to Museum Exhibits during the year, per contra	1,700 0 0	
		125,208 15 6	
	Less: Withdrawals, per contra	737 15 6	
		124,471 0 0	
	Add: Appreciation of Investments since 31st December, 1949...	600 8 9	
		125,071 8 9	
	Add: Revenue Account—Surplus per annexed account	115 16 11	
123,509			125,187 5 8
213	MUSEUM EXHIBITS PURCHASE FUND... ...		16 11 4
4,656	LEASEHOLD REDEMPTION FUND		4,722 2 5
9,377	LIFE SUBSCRIPTION FUND		11,142 7 6
2,437	DISCRETIONARY FUND		2,384 7 4
1,783	DRUMMOND'S BRANCH—ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND		- - -
260	SUBSCRIPTIONS PAID IN ADVANCE		216 4 8
3,784	CREDITORS		2,410 8 6
£146,019			£146,079 7 5

JOHN A. LONGMORE, *Chairman, Finance Committee.*

P. S. M. WILKINSON, *Secretary.*

1949		£ s. d.	£ s. d.
23,102	LEASEHOLD BUILDING, Whitehall, S.W.1 ...		23,101 16 8
	FURNITURE, FIXTURES, FITTINGS, BOOKS, Maps, Charts, etc. (as valued for Insurance at 4th July, 1945, with subsequent additions at cost).		
	Furniture, Fixtures and Fittings as at 31st December, 1949	7,448 7 0	
	Books, Maps, Charts, etc., as at 31st December, 1949...	15,000 0 0	
22,448			22,448 7 0
	MUSEUM EXHIBITS, etc. (excluding Loan Collection) as valued for Insurance	60,221 18 1	
	Additions during the year	1,700 0 0	
		61,921 18 1	
	Deduct: Withdrawals during the year	737 15 6	
60,222			61,184 2 7
	Note: The Loan Collection is covered by Insurance for £9,758 9s. 0d.		
	LEASEHOLD REDEMPTION FUND—		
	Premiums paid to 31st December, 1949, on Insurance Policies for £23,100 expiring October, 1972 ...	4,655 18 10	
	Add: Premium paid during the year	66 3 7	
4,656			4,722 2 5
	LIFE SUBSCRIPTION FUND—		
	Investments at Market Prices, 31st December, 1950—		
	£2,877 4s. 1d. 3% Savings Bonds, 1965–75 ...	2,790 17 8	
	£2,004 12s. 3d. Met. Water Board 3% "B" Stock	1,794 2 2	
	£1,500 0s. 0d. 2½% Treasury Stock, 1975 ...	1,065 0 0	
	£1,029 7s. 11d. 3% Redemption Stock, 1986–96 ...	941 18 2	
	£1,032 1s. 1d. 3% British Transport Guaranteed Stock, 1978–88	944 6 6	
	£1,500 0s. 0d. 2½% Defence Bonds	1,500 0 0	
	Balance at Bankers	2,106 3 0	
9,377			11,142 7 6
	DISCRETIONARY FUND—		
	Investment at Market Price, 31st December, 1950—		
	£2,346 15s. 11d. 3% Savings Bonds, 1965–75 ...	2,276 8 0	
	Balance at Bankers	107 19 4	
2,218			2,384 7 4
	INVESTMENTS AT MARKET PRICES, 31st December, 1950—		
	£14,582 15s. 8d. 3% Funding Loan, 1959–69 ...	14,436 19 5	
	£500 0s. 0d. 2½% Defence Bonds	500 0 0	
	£2,500 0s. 0d. 3% Savings Bonds, 1960–70 ...	2,468 15 0	
	£2,000 0s. 0d. 3% Savings Bonds, 1965–75 ...	1,940 0 0	
	£505 8s. 8d. Met. Water Board 3% "B" Stock ...	452 7 6	
19,380			19,798 1 11
4,603	DEBTORS AND AMOUNTS PAID IN ADVANCE		930 12 0
13	BALANCE AT BANKERS AND CASH IN HAND		367 10 0
£146,019			£146,079 7 5

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

We have audited the above Balance Sheet dated 31st December, 1950, and have obtained all the information and explanations we have required. In our opinion such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the Institution's affairs according to the best of our information and the explanations given to us and as shown by the books of the Institution.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE,
BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
7th February, 1951.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

ONE HUNDRED-AND-TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY MEETING

REVENUE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER, 1950

DR.

1949		£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
4,143	To Salaries	4,534	7	1			
3,754	,, Wages and National Insurance	3,580	19	7			
32	,, Attendants' Clothing	90	10	3			
104	,, Pensions	98	10	0			
					8,302	6	11
448	,, Museum Repairs and Sundries				481	13	5
3,457	,, Journal Printing	3,583	17	2			
407	,, Journal Postage	411	2	8			
240	,, Literary Services	255	3	6			
102	,, Shorthand Notes	80	0	8			
					4,330	4	0
344	,, Library Purchases	331	17	10			
44	,, Periodicals and Newspapers	40	5	8			
					372	3	6
3	,, Advertising	3	6	0			
15	,, Lecture Expenses	–	–	–			
					3	6	0
580	,, Ground Rent	580	0	0			
102	,, Water Rate	97	0	7			
165	,, Insurance	160	6	10			
					837	7	5
209	,, Fuel	190	17	2			
448	,, Lighting	498	1	6			
*1,992	,, General Repairs and Maintenance	1,815	4	7			
					2,502	3	3
29	,, Restoration of Pictures	–	–	–			
204	,, House Expenses and Sundries	294	19	6			
					294	19	6
89	,, Audit Fee	89	5	0			
91	,, Architect's Fee	125	6	0			
150	,, Postages, Telegrams, etc.	181	18	4			
1,065	,, Printing, Stationery and Binding of Books	470	5	11			
61	,, Telephone	63	12	7			
1	,, Travelling Expenses	1	15	10			
					932	3	8
80	,, Contributions to Staff Pension Scheme				80	0	10
66	,, Leasehold Redemption Fund				66	3	7
120	,, R.U.S.I. Uniforms Fund—Donation				150	0	0
—	,, Balance being surplus for the year, carried to Accumulated Fund				115	16	11
£18,543					£18,468	9	0

* after transferring £980 from Maintenance Reserve Fund

CR.

1949		£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
5,791	By Members' Annual Subscriptions received	5,850	7	6			
	,, Income Tax recovered on Subscriptions under Deed						
3,746	of Covenant	3,609	12	3			
3	,, Voluntary extra Subscriptions	2	11	0			
	,, Life Subscriptions—						
1,848	Amount brought to credit	1,961	17	0			
					11,424	7	9
2,598	,, Admissions to Museum	2,527	4	0			
126	,, Sales of Catalogues and Pamphlets	181	9	10			
					2,708	13	10
1,745	,, Sales of Journal	2,180	2	11			
395	,, Advertisements in Journal	399	18	8			
					2,580	1	7
3	,, Profit on Repairing Regimental Colours, etc.	6	12	3			
181	,, Miscellaneous Receipts	136	4	8			
					142	16	11
629	,, Dividends and Interest Received (Gross)				637	8	11
975	,, Government Grants				975	0	0
503	,, Balance, being Excess of Expenditure over Income for the year, carried to Balance Sheet				–	–	–
£18,543					£18,468	9	0

CHESNEY MEMORIAL MEDAL FUND

31st December, 1950

	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1949:—		
Balance at Bankers	63 2 1	
Investment at Market Price	270 4 0	
		333 6 1
Dividends Received, Gross		8 8 0
Appreciation of Investment since 31st December, 1949		6 6 0
		£348 0 1

	s. d.	£ s. d.
Gold Medal, 1950		33 12 6
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1950:—		
Balance at Bankers	37 17 7	
Investment at Market Price:—		
£280 3% Savings Bonds 1960–70	276 10 0	
		314 7 7
		£348 0 1

We have audited the above Statement of the Chesney Memorial Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1950, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE,
BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
7th February, 1951.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors

TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE FUND

31st December, 1950

	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1949:—		
Balance at Bankers	143 12 8	
Investments at Market Prices...	1,912 12 9	
		2,056 5 5
Dividends Received, Gross		64 3 4
Income Tax recovered in respect of the year 1949–50		12 19 6
Appreciation of Investments since 31st December, 1949		40 14 3
		£2,174 2 6

	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
First Prize Essay	31 10 0	
Second Prize Essays	21 0 0	
		52 10 0
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1950:—		
Balance at Bankers	168 5 6	
Investments at Market Prices:—		
£1,922 10s. 3d. British Transport 3% Guaranteed Stock 1978–88	1,759 2 0	
£100 3½% War Stock	94 5 0	
£100 3% Defence Bonds	100 0 0	
		2,121 12 6
		£2,174 2 6

We have audited the above Statement of the Trench Gascoigne Prize Fund for the year ended 31st December 1950, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE,
BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
7th February, 1951.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

BRACKENBURY MEMORIAL FUND

31st December, 1950

	£ s. d.	£ s. d.		£ s. d.	£ s. d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1949 :—			Expenditure on Books, etc.		13 0 9
Balance at Bankers	9 13 5		**BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1950 :—**		
Investment at Market Price	387 7 4		Balance at Bankers	11 7 4	
		397 0 9	Investment at Market Price :—		
Dividends Received, Gross		14 14 8	£421 1s. 0d. 3½% War Stock	396 16 0	
Appreciation of Investment since 31st December, 1949		9 8 8			408 3 4
		£421 4 1			£421 4 1

We have audited the above Statement of the Brackenbury Memorial Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1950, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE,
BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
7th February, 1951.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
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EARDLEY-WILMOT MEDAL FUND

31st December, 1950

	£ s. d.	£ s. d.		£ s. d.	£ s. d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1949 :—			**BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1950 :—**		
Balance at Bankers	13 1 3		Balance at Bankers	17 5 3	
Investment at Market Price	135 2 0		Investment at Market Price :—		
		148 3 3	£140 3% Savings Bonds 1960–70	138 5 0	
Dividends Received, Gross		4 4 0			155 10 3
Appreciation of Investment since 31st December, 1949		3 3 0			
		£155 10 3			£155 10 3

We have audited the above Statement of the Eardley-Wilmot Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1950, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE,
BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
7th February, 1951.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

THE CHAIRMAN: The reason I am in the Chair this afternoon is that the Chairman, Admiral Sir Henry Moore, is in the United States, and the Vice-Chairman, Lord Ismay, could not possibly get here.

I am very glad to be able to report to you that Admiral Sir Henry Moore has been re-elected Chairman of the Council for a further year. He has been a most successful Chairman and we are very fortunate to have him for another year. Similarly, Lord Ismay has been re-elected and is taking on the Vice-Chairmanship again.

May I refer with regret to the death of Captain Edward Altham last October. Those who have the JOURNAL will have seen the personal tribute from the Chairman and also the Appreciation of his long service to the Institution. These tributes I know will have the very sincerest endorsement from all of us who have known Captain Altham and who have experienced the excellent work which he did. At this point may I say that it is very difficult for anybody to follow in his footsteps, and we are extremely fortunate in more ways than one to have on my right Colonel Wilkinson who will carry on the good work. I am sure we all wish him the best of success and hope that he will enjoy it as much as we enjoy his Secretaryship.

For some time past it has been the duty of the Chairman of this Meeting to record with regret that the Ceiling of the Banqueting Hall remained bare of its adornment. I am happy to say that this is no longer a routine statement. The magnificent panels painted by Rubens have now been replaced in their original setting. When the canvases, which are mounted on wood, were removed for safety in 1940, it was necessary to cut the large panels into sections, and even these could only be taken from the Hall through a window space. The very greatest credit is due to the Ministry of Works and the artists concerned for the skill with which the parts have been welded together and the panels restored to their original position.

The Institution building was redecorated during 1949, and your Council decided to have the Banqueting Hall similarly treated concurrently with the replacement of the Ceiling. This has been done to our full satisfaction under the supervision of the Ministry of Works; the cost, of course, being borne by the Institution. The scaffolding will be gone within the next day or so, but it will take some time to prepare the Hall for the display of exhibits, for which it is proposed to provide a new lighting system.

However, I think we can congratulate ourselves that by the end of April the Banqueting Hall will be in a condition to take its place again as one of the outstanding attractions of historic London.

I should like at this point, if I may, to thank those responsible for the administration of the Institution and the Museum, and particularly to mention the clerical staff for the outstanding work they have done in connection with the covenanted subscriptions. It is a difficult and tricky business, but of great benefit financially to the Institution. At the same time I desire to thank those members of the Institution who covenant to pay their subscriptions for seven years with the resultant financial benefit to the Institution.

We now come to the Annual Report, copies of which are in your hands.

FINANCE AND JOURNAL

As you will see in the Finance report, the sales of the JOURNAL for this year broke all records, and the very greatest credit is due to those responsible for its production. The Chairman of the Journal Committee is unavoidably absent, but Major-General Vyvyan, the Editor, is prepared to answer any questions. (*No questions were asked.*)

LIBRARY

Since September, the Library has been without the full-time services of a Librarian, but I think you will agree it has maintained its efficiency, which reflects much credit on the remaining staff. It is hoped that the new appointment will be announced shortly.

MUSEUM

The Chairman of the Museum Committee is, unfortunately, unable to be present, but Colonel Wilkinson is prepared to answer any questions which Members may desire to ask. (*No questions were asked.*)

That concludes the Annual Report for 1950, and I now move :—

"That the Report and Accounts, as circulated, be taken as read and adopted."

BRIGADIER J. A. LONGMORE : I have pleasure in seconding that. With regard to the covenanted subscriptions, I would just mention that they number 2,301 and are of the greatest help to the funds of this Institution.

The Resolution was then put to the Meeting and the Report and Accounts adopted.

ELECTION OF AUDITORS

THE CHAIRMAN : The next Resolution will be proposed by Lieut.-Colonel Currey.

LIEUT.-COLONEL R. G. CURREY : I beg to move :—

"That Messrs. Barton, Mayhew & Company be re-elected Auditors for the ensuing year."

COLONEL J. D. GRANT : I second that.

The Resolution was put to the Meeting and carried unanimously.

VACANCIES ON THE COUNCIL

The Chairman announced that the undermentioned Officers had been nominated as candidates for the vacancies on the Council :—

ROYAL NAVY (one vacancy)—
Admiral Sir Henry Moore, G.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.

REGULAR ARMY (one vacancy)—
Major-General L. O. Lyne, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

TERRITORIAL ARMY (one vacancy)—
Lieut.-Colonel R. D. Judd, D.S.O., M.C.

ROYAL AUXILIARY AIR FORCE AND ROYAL AIR FORCE VOLUNTEER RESERVE

(one vacancy)—

Air Commodore F. Crerar, C.B.E.

These officers were unanimously elected to the Council.

THE GOLD MEDAL AND TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1950

The Secretary reported that the total number of entries was 23, of which 5 came from the Royal Navy, 13 from the Army, and 5 from the Royal Air Force.

On the unanimous recommendation of the Referees, the Council awarded the Gold Medal of the Institution and the First Trench Gascoigne Prize of thirty guineas to Major W. G. F. Jackson, Royal Engineers, who also won the first prize last year.

Although no mention was made in the Rules governing the Competition, the Council decided to award a Second Trench Gascoigne Prize of ten guineas to Commander R. C. P. Wainwright, Royal Navy.

The Chairman presented the Medal and prizes to these Officers amidst applause.

VOTE OF THANKS TO THE CHAIRMAN

REAR-ADMIRAL W. W. DAVIS: I have much pleasure in proposing:—

"That the thanks of the Meeting be accorded to the Chairman."

This was seconded by General Sir Gerald Templer and carried by acclamation. The Meeting then terminated.

McCorquodale, London, S.E.

FOR ALL CONDITIONS



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